融资渠道的选择课件

Chapter 8An Economic Analysis of Financial StructureTake-home MessagesFinancial Structure,不同融资渠道的统计特征关于不同融资渠道的特征：EightBasicFacts/PatternWhat affect the structure，不同渠道存在的原因Theory1,TransactionCosts重点讨论Theory2,AdverseSelectionindebtmarket：Lemonsproblem重点讨论Theory3,MoralHazardinequitymarket：Principal-AgentProblem:重点讨论andtoobigtofailindebtmarket：本章的主要内容本章的主要内容 以一个汽车贷款案例串联以上问题提出各种方案，问题，找出对策思考思考题：汽：汽车贷款案例款案例你的祖母过世了，留给你10000美元遗产。当你收到支票的时候，你最好的朋友陪你去银行，并计划把这笔钱存人银行。在银行里，你的朋友提醒你这家银行的存款利率为3%，而其购车贷款的利率为9%。你的朋友建议：“你为何不站在购车贷款办事处的门口，自己直接向来一个来申请购车贷款的客户放贷？这样你可以获得比存款3%的利率更高的利息收入，并且排除中间人。”1请解释你如果发放这笔贷款很难获得收益的原因。2请解释由银行发放这笔贷款能够获得收益的原因。视角一：角一：间接金融接金融vs间接金融接金融如果选择间接金融即银行问题：利率低，回报低解决方法：用直接金融，example：招财宝如果选择直接金融，个人贷款给个人问题：交易成本之一，合同制定和执行成本很高。解决方法：银行通过规模效应，与专业分工，降低成本视角二：如果角二：如果选择债券合同券合同-逆向逆向选择问题问题：逆向选择信用差的才来借款解决方法：1.Privateproductionandsaleofinformation信用调查，央行信用，芝麻信用，2.Governmentregulationtoincreaseinformation温州私人借款，在政府部门登记3.Collateralandnetworth拿你们家牛和犁抵押，找有信用的人大户担保4.Financialintermediation经过银行借贷视角三：如果角三：如果选择债券合同券合同-道德道德风险问题问题：道德风险合同签订后，借款人投资高风险解决方法1.Networthandcollateral拿你们家牛和犁抵押，找有信用的大户做中保2.MonitoringandEnforcementofRestrictiveCovenants合同条款包含Incentivecompatible:Discourageundesirablebehavior,EncouragedesirablebehaviorKeepcollateralvaluable,MarginrequirementProvideinformation3.Financialintermediation经过银行借贷视角三：如果角三：如果选择股股权合同合同还是是债券合同券合同如果选择债券合同内容如上问题：如上述解决方法：如上述，新的方法：股权激励如果选择直接金融，股权激励问题：股权合同的道德风险解决方法：见下文视角四：如果角四：如果选择股股权合同合同-道德道德风险问题：委托代理问题我出钱你打工解决方法：1.Monitoring(CostlyStateVerification)手机定位签到。Free-riderproblemamongstockholders2.GovernmentregulationtoincreaseinformationLaws:standardaccountingprinciples;imposestiffcriminalpenalties3.FinancialIntermediationventurecapitalfirm:holdseveralpositionsinthemanagingbodyofthefirm4.DebtContracts1.如果向律师支付佣金制定一份贷款合同仅仅使用一次的话，那么这一交易成本就过于高昂。如果你将所有资金都借给一个人，那么就像把所有鸡蛋都放在一个篮子里那样承担了较高的风险，实现风险分担。最后，你几乎无法获得避免信息不对称所产生问题的方法。在高风险水平的借款者筹借资金的时候，会产生逆向选择。而那些将贷款资金用于赌博而非（原计划的）的车的行为，将会导致道德风险。2由于商业银行具有多笔同类贷款，所以它们向律师支付一次佣金，制定出一份可以重复使同的合同（规模效应）。商业银行发放收益率并非总是同向变动的多样化贷款，通过这种方式从总体上降低这些贷款的风险水平。商业银行掌握了监督和控制借款者的方法，以此降低逆向选择和道德风险的危害（专业分工）。Warning本章的Pattern与theory脱节Pattern部分讨论：企业不同渠道的融资哪个多，哪个少的问题。但是理论部分却讨论，为什么选这种渠道，不选择那种渠道Financial Structure金融合同的常见形式：股权与债券金融交易链条的长短：直接与间接 股权，债券，直接，间接都有存在价值都出现问题都有解决方案此消彼长的原因本书没有讨论量变的原因，而是关注存在价值。在于成本和收益的平衡 股股权vs债权股权为什么需要股权合同，视频：HowtheStockMarketWorks(9:12)股权的问题解决方法债权为什么需要债权合同债权合同的问题解决方法直接金融直接金融vs间接金融接金融直接债权Why需要直接金融，视频的截图直接金融的问题解决方法间接债权（债权的金融中介：银行）为什么需要间接债权。也即为什么需要银行。间接债务的问题：余额宝的兴起与银行衰弱解决方法Basic Facts about Financial Structure Throughout the WorldThischapterprovidesaneconomicanalysisofhowourfinancialstructureisdesignedtopromoteeconomicefficiencyThebarchartinFigure1showshowAmericanbusinessesfinancedtheiractivitiesusingexternalfunds(thoseobtainedfromoutsidethebusinessitself)intheperiod19702000andcomparesU.S.datatothoseofGermany,Japan,andCanadaFigure 1 Sources of External Funds for Nonfinancial Businesses:A Comparison of the United States with Germany,Japan,and CanadaSource:Andreas Hackethal and Reinhard H.Schmidt,“Financing Patterns:Measurement Concepts and Empirical Results,”Johann WolfgangGoethe-UniversitatWorkingPaperNo.125,January2004.Thedataarefrom19702000andaregrossflowsaspercentageofthetotal,notincludingtradeandothercreditdata,whicharenotavailable.Sources of External Funds for Nonfinancial Businesses:AComparison杨玉琳杨玉琳 林明英林明英 奚雅芝奚雅芝 付佩雯付佩雯 直接融资间接融资stockbondloanSources of External Funds for Nonfinancial Businesses:AComparisonFact2：marketable debt and equity securities is not the primary wayFact1：StocksarenotthemostimportantsourcesSources of External Funds for Nonfinancial Businesses:AComparisonFact3：Indirect finance is many times more important than direct finance Fact4：Financial intermediaries,particularly banks,are the most important source直接融资的发展趋势Eight Basic Facts1.StocksarenotthemostimportantsourcesofexternalfinancingforbusinessesReally？