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单击此处编辑母版标题样式,*,*,*,单击此处编辑母版文本样式,第二级,第三级,第四级,第五级,Bargaining costs,influence costs,and the organization of economic activity,1990 Cambridge University PressPerspective on Political Economy J.Alt and K.shepse(eds.),Transaction Cost Economy,Coase(1937,1960),Williamson(1975,1985),Cost of Organizing the economic activities,1.Physical Production and distribution,2.Cost of carrying out necessary exchange,（Vague）,Two Elements to Add,Shot-term bargaining cost(强调),(Williamson:asset specificity,frequency,uncertainty,Influence cost：,Identify costs attached to centralized,discretionary decision making,Critique and Extension of the received theory,1.Uncertain future,Vs,short-term contracts,Explain STC:Period short enough,All information available,BC:Wage paid;Monitoring;Enforcing,Problem:STC cannot restrict long-term behaviors,Two-parties relation analysis,hypothesis,:,1.Risk neutral,Financially Unconstrained,Expected-wealth-Maximizing Bargainer.,2.farsighted,3.Opportunistic,4.Distant contracts governing prohibitively costly to write.,Proposition,If the costs of bargaining over short-term arrangements were ZERO-then the market outcome would be efficient.,Two emphasis before Provement：,1.The actions do not depend on bargaining power but the distribution of the fruits,2.Inability to write complete contracts has effect on the way the parties share risks.(Limited intertemporal or contingent transfer),Example：,Fisher Body and General Motors,（Klein，Crawford，Alchian）,Two period：,1.Agreement about plant site and design,share of cost,2.Negotiate price,fixed transfer payment,quality standards,delivery schedule.(Full knowledge),Problems:,General Motors fear Fisher Body Opportunism(Quasi rents),resoluton:having General Motors bear part of the plants cost,Essence:Distributional risk and be compensated by intitial cash payment,Condultion:Bargaining costs is in the determining the efficiency of market transaction.,Addment：,About assumption：,Risk neutral:fail in individual,Contract without restriction:cant not be precisely monitored,Fudenberg,holmstrom,milgrom(1990),Nonmarket transactions:,1 Why Prefer Market?,2.Incentive(Williamson,Grossman,Hart),3.Miss:The cost that do not depend specifically on control of assets.,（Centralized authority）,Costs of centralized authority,Why unplanned,decentralized system always do better than centrally planned,consciously coordinated system.(No answer),View:most distinguishes any centralized organization is the authority autonomy of its top decision makers or management(Intervene),Inappropriate use.,1.For their own initiative.,2.Be persuade or manipulate by others for excessive or inappropriate use.,Influence costs,The cost When the central authority is both incorruptible and intelligent enough,Resource：,1.Affect others decisions to their benefit,2.Ineffcient decisions result from influence activity or the attempts to prevent or control them.,Why it is difficult to ignore the attempt at influence?,One reason influence is inevitable is that decision makers must rely on others for information that is not easily available to them directly,The incentives to attempt to influence an organizations decisions are,to some extent,endogenous,Thus,careful organizational design can at least partially control the direct cost s of influence activities.,Expression,1.,boundaries of the firm:The widespread practice of spinning off or isolating unprof-itable subsidiaries,2.,A universitys policy of requiring its schools to be tubs,on their own bottoms,each individua lly responsible for its revenues and expenditures,costs of their own,Worthwhile investments will be foregone,less qualified people will be assigned to key positions,less qualified people will be assigned to key positions,bad decisions will be made because communication has been restricted and available information is not used,desirable resource transfers between divisions will not be effec-ted.,Trading off the costs,Japanese firms make use both ofwage policies and of organizational rules to facilitate extensive involvement of their employees in decision making without encouraging excessive attempts at influence,The validity of these arguments depends on,Centrally controlled organization considerably free from outside intervention.,1.,property rights over the firm generally reside at the executive level or higher,2.,executives generally have better and more fluid information systems than courts or government agencies do,Summary and conclusions,Governmental unit or an executive in a firm has intervene certain identifiable costs are incurred.,1,.,a tendency for the authority to intervene excessively,2.Increased time devoted to influence activities and a corresponding reduction in organizational productivity,3.poorer decision making,4.,a loss of efficiency as the organization adapts its structure and policies to control influ-ence activities and their costs.,Influence activities are essentially political and because the theory applies equally to public and private or
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