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Industrial Economics Dr.WangShengECNUOrientalRealEstateCollege1大学课件IndustrialEconomicsDr.WangChapter1Introduction2大学课件Chapter1Introduction2大学课件Maincontents：TheoryofindustrialorganizationDifferentiation：IndustrialEconomicsvsIndustrialOrganizationTheoryMajorcontents：industrialstructure;industrialconnection;industrialorganization;Industrialpolicies：notanindependentdomainPopularrecognition：industrialeconomicsisreallyindustrialorganizationtheory.3大学课件Maincontents：TheoryofindustIndustryandindustrialorganizaitonIndustry1、Chamberlin,EdwardH.Competinggroup(竞争群)ProductheterogeneityReplaceablecontinualindustrychain4大学课件IndustryandindustrialorganiManufacturingproductiveenterprisescollectively,especiallyasdistinguishedfromagriculture(WebstersNewWorldDictionary5a)Anylarge-scalebusinessactivity,suchasthetourismindustry,forexample.(WebstersNewWorldDictionary4b)5大学课件Manufacturingproductiveenter所谓产业，是指提供同一或有密切替代关系产品、服务的同类企业市场关系的集合体（毛林根，1996）。苏东水：单个产业无非是一些具有某种相同生产技术或产品特征的企业的集合，产业存在的基础是这些企业及其组织（苏东水，p474）。但关于产业的界定，“规定产业概念的立足点，与其说是理论上的严密性，不如说是现实上的可用性”（杨冶，1985，p16，转引自毛林根，1996）。产业的分类、界定，“往往划分和集合难以说出前后一贯的分类原则，在应用经济理论领域里，如果囿于基础理论规范的严密性，产业划分就寸步难行”（杨冶，1985，p16）。6大学课件所谓产业，是指提供同一或有密切替代关系产品、服务的同类企业市Industrialorganizationisconcernedwiththeworking of markets and industries,in particular the way firms compete with each other.Itemphasizesonthestudyofthefirmstrategiesthatarecharacteristicofmarketinteraction:pricecompetition,productpositioning,advertising,researchanddevelopment,andsoforth.7大学课件IndustrialorganizationisconIndustrialEconomicsvsMicroeconomicsMarketsrunningrulealsoisIEsresearchobjects,anditoriginsfrommicroeconomistsworksuchasChamberlin&MrsRobinsons,sosomeonesays“itsjustonechapterofmicroeconomics”.Explainingpattern:IEchoosesmoreindependentfactorstomakemoredetailedexplanationforrealworldwhiletheotherseeksforthesimplicityoftheoryandtrytomakemodelsonpossiblylittlebasicassumptionandvariables.Analysistechniques:History,statisticsandtheory,threemaintechniquesshouldbemastered.-Schumpeter,1954Industrialorganizationcanbegenerallydefinedaseconomicaldomainswhichisrelatedwithmarketsandisnoteasilyanalyzedwithcompetitionmodelinstandardtextbook.TheNewPalgraveADictionaryofEconomics,1988,p8038大学课件IndustrialEconomicsvsMicroeBibliographyLuisM.B.Cabral(2000)IntroductiontoIndustrialOrganization,MIT(MassachusettsInstituteTechnology)PressMartin,S.(2002)：AdvancedIndustrialEconomics,2nded,OxfordandMalden:Blackwell泰勒尔(2001)：产业组织理论，中国人民大学出版社骆品亮(2005)：产业组织学，复旦大学出版社奥兹夏伊(2005)：产业组织：理论与应用，清华大学出版社 Cabrals is mainly applied.9大学课件BibliographyLuisM.B.Cabral(201.AcaseofZantacZantac（branded)是Wellcome生产的专治溃疡和胃痛药品，其通用名（generic)是雷尼替丁。Wellcome的该药以年销售量16亿美元居全球处方药销量的榜首，其价格远远高于边际成本。为什么Wellcome公司能够大幅度提升价格而不失去顾客？由于W公司专利到期，Novopham公司和其它七家公司已经获得美联邦地区法院许可，以通用名即化学名销售Zantac。尽管有无数证据表明它的功效不比W公司的Zantac差，但其市场价格要少7.5倍。Why?另外，Smithkline公司的Tagament可替代Zantac，但它们确实不同，并各有专利。为什么这些药品的价格竞争并没有因此而日趋激烈？10大学课件1.AcaseofZantacZantac它们之间没有发生价格战的原因或许可从以下材料来获得解释：胃痛战役。我们知道治疗胃痛的药品战将会是大规模的，但没想到会如此的激烈。成千上万的美元投入到为树立对TagametHB或Pepcid AC的品牌忠诚而设计的广告中去。Zantac75将在不久之后加入药品战。The Peoples Pharmacy换言之，广告起到了非常重要的作用。实际上，在大型制药公司里，广告的预算规模和研发的预算规模差不多。药品本身的价值并不重要，而是消费者，或者作为代理人的医生怎样看待药品才更为重要。在推出Zantac的时候，Glaxo是一家独立公司。此后，它与Wellcome公司合并组成了GlaxoWellcome公司，目的为两家把以前双方独立研究的同类处方联合起来。GlaxoWellcome公司的例子说明了产业组织学所关心的几个问题。11大学课件它们之间没有发生价格战的原因或许可从以下材料来获得解释：11GlaxoWellcome与其他药品生产商在雷尼替丁市场的竞争产业组织学中所研究的问题：GlaxoWellcome是一家治疗溃疡和胃疼的药品市场中（相关的市市场定义场定义）有很强的市场势力市场势力的企业。由Glaxo和Wellcome合并而的GlaxoWellcome公司用很明智的研发战略确立其市场地位，使其得以进入已经由Smithkline公司占主导地位的领域。并且通过运用具有攻击性的市场战略市场战略来增加其市场份额。在短时期内，Zantac的地位受到专利权的保护。但时过境迁，面临即将进入市场进入市场的对手（通用药品生产商），如今需要优先考虑产品差异化产品差异化的问题。12大学课件GlaxoWellcome与其他药品生产商在雷尼替丁市场的2.CentralquestionsIstheremarketpower?Howdofirmsacquireandmaintainmarketpower?Whataretheimplicationofmarketpower?Istherearoleforpublicpolicyregardingmarketpower?Whatismarketpower?Simply,marketpowermaybedefinedastheabilitytosetpricesabovecost,specificallyaboveincrementalcostormarginalcost,thatis,thecostofproducingoneextraunit.13大学课件2.CentralquestionsIstherem3.Origin and evolution of the theory 3.1Earlystage：Chamberlin&MrsRobinsonThetheoryofMonopolisticCompetitionChamberlin,EdwardH.1933TheEconomicsofImperfectCompetitionRobinson,Joan.1933“TherevolutionofMonopolisticCompetition”(Samuelson,1967)overthrowtheviewoffullmonopolyorfullcompetition.AndChamberlinalsomaderesearchforseriesquestionssuchasproductgroup、entryandexit、productheterogeneity、competitