外文翻译---企业社会责任股权结构和政治干预：来自中国的证据

中文4490字本科毕业论文（设计）外 文 翻 译外文题目 Corporate Social Responsibility, OwnershipStructure, and Political Interference: Evidence from China 外文出处 Journal of Business Ethics 2010（96）：P631-645 外文作者 Wenjing Li Ran Zhang 原文：Corporate Social Responsibility, Ownership Structure, and Political Interference: Evidence from ChinaIntroduction In recent years, there has been growing awareness of the role of corporations in society in an international setting. Among the unresolved issues that deserve attention, Aguilera et al. (2007, p. 837) postulate that an important question in corporate social responsibility (CSR) requiring further attention is what catalyzes organizations to engage in increasingly robust CSR initiatives. Prior research studies (Chapple and Moon, 2005; Deniz-Deniz and Garcia-Falcon, 2002; Graves and Waddock, 1994; Johnson and Greening, 1999; Muller and Kolk, 2010; Roberts, 1992; Stanwick and Stanwick, 1998; Zu and Song, 2009) document a link among CSR and rm size, protability, corporate governance, leverage, employees, industry, and environmental pressures, e.g., shareholder demands, regulation, or media pressure. Among those studies, Graves and Waddock (1994) and Johnson and Greening (1999) document a relationship between rm ownership structure and CSR. Keim (1978), Ullmann (1985), and Roberts (1992) all document a positive relationship between dispersed corporate ownership and CSR disclosure in the context of developed countries. Given the difference in peoples ethical reasoning and decisions between developed and emerging countries (Ge and Thomas, 2007; Lam and Shi, 2008; Whitcomb et al., 1998), does ownership structure also affect CSR in emerging markets such as China? Do the factors that have been previously documented to drive CSR in Anglo-American countries (the USA and the UK) also determine CSR in emerging markets? In order to answer those questions, our study focuses on examining how a rms ownership structure and political interference affect CSR in the largest emerging market, namely, China. Using Shanghai National Accounting Institutes (SNAI) Chinese rms social responsibility ranking, we show that for non-state-owned rms, corporate ownership dispersion is positively associated to CSR. However, for state-owned rms, this relation is reversed. We attribute the reversed relationship to political interferences and further test this hypothesis by demonstrating that regional economic development is negatively related to CSR for state-owned rms due to decreased political interference in more developed areas. The results also reveal that rms size, protability, employee power, leverage, and growth opportunity affect CSRs in China.This study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, this study directly examined the relationship between ownership structure and CSR in emerging markets, and our results depict that it is important to consider ownership type in assessing CSR in emerging market where state ownership is still prevalent, such as in China. Second, the high extent of retained government ownership in China allows us to investigate the link between CSR and ownership type using a unique data set provided by SNAI Chinese rms social responsibility ranking. Our ndings on the relationship between rm ownership type and CSR have implications in other countries where state-ownership is still prevalent, such as Singapore, Malaysia, Austria, and Finland (Claessens et al., 2000; Faccio and Lang, 2002). Third, we provide evidence of associations between CSR and rms size, protability, corporate governance, environmental pressures, and leverage. These ndings are consistent with those of prior research, which are mostly documented in the developed-country context, suggesting that CSR activities are largely driven by strategic motivations and are constricted by economic considerations. Finally, while the issue of CSR has