关于B2C电子商务竞争力的问题与实证分析外文翻译可编辑

关于B2C电子商务竞争力的问题与实证分析外文翻译 外文翻译原文Competition in B2C E-Commerce: Analytical Issues and Empirical Evidence Material Source: Austrian AcademyAuthor: Stefan W. Schmitz of Sciences and Michael Latzer Abstract This paper questions the widely held view that B2C E-Commerce markets are characterized by a high intensity of competition, using a mixture of theoretical arguments and empirical evidence. We discuss two hypothesis and survey empirical studies which test them. We argue that the goods sold in B2C E-Commerce have to be interpreted as heterogeneous “composite goods” that market transparency in B2C E-Commerce is lower than widely assumed, and that high endogenous sunk costs limit the intensity of competition in B2C E-CommerceKeywords: B2C E-Commerce; Competition; Market Transparency; Endogenous Sunk Costs; Network EffectsIntroduction We will start with a summary of common arguments for a high intensity of competition. In section 2 we formulate testable hypothesis about the competitiveness of B2C E-Commerce. We also discuss three limitations of these tests. In section 3 we present and interpret results of a large number of empirical studies on prices and price dispersion in B2C E-Commerce. In section 4 we discuss the explanations for the findings of these empirical studies offered in the literature. In section 5 we emphasize additional arguments against a high intensity of competition. In the final section we draw our conclusions.Arguments for a High Intensity of Competition in B2C E-Commerce “One of the major features of the Internet revolution is its potential to make the whole economic system, nationally and internationally, more competitive by bringing markets closer to the economists textbook model of perfect competition, characterized by large numbers of buyers and sellers bidding in a market with perfect information.” “Lower search costs in digital markets will make it easier for buyers to find low-cost sellers, and thus will promote price competition among sellers.” The widely held view that the degree of competition in B2C E-Commerce markets is, or at least tends to be high, rests upon the following arguments in essence: ? Goods sold in B2C E-Commerce are essentially homogenous. Hence transaction costs are low and market transparency is high. ? The abundance of information results in low search and information costs, so that the price can be compared virtually at no cost. The rising use of search engines and electronic price comparisons further decreases transaction costs and increases market transparency. ? High transparency of B2C E-Commerce markets leads to a high intensity of competition and high contestability of B2C E-Commerce markets: Technological barriers to entry are low; access to production and distribution capacities is fast and inexpensive; possibilities of “boundary crossing” for large companies are high.Hypothesis to Evaluate these Arguments In order to analyze and challenge the arguments listed above, we formulate and discuss two testable hypotheses. The literature focuses on two criteria to test the high intensity of competition in B2C E-Commerce: price level and price dispersion. Hypothesis A regards the argument that the intensity of competition is higher in B2C E-Commerce and costs are lower than in traditional retailing so that prices should be lower in B2C E-Commerce. It is a joint hypothesis so that a rejection cannot be interpreted as a rejection of a high intensity of competition alone, but only as a rejection of the joint hypothesis of a high intensity of competition and lower or equal marginal costs. Hypothesis B is based on the “Law of one price” and regards the argument argues that the price dispersion should be low in B2C E-Commerce: If B2C E-Commerce markets approach the ideal of a frictionless market, and then the dispersion of prices is low in B2C E-Commerce. A rejection of this hypothesis is consistent with a number of potential explanations, e.g. lack of market transparency, high transaction costs and heterogeneity of goods. Three major limitations have to be considered when testing these hypotheses empirically. 