Why？2.IssuingmarketabledebtandequitysecuritiesisnottheprimarywayinwhichbusinessesfinancetheiroperationsWhy？3.IndirectfinanceismanytimesmoreimportantthandirectfinanceWhy？Whatisadvantageofindirectfinance?Whatisadvantageofdirectfinance?4.Financialintermediaries,particularlybanks,arethemostimportantsourceofexternalfundsusedtofinancebusinesses.Arethesetrueinchina?Eight Basic Facts(5-8)5.Thefinancialsystemisamongthemostheavilyregulatedsectorsoftheeconomy6.Onlylarge,well-establishedcorporationshaveeasyaccesstosecuritiesmarketstofinancetheiractivitiesTherulesischangingastimegoesby.Howaboutcrowd-funding?Kickstarteristheworldslargestfundingplatformforcreativeprojects.雷锋网。7.Collateralisaprevalentfeatureofdebtcontractsforbothhouseholdsandbusinesses.Why?Anyexamples?Thinkaboutthestoryofruralloansinrepublicofchina.Isthistrueinchina.8.DebtcontractsareextremelycomplicatedlegaldocumentsthatplacesubstantialrestrictivecovenantsonborrowersTheory 1,Transaction costWhyFinancialintermediaries?Transactioncost：EconomiesofscaleandExpertiseTransaction CostsWhytransactioncostsiscauseproblems?(1)Thresholdofinvestment:largecommissiononsmalltrade.(2)restrictedchannelofinvestment,youhavetoputallyoureggsinonebasket.FinancialintermediarieshaveevolvedtoreducetransactioncostsEconomiesofscaleExamples?Bundlesmallinvestorsfundstogether.Mutualfunds.(1)Overcomethresholdproblem;(2)diversification.Expertisetheexpertiseincomputer/internettechnologyreducethecost（supplyside）Case:AlibabasYuEBao（余额宝）Hits2.5MUsers,$1BillionAlreadyDeposited;Yongjinbao（国金证券“佣金宝”）Theory 2,Adverse selection原理：lemonprobleminsecondhandcarmarket股权：PE债权：lemonprobleminLoanmarketForinstance,ifyouofferanaverageinterestrateforyourloans,thepeoplewhoarebetterriskswillgoelsewherefortheirmoney,whiletheriskypeoplewillgladlytakeyourmoney.Asymmetric Information:Adverse Selection and Moral HazardAdverseselectionoccursbeforethetransactionMoralhazardarisesafterthetransactionAgencytheoryanalyseshowasymmetricinformationproblemsaffecteconomicbehaviorThe Lemons Problem:How Adverse Selection Influences Financial StructureIfqualitycannotbeassessed,thebuyeriswillingtopayatmostapricethatreflectstheaveragequalitySellersofgoodqualityitemswillnotwanttosellatthepriceforaveragequalityThebuyerwilldecidenottobuyatallbecauseallthatisleftinthemarketispoorqualityitemsThisproblemexplainsfact2andpartiallyexplainsfact1Cases：theused-carmarket.Akelof(1970).Stockandbondmarkets.Discuss:Whytherearestillpeachintheused-bysiclemarket?Adverse Selection：lemons problemWhatislemonsproblem?Howtodealwithit?Video:TheLemonProblem(2:46)https:/ problem in financeGoodBadGovernment regulation to increase informationPrivate production and sale of informationFinancial intermediationCollateral and net worthTools to Help Solve Adverse Selection