attracted growing research interest in recent years, most empirical results are based on the US data and this article is the rst empirical CSR research examining drivers of CSR in emerging markets to use a large research sample. In both Amato and Amato (2007) and Muller and Whiteman (2009), the corresponding authors advocate non-US-based studies of CSR to examine the effect of cultural, economic, legal, and ethical differences in corporate social performance. This article adds to a growing number of non-US studies by investigating the link between rms characteristics and CSR in China, the largest emerging market in the world. The remainder of this study is organized as follows: The next section shows the relevant literature and identies our research questions. The third section provides an institutional background and develops hypotheses. The fourth section discusses data gathering and methodology. The fth section presents results, and the last section concludes, suggesting implications of the study. Literature reviewPrior research on CSR mainly focuses on conceptualizing as well as empirically assessing its impact on business performance. A number of studies have been conducted in an attempt to link CSR with nancial performance (i.e., Abratt and Sacks, 1988; Aupperle et al., 1985; Russo and Fouts, 1997; Waddock and Graves, 1997). In addition to corporate performance, recent studies also examined the impact of CSR on other stakeholders of the companies. For example, Mohr et al. (2001) observe the impact of CSR on the customer buying behavior, while Turban and Greening (1997) examine the impact of CSR on the organizational attractiveness to employees. Compared with the growing body of literature on the nature and consequences of CSR, however, the issue of how to improve the companies level of CSR, or what factors determine CSR level, has received relatively limited attention, especially in the emerging market setting. Jones (1999) establishes that an institutional framework for the determinants of CSR, suggesting that institutional structure, such as sociocultural, national economy, industry, rm, and individual, mainly determines CSR. Following the logic of Jones (1999), a numbers of studies document several factors affecting the level of CSR based on the context of developed countries. For example, Stanwick and Stanwick (1998) nd evidence of a positive relationship between corporate social performance (CSP) and organization size, nancial performance, and environmental performance. Johnson and Greening (1999) examine the effects of corporate governance and institutional ownership type on CSP, which indicates that ownership structure is correlated to CSP. Although several studies have shed light on the determinants of CSR in developed countries, research on this area is still quite limited in developing countries. Only a few recent articles have addressed this area, and none of them examines the ownership structureCSR relationship directly in developing countries. Analyzing website reporting of 50 companies in seven Asian countries, Chapple and Moon (2005) conclude that variation of CSR is explained by factors in the respective national business systems. Muller and Kolk (2010), using survey data from 121 auto parts suppliers in Mexico, nd that managements commitment to ethics is a dominant driver of CSP, and managements commitment to ethics interacts positively with trade-related pressures to raise CSP levels. Based on a survey method and a small sample, Zu and Song (2009) document that rms smaller in size, state-owned, producing traditional goods, and located in poorer regions are more likely to have managers who opt for a higher CSR rating in China.The studies related with emerging markets may be inconclusive given the small sample size. Considering the validity and reliability of the conclusion, the multivariate analysis of a large sample may describe