1 The “disequilibrium critique” stresses that the hypothesis are theoretically valid in market equilibrium only. B2C E-Commerce markets are not in equilibrium: The high losses of many B2C E-Commerce companies cannot be sustained in a long-term equilibrium. Some of them might still struggle to reach the highest possible level of efficiency with respect to the optimal organizational, technological, and economic business models and strategies. Brown and Goolsbee argue that B2C E-Commerce tends to increase the price dispersion initially, as B2C E-Commerce companies offer low prices to attract customers. But the low number of customers does not lead to pressure on prices in the offline market, initially 2 The hypothesis presupposes data sets which are very hard to collect ? e.g. data on marginal costs ? so that they have to be considered as ideal formulations. If the reduction of marginal costs exceeds that of prices, lower prices will be consistent with a lower intensity of competition. The hypotheses assume that the goods in the samples are homogenous. This depends on the subjective marginal rates of substitution of consumers, which are not directly observable 3 The interpretation of lower prices in B2C E-Commerce and/or a low price dispersion as evidence of a high intensity of competition is a logical fallacy. Lower prices can be consistent with a lower intensity of competition, if companies do not cover costs, or if marginal costs are further reduced than the prices. Low price dispersion can be consistent with a low intensity of competition, if B2C E-Commerce companies collude.Arguments against a High Intensity of Competition The majority of the literature which argues that the intensity of competition is lower than expected, refers to 1 price discrimination 2 lock-in effects 3 bundling 4 heterogeneity of “composite goods” in B2C E-Commerce 5 limited market transparency 6 high endogenous costs 7 Network effects, increasing returns to scale and positive feedback-loops.Price Discrimination A number of studies argue that price discrimination is the explanation for the larger than expected price dispersion in B2C E-Commerce, because the informational prerequisites can be obtained more easily in B2C E-Commerce than in the traditional retail market. The argument is unsatisfactory, as it already presupposes that B2C E-Commerce companies are not pure price takers ? i.e. they must have some market power ? and that arbitrage is not possible between different segments of the market. The segmentation of the market is achieved by product differentiationLock-in Effects and Switching Costs Lock-in effects and switching costs are the result of a previous investment that, if compatible with a current purchase, reduces the costs of that purchase. The investment depreciates rapidly, if the consumer switches suppliers, unless it is perfectly compatible with the new supplier. The B2C E-Commerce market, however, is certainly not a mature market, but a market growing rapidly in terms of both volume and customers. Once market shares are determined and the profits generated from new customers are only of minor importance relative to that on existing customers, companies tend to charge higher prices in markets with switching