ProblemsPrivateproductionandsaleofinformationthatdistinguishesgoodfrombadfirmsandthensellit(征信公司)Free-riderproblem(与盗版有何区别)Howaboutpublicgoods.GovernmentregulationtoincreaseinformationNotalwaysworkstosolvetheadverseselectionproblem,explainsFact5.Case:Cheatwithnopunishmentinchinasstockmarket.Specialtreatmentstock,ST*forshort.Isitlemonmarket?FinancialintermediationExplainsfacts3,4,&6.Peachorlemon?Intheused-carmarket，used-cardealers?Inthefinancialmarket,bank?CollateralandnetworthExplainsfact7.Collateralv.s.information?Equitycapitalascollaterral.republicofchinaruralloan.EightBasicFacts(contd)Theory 3,Moral hazard原理：PrincipalAgentproblem股权：MoralHazardinEquityContracts:（1）PeoplewhoinvestedinAIG，thoughtthattheirmoneywasrelativelysafe(2)However,AIGwasalsosellingCDSandMBSsthatstartedtodefaultinlargenumbersin2008（3）AIGis too big to fail债权：MoralHazardinDebtContractsMoral hazardMoralhazard的特点（成本）。Video:MoralHazard（1:21）Video：Tobigtofail:CEORichardFuldgot$483,800,000toBankruptLeheman.Isthisfair?（6:41）Video:IntroductiontoMoralHazard(4:09)Video:SolutionstoMoralHazard(5:55)Video:SolutionstoMoralHazard:Signaling(6:45)How Moral Hazard Affects the Choice Between Debt and Equity ContractsCalledthePrincipal-AgentProblemPrincipal:lessinformation(stockholder)Agent:moreinformation(manager)Theoryormath,.SeparationofownershipandcontrolofthefirmManagerspursuepersonalbenefitsandpowerratherthantheprofitabilityofthefirmHow to solve the principal-Agent ProblemVideo：BusySecretary-ThePrincipal-AgentProblem(4:17)Tools to Help Solve the Principal-Agent ProblemMonitoring(CostlyStateVerification)Free-riderproblemamongstockholdersFact1GovernmentregulationtoincreaseinformationFact5(Laws:standardaccountingprinciples;imposestiffcriminalpenalties)FinancialIntermediationFact3(venturecapitalfirm:holdseveralpositionsinthemanagingbodyofthefirmDebtContractsFact1:fixedpaymentinsteadofflexiblereturn;Mechanismdesign:incentive-compatible,truth-tellingcondition,participationconditionEightBasicFactsHow Moral Hazard Influences Financial Structure in Debt MarketsBorrowershaveincentivestotakeonprojectsthatareriskierthanthelenderswouldlike.Thispreventstheborrowerfrompayingbacktheloan.Tools to Help Solve Moral Hazard in Debt ContractsNetworthandcollateralLowerthecollateral,greaterthemoralhazardproblemIncentivecompatibleMonitoringandEnforcementofRestrictiveCovenantsDiscourageundesirablebehaviorEncouragedesirablebehaviorKeepcollateralvaluableProvideinformationCovenantMonitoringandEnforcementareoftencostlyFinancialIntermediationFacts3&4：Bank：privateloansavoidingfree-rideproblem.insurancecompany:?Summary Table 1 Asymmetric Information Problems and Tools to Solve ThemAsymmetric Information in Transition and Developing Countries“Financialrepression”createdbyaninstitutionalenvironmentcharacterizedby:Poorsystemofpropertyrights(unabletousecollateralefficiently)Poorlegalsystem(difficultforlenderstoenforcerestrictivecovenants)Weakaccountingstandards(lessaccesstogoodinformation)Governmentinterventionthroughdirectedcreditprogramsandstateownedbanks(lessincentivetoproperchannelfundstoitsmostproductiveuse).BreachofcontractApplication:Financial Developmentand Economic GrowthThefinancialsystemsindevelopingandtransitioncountriesfaceseveraldifficultiesthatkeepthemfromoperatingefficientlyInmanydevelopingcountries,thesystemofpropertyrights(theruleoflaw,constraintsongovernmentexpropriation,absenceofcorruption)functionspoorly,makingithardtousethesetwotoolseffectively中国是反例吗？Inchinaacounterexampletotheimportanceoffinancialdevelopment?Howhaschinabeenabletosorapidly,givenitslowleveloffinancialdevelopment?Chinaisinanearlystateofdevelopment.Aschinagetricher,howeverthisstrategyisunlikelytocontinue.LookatthecaseofSovietUnion.