a clear picture of determinants of CSR in emerging markets. According to the argument of Jones (1999) and the general framework for environmental constraint drivers of CSR provided by See (2009), the previous studies only examine one or several aspects of the driving factors of CSR, and are with high chances of missing important control variables affecting levels of CSR. Therefore, the multivariate regression in our study perceives the inclusion of a comprehensive set of control variables from not only existing evidences in prior studies, but also theoretical analysis on the determinants of CSR (Jones, 1999; See, 2009). Using the sample of manufacturing rms in China, we extend the existing research by examining the effect of ownership structure and economic development, as well as political interference, on the level of CSR according to the theoretical framework on harmonious society and Chinese CSR (See, 2009) after controlling for a variety of variables which have been documented as inuencing factors of CSR.Background and hypotheses developmentInstitutional background Chinese public listed companies (PLCs) differ from their counterparts in other countries in the relatively large government stake and the associated, generally more concentrated, shareholding structure (Tian and Estrin, 2008).Table1 compares the percentage of rms with the state as ultimate controller in China versus other countries. Consistent with prior research (Bennett et al., 2005), we observe that the government as owner plays a role in Chinese listed rms quite out of line with that observed in other markets or transition economies. In 1481 Chinese public listed companies with available nancial and ownership data, 63.15% have the state as ultimate controller, comparing with the highest 23.50% in Singapore and the lowest 0.08% in the U.S., amongst all other countries. The very high extent of retained government ownership of Chinese listed rms suggests that political interference becomes an important institutional characteristic of Chinas capital market which offers us a great opportunity to investigate the relationship between rm ownership type, ownership structure, and CSR. Compared with western companies, Chinese enterprises face more severe agency problems that arise between controlling and non-controlling shareholders (Type II agency problem) because of controlling shareholders signicant stock ownership and control over the rms board of directors (Jiang et al., 2010; Johnson et al., 2000). Shleifer and Vishny (1997) point out, large investors may represent their own interests, which need not coincide with the interests of other investors in the rm, or with the interests of employees and managers. In order to exploit their own interests, controlling shareholders have clear incentives to divert corporate wealth by tunneling through inter-corporate loans (Jiang et al., 2010). Type II agency problem diverts corporate wealth from related rms, and it has a negative effect on corporate business behavior, especially performance. The literature also documents such empirical evidences. Some economists usually view that political interference, the type II agency problem for state-owned enterprises (SOEs), is usually at the expense of corporate protability (Boycko et al., 1996). Frye and Shleifer (1997) show that private ownership is preferable to state ownership because the government has a grabbing hand that extorts rms for the benet of politicians and bureaucrats. Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) provide cross-country evidence that countries with weaker property rights and limited protection against expropriation by politicians and the countrys elite have substantially lower income per capita and investment rates, and less-developed stock markets. Similar conclusions are drawn in China. Fan et al. (2007) document that the accounting and stock return performance of the rms run by politically connected CEOs is poor relative to their politically unconnected counterparts. Dougherty and McGuckin (2008) propose that decentralized administration has been a key factor in determining business productivity in China. In general, government intervention is shown to be detrimental to corporate performance as a result of diverting corporate wealth for political purposes.Hypotheses development Previous literature indirectly supports the argument that when rms ownership gets more dispersed, the CSR level gets higher (Keim, 1978; Ullmann, 1985). Keim (1978) stated that as the distribution of ownership of a corporation becomes less concentrated, the demands placed on the corporation by share owners become broader. Dispersed corporate ownership, especially by investors concerned with corporate social activities (e.g., social responsibility mutual funds, church, and civic pension plans, and ethical investors), heightens pressure for management to disclose social responsibility activities (Ullmann, 1985). Some studies show CSP is positively related to the number of institutions holding the shares of a company (Graves and Waddock, 1994) and pension fund equity (Johnson and Greening, 1999).Consistent with the western counterparts, the shareholders of Chinese non-state-owned rms should have the same relationship between ownership dispersion and CSR. According to the theory of type II agency problem, the largest shareholder of non-state-owned rms expropriates minority shareholders to achieve its own interest, which impairs other stakeholders interest and declines CSR. Therefore, well-protected minority shareholders are associated with higher levels of CSR engagement (Johnson and Greening, 1999; See, 2009). Corporate ownership dispersion lessens the extent of type II agency problem. The less the ownership dispersion, the more the control of largest shareholder over company to divert corporate wealth. Taken together, corporate ownership dispersion is negatively related to levels of CSR for Chinese non-state-owned rms.With much higher impact of political interference on company behaviors, we expect the relationship between ownership dispersion and CSR to be negative for state-owned rms. Higher levels of perceived governmental inuence on corporate activity would be expected to lead to a greater effort by management to meet expectations of government. The government, largest shareholder of SOEs, has incentives to divert wealth to obtain social stability (Bai et al., 2006), which helps to improve CSR. High levels of government ownership create incentives for CEOs to achieve non-nancial objectives related to government policy,such as infrastructure development and resolution of the regions scal and unemployment challenges, and hence, these social or political objectives exert pressure on rms to pursue CSR (See, 2009). Roberts (1992) documents that political interference positively impact social responsibility disclosures. In the example provided by Tian and Estrin (2008), the Sinopec Shanghai Petrochemical Company Limited, which has the government as majority shareholder, employed 38,000 people for its core operation in 1998. When it tried to lay off 17,000 employees, its government shareholder prevented it, instead forcing it to nd alternative employment. Although this kind of behavior may harm corporate wealth, it satises the government shareholders political interests and committed a high level of CSR. Accordingly, we propose our rst hypothesis as follows: H1a: For SOEs, as the state is the largest shareholder, the corporate ownership dispersion is positively related to the level of CSR. H1b: For non-state-owned rms, corporate ownership dispersion is negatively related to the level of CSR.Source:Wenjing Li，Ran Zhang.Corporate Social Responsibility，Ownership Structure，and Political Interference：Evidence from China J .Journal of Business Ethics.2010（96）：P631-645.