costs than in markets without them. In the second period, companies with smaller market shares will charge lower prices than those with large ones. If consumers anticipate the negative effects of lock-in and switching costs, market demand will be less price elastic in the first period. Firms can develop commitment strategies in order to reassure consumers that the costs of lock-in and switching will not be excessive.Bundling Bakos/Brynjolfsson argues that bundling reduces the intensity of competition. Bundling is a strategy that focuses on aggregation of large numbers of information goods so that the entire set of goods can be sold at a single price. The list of examples comprises online newspaper articles, music and software downloads, photographs, and video clips. Bakos/Brynjolfsson shows that: ? The seller of the larger bundle will always be willing to spend more for an additional good to add to the bundle. Thus the larger bundler will grow larger relative to the smaller one. ? In a slightly adapted model the bundler can attract more consumers, charge a higher price and achieve higher revenues from a single, specific good than the seller distributing the goods imperfect substitute on its own. ? A bundling strategy can make market entry unattractive for potential entrants if their goods cannot be bundled.Heterogeneity of composite goods and asymmetric information The utility derived from the purchase in B2C E-Commerce depends on the quality attributes of the composite good, consisting of the product e.g. book, CD and of various complementary goods including: ? Correct details of physical presence, contact address, relevant jurisdiction, ? Convenience of navigating a web shop, ? Transparency of information, ? Delivery services, ? Payment procedure, ? Consumer rights and data protection, ? After sales service.Market transparency In the following section we present evidence that the amount of information provided on the web is huge, while consumers resources to handle it are limited. Online consumers respond to abundance of information by restricting their attention to a very limited fraction of online shops. B2C E-Commerce companies respond with high marketing and advertising expenditures and high customer acquisition costs.Endogenous sunk costs To some extent sunk costs associated with market entry in B2C E-Commerce are lower than in conventional retail markets; as the demand for the inputs personnel and outlet space is lower in online than in offline retail operations. The evidence presented above shows that brand names play a crucial role in B2C E-Commerce so that marketing and advertising expenditures are expected to be high. These endogenous sunk costs affect market structure. The concentration ratio in markets characterized by sunk costs does not converge to zero as the market size grows. By limiting the number of competitors and the intensity of competition in the market, even in the presence of free entry, the long run average prices can be sustained above marginal costs to recoup sunk costs.Conclusions This paper highlights potential problems related to hypothesis testing of the intensity of competition in B2C E-Commerce and warns of premature conclusions. The hypotheses are ideal-type formulations and one has to be aware of the “fallacy of affirming the consequent”. The empirical studies on prices in B2C E-Commerce relative to traditional retail are inconclusive, while those on the dispersion of prices in B2C E-Commerce lead to the rejection of the hypothesis of high intensity of competition in B2C E-Commerce. The literature concentrates on the following explanations of these findings: price discrimination, lock-in effects and bundling. Our analysis shows that additional explanations have to be considered as well: Heterogeneity of composite goods, limitations to market transparency and high endogenous sunk costs. The consideration of these additional arguments might change the net-effect of the arguments for and against high intensity of competition in B2C E-Commerce.译文关于B2C电子商务竞争力的问题与实证分析 资料来源:奥地利科学院 作者:斯特凡瓦特施米茨,迈克尔拉策摘要 本文结合理论观点和经验论据来质疑一个被普遍认同的观点:B2C电子商务市场的特点是高强度竞争。本章将提出两种假设,并且用实证研究来对其进行验证。本文认为由于B2C电子商务的市场透明度低于人们所普遍认为的数值,B2C电子商务中销售的产品必须被解释为合成的“复合商品”,且其内在隐性成本也限制着B2C电子商务的竞争强度。 关键词:B2C电子商务;竞争;市场透明度;内在隐性成本;网络效应绪论 本文从概括高强度竞争的普遍争论着手,于第二部分制定了一个关于B2C电子商务竞争力的可检验假设,同时对论证时的三个限制因素进行了研究。文章第三部分是提出并解释大量关于价格以及B2C电子商务模式下价格离散的实证研究结果,而第四部分是阐释文献中提供的部分实证研究结果。在第五部分中我们将强调另外针对高强度竞争的一些论据,最后给出相应的结论。1 B2C电子商务下的高强度竞争论据 “潜力是互联网革命的主要特征之一,它可以让市场更接近经济学教科书上的理想竞争模式,从而使得整个经济系统在国内外更有竞争力。同时,还可通过大量买家和卖家在一个具备完善信息的市场里进行招标竞争而使其变得更具有特征性。” “在电子市场中,降低搜寻成本将使买家更容易找到低价的卖家,从而促进卖方之间的价格竞争。” 由此可见,普遍观点均认为B2C电子商务市场中的竞争激烈程度,或者至少是竞争力趋于较高的,在本质上是取决于以下的论据: (1)B2C电子商务中销售的产品基本上都是同一类型的,因此交易成本低,市场透明度高。 (2)以较低的搜索信息成本得到丰富的信息结果,相比而言几乎可以没有成本。搜索引擎使用率的上升以及智能的价格比较进一步降低了使用的成本,同时也增加了市场交易的透明度。 (3)B2C电子商务市场的高透明度会导致高竞争强度和高可竞争性:进入市场的技术壁垒较低;获得生产和分配的能力快速而且便宜;大型公司 “过境”的可能性高。2 评估这些论据的假设 为了分析和论证上述论点,本文将制定和讨论两种可检验的假设情况。文献主要集中于测试B2C电子商务高强度竞争的两个标准:价格水平和价格离散。 假设一是跟论据有关,B2C电子商务中的竞争强度比传统零售业的高而成本却比其低,因此B2C电子商务交易过程中价格应该降低。这是一个联合假设,对其的否定不能被解释为是一个单独的高强度竞争排斥反应,只能作为一种联合假设,是高强度竞争和低于或等于的边际成本的排斥反应。 假设二是基于“一价定律”这一说法,根据论据可知价格离散程度在B2C电子商务中应该是低的:如果B2C电子商务能够有一个理想的市场环境,那么B2C电子商务下的价格离散程度应该是较低的。 对这个假设的否定有许多可能的解释,例如:缺乏市场透明度,较高的交易成本以及物品的不一致性。当论证这些只是基于经验而提出来的假设时,必须考虑到三个主要的局限性: (1)“不平衡批判”强调,这些假设只在市场均衡时才是有效的理论。B2C电子商务市场若不均衡,许多B2C电子商务公司高度的损失就会使公司无法长期维持平衡。这些公司中有些还可能想争取用理想的组织、技术、经济商业模式以及战略来使效率达到可能的最高水准。布朗和古尔斯比认为B2C电子商务增长的价格趋于分散初期,例如B2C电子商务公司以低价来吸引顾客,但是在最初之时少量的客户数目并不会给离线市场的价格带来压力。 (2)支持假设的假定数据是很难收集的,例如边际成本的数据,因此数据必须是理想的。该假设设想认为当样品中的物品是同一类时,如果边际成本减少的价格超过了规定的价格,那么较低的价格即意味着较低的竞争强度。这就取决于消费者的主观边际替代率,而这一数值是无法被直接观察到的。 (3)B2C电子商务低价的解答和作为高强度竞争低价离散的证据是一逻辑悖论。如果公司不支付费用或者边际成本进一步降低价格比,那么较低的价格即可与较低的竞争强度保持一致。低价分散也可符合低强度的竞争,如果B2C电子商务公司互相串通的话。 3 针对高强度竞争的论据 各类文献认为竞争的激烈程度低于预期所想,多数指出以下这几点论据:价格歧视、锁定效应、捆绑、B2C电子商务下“复合商品”的不一致性、市场透明度的有限性、高内在成本。3.1 价格歧视 部分研究认为,价格歧视可以解释B2C电子商务中价格的离散程度为什么比预期的更大,那是因为B2C电子商务中产品的信息比在传统零售市场中更容易获取。这个论点没办法令人很满意,因为它已预示着B2C电子商务公司不再是单纯的价格接受者 ,他们必须有一定的市场力量。而这一点在不同的细分市场内是不可能的,市场的分割是由产品差异化来决定的。3.2 锁定效应和转换成本 如果与目前购买兼容,降低购买成本,那么锁定效应和转换成本都是预先投资的结果。而若消费者与供应商进行交换,且是完全兼容的新供应商,则投资将迅速贬值。 然而,虽然无论是从数量还是从客户上来考虑,B2C电子商务市场都是一个发展迅速的市场,但却绝对不是一个成熟的市场。在第一阶段,若其市场份额已经决定了,那么相对于现有客户而言,来自新客户的利润只有轻微的作用。此时,公司往往都是在有转换成本的市场上收取更高的价格。在第二阶段,市场份额较小的公司收取的价格要比市场份额大的公司低。如果消费者已预料到锁定效应和转换成本会带来负面影响,那么市场需求将减少价格弹性在第一阶段时的负面影响。此时企业可以使用承诺战略来向消费者保证:锁定效应和转换成本不会过高。3.3 捆绑 巴克斯/布林约尔松认为捆绑降低了竞争的激烈程度。捆绑是一种致力于聚集大量信息商品的销售策略,使整套货物以单一的价格出售。典型的信息商品清单包括在线报纸文章、音乐和软件下载、照片和视频剪辑。 巴克斯/布林约尔松表示: (1)有着较大捆绑规模的卖家总是愿意添加额外的好处来增加捆绑量,因此相对于较小捆绑规模的卖家,较大规模的发展更快。 (2)在一个轻度衍生的交易模型中,捆绑能吸引更多的消费者。相比卖家自己分配良好的完美替代品,单个具体的产品能得到更高要价从而获得更高的收入。 (3)捆绑策略可使那些不采取此策略的卖家失去自身市场的潜在消费者。3.4 “复合商品”的不一致性和非对称的信息 从B2C电子商务市场采购所得产品的效用取决于其综合属性素质,产品的组成(例如书籍、光盘)和商品的各种补充信息,包括:实际存在的正确信息、联系地址、有关司法管辖区;一个方便浏览的网上商店;信息的透明度;送货服务;付款程序;消费者权利和数据保护;售后服务。3.5 市场透明度 下一节文章将呈现数据表明网络上提供信息的数量是巨大的,而消费者能掌握的资源却是有限的。消费者在面对丰富的网络信息时往往只会注意网上商店中非常有限的一部分,而B2C电子商务公司则是以高销售、广告支出以及较高的客户收购成本来回应这一点。3.6 内在隐性成本 B2C电子商务环境下进入市场的隐性成本一定程度上比传统零售市场低,因此在网上对投入人员和出口空间的需求低于离线零售业务。由上表明在B2C电子商务中品牌扮演着重要的角色,因此市场营销和广告支出的预计就比较高。这些内在隐性成本影响着市场结构,其特点是市场集中度不会随着市场规模的增大而无限趋向于零。通过对竞争者的数目和市场竞争激烈程度的限制,即使存在着自由进入的情况,从长远来看价格还是可能持续高于边际成本,以便收回隐性成本。4 结论 本文强调提出了在假设中B2C电子商务环境下竞争程度存在的潜在问题,并给予了对一些不成熟结论的警示。该假设是典型的理想配方,人们必须需要意识到“肯定后件谬误” 肯定后件谬误:若因后件正确而推论前件也正确,则犯了逻辑上的肯定后件谬误。 相对于传统零售市场,B2C电子商务环境下的价格实证研究仍然没有结果,而B2C电子商务中物价的分散性否定了其竞争的高强度性。结合所有文献,文章得出以下主要研究结果:价格歧视,锁定效应和捆绑。本文分析认为其他几点也需要考虑,有复合商品的不一致性、市场透明度的限制以及高内在隐性成本。这些额外论据可能会改变关于B2C电子商务环境的高竞争强度言论的实际效应。