译文：企业社会责任，股权结构和政治干预：来自中国的证据引言近年来在国际环境中，企业在社会中所扮演的角色得到了人们越来越多的认知。在各种值得关注的悬而未决的问题中，阿奎莱拉等（2007，第837页）认为在企业社会责任（CSR）方面的一个问题“是什么促进了各组织参与企业社会责任研究的积极性的日益增长”最值得关注。此前的调查研究（查普尔和穆恩，2005年；丹尼斯-丹尼斯和加西亚-法尔肯，2002;；格拉芙和伍德科，1994；约翰逊和格林，1999；穆勒和科尔克，2010；罗伯茨，1992年；斯坦威克和斯坦威克，1998年；祖和宋，2009）证明了企业社会责任和公司规模、盈利能力、公司治理、影响力、员工和环境压力如股东的要求、法规或舆论压力之间的一种关系。在这些研究中，格拉芙和伍德科（1994）以及约翰逊和格林（1999）证明了公司所有制结构和企业社会责任之间的一种关系。凯姆（1978），乌尔曼（1985），和罗伯茨（1992）都证明了在发达国家中企业所有权分散和企业社会责任信息披露方面的一种积极关系。考虑到在发达国家和新兴国家之间人们基于道德的推论和决定不同，（葛和托马斯，2007；林和石，2008；惠特科姆等，1998），在新兴国家如中国的所有制结构是否也会影响企业社会责任？之前已经证明的在英美国家（英国和美国）推动企业社会责任的因素是否也决定了企业社会责任在新兴市场的发展？为了解答这些问题，我们的研究焦点主要是在一个公司的所有制结构和政治干预是如何在中国这个最大的新兴市场上影响企业社会责任的。通过上海国家会计学院的中国企业社会责任排行，我们可以发现对于非国有企业，企业所有制分散和企业社会责任呈正相关。但是，对于国有企业，这种关系是相反的。我们把这种相反的关系归因于政治的干预并通过演示由于国有企业在发达地区较少的政治干预而导致区域经济发展和企业社会责任的负相关来进一步证明这种假说。调查结果还显示，在中国，公司的规模、盈利能力、员工能力、影响力和成长机会对企业社会责任的影响。这项研究对本文的贡献表现在以下几方面。首先，这项研究直接检验了所有制关系和企业社会责任在新兴市场的关系，我们的结果显示在如中国这种国有制仍然普遍存在的新兴市场中，评估企业社会责任时考虑所有制的形式是很重要的。第二，中国大范围的保留国有制使我们在调查企业社会责任和所有制类型时可以使用由上海国家会计学院提供的中国企业社会责任排名这项独特数据。我们在企业所有制类型和企业社会责任的关系方面的发现可以推及到一些国有制仍然普遍存在的国家，如新加坡，马来西亚，澳大利亚和芬兰（克莱森等，2000；发科尔和郎，2002）。第三，我们可以为企业社会责任和企业的规模、盈利能力，公司治理，环境压力和影响力之间的关系提供证据。这些发现和之前在大部分发达国家发现的企业社会责任活动主要受到战略动因和经济因素的影响的研究是一致的。最后，虽然近年来企业社会责任已经引起了人们越来越大的研究兴趣，但大多数实证结果是根据美国的数据得出的，本文是第一个在对企业社会责任进行实证研究时大量使用新兴市场的企业社会责任样本。阿玛托和阿玛托（2007），穆勒以及怀特曼（2009）等作者都提倡用非美国的企业社会责任研究去验证在文化，经济，规模和道德不同时企业的社会表现所受到的影响。本文通过在世界上最大的新兴市场中国的对企业特征和企业社会责任的关系的研究增加了大量的非美国的研究。本研究的其余部分结构如下：下一节介绍相关文献以及我们的研究问题。第三节提供了一个体制背景和发展假说。第四节讨论数据收集和研究方法。第五节介绍研究成果，最后一节是总结以及说明研究的意义。文献综述在此之前对企业社会责任的研究主要集中于概念化以及经验评估它对企业绩效的影响。许多研究已经试图分析企业社会责任和财务绩效之间的联系（如阿伯特和萨克斯，1998；奥普勒等，1995；罗索和福茨，1997；伍德科和格拉芙，1997）。除了企业绩效，最近的研究还调查了企业社会责任对公司其它利益相关者的影响。例如，摩尔等（2001）观察了企业社会责任对客户购买行为的影响，特伯恩和格林（1997）调查了企业社会责任对企业对员工吸引力的影响。然而相较于越来越多的文献对企业社会责任的性质和后果的研究，如何提高企业的企业社会责任水平或者企业社会责任水平由什么因素决定等问题的研究尤其实在新兴市场环境下的研究获得的关注相当有限。琼斯（1999）设立了一个体制框架作为企业社会责任的决定因素，表明如社会文化，国家经济，产业，企业，个体等的体制结构主要决定了企业社会责任的水平。继琼斯（1999）的逻辑后，数个在以发达国家为基础的研究又证明了对企业社会责任水平有影响的几个因素。例如，斯坦威克和斯坦威克（1998）发现了企业社会绩效（CSP）和组织规模，财务表现以及环境绩效之间的有一种积极关系的证据。约翰逊和格林（1999）验证了公司治理和所有制类型对企业社会绩效的影响，这表明所有制结构与企业社会责任之间是有联系的。虽然一些研究揭示了发达国家中企业社会责任的决定因素，但在发展中国家这方面的研究还是相当有限的。只有最近少数几篇文章涉及到了这个领域，然而其中任何一个都没有验证在发展中国家中所有制结构和企业社会责任之间的关系。通过对网站报告的七个亚洲国家的50个企业的分析，查普和穆尔（2005）推断企业社会责任的差异是由各个国家的商业系统因素造成的。穆勒和科尔克（2010）利用121个墨西哥汽车零部件供应商的调查数据，研究发现管理层的道德承诺是企业社会责任的主导动力，管理层道德承诺和与贸易相关的压力的积极互动提升了企业社会责任的水平。根据一项调查方法和小样本，祖和宋（2009）证明，在中国，企业规模较小，国有的，生产传统商品以及在贫困地区的企业的管理人更可能选择高标准的企业社会责任等级。小样本的规模可能不能证明与新兴市场相关的研究。考虑到结论的有效性和可靠性，一个大样本的多变量分析可能更能描述企业社会责任的决定因素在新兴市场的清晰画面。根据琼斯（1999）的论据和瑟（2009）提供的环境对企业社会责任动力的约束的总体框架，以往的研究只验证了企业社会责任的一个或几个方面的驱动因素，并很有可能遗漏了可以影响企业社会责任水平的重要控制参数。因此，在我们研究的多元回归中应认识到包含的一整套控制变量不仅存在于之前研究的证据中，也存在于对企业社会责任的决定因素的理论分析（琼斯，1999；瑟，2009）。以中国的制造业公司为样本，我们通过验证所有制结构和经济发展以及政治干预对根据和谐社会的理论框架以及在控制多种企业社会责任影响因素的变量后的中国的企业社会责任（瑟，2009）的企业社会责任水平的影响来扩展了研究。背景和假设发展体制背景中国上市公司（PLCs）不同于其它国家，政府占有了比较大的股份，关联的股权结构比较集中（田和埃斯特林，2008）。表1比较了中国和其它国家的企业的国家控股比率。与以前的研究一致（班尼特等，2005），我们注意到政府作为所有者在中国上市公司中扮演的角色与在其它市场和转型经济中的相当不一致。在1481家中国上市公司提供的资金和所有权的数据中，63.15%是国家作为最终控股人，相对于在其它所有国家来说的新加坡最高的23.50%和美国最低的0.08%。中国上市公司中如此之高的政府所有程度说明了对于为我们研究企业所有制类型，所有制结构和企业社会责任之间的关系提供了很好机会的中国的资本市场来说，政治干预成为了一个非常重要的体制特征。与西方公司相比，中国企业在由于控股股东的重大股权在公司董事会的重大控制权而引发的在控股和非控股股东之间的代理问题（第二类代理问题）更加严峻（江等，2010；约翰逊等，2000）。歇尔夫和维什尼（1997）指出，“大型投资者在与公司其它投资者的利益或者员工和管理员的利益不相一致时，往往会选择代表自己的利益。”为了获取个人利益，控股股东有名曲的诱因去通过跨企业贷款的渠道去转移集体财产。（江等，2010）。第二类代理问题从相关企业转移了集体财产，而且它会对企业的经营行为尤其是经营绩效产生一个负面的影响。文献还记载了这样的实证证据。一些经济学家通常认为政治干预，即国有企业（SOEs）的第二类代理问题，通常是以企业的盈利能力为代价的（保科等，1996）。弗莱和歇尔夫（1997）表明私有制比国有制更好，因为政府往往会为了政客和官僚主义者的利益运用用强制手段对企业进行索求。阿西莫戈鲁和约翰逊（2005）提供的跨国家的证据表明，财产权比较弱以及对政客和国家精英分子的征用的保护的有限限制大大降低了人均收入和投资率，减慢了股票市场发展。在中国也有类似的例子。范等（2007）证明有政治联系的首席执行官经营的企业的会计和股票回报的表现比那些无政治联系的同行差。杜尔迪和麦高酷奇（2008）提出在中国分级管理是决定企业生产力的关键因素。总之，政府干预作为政治目的下集体财产转移的结果，是被证明不利于达到公司业绩的。假说的发展之前的文献间接的支持了一个论点，那就是企业的所有权越分散，企业社会责任的水平越高。（坎姆，1997；乌尔曼，1985）。坎姆（1987）指出，当公司的所有权变的不那么集中后，企业股份持有人对公司了解的需求就会变得更加广泛。公司所有权分散，尤其是通过投资者参与社会活动（如，社会责任共同基金，教会和公民的退休计划，以及道德的投资者），提升了管理人员披露社会责任活动的压力（乌尔曼，1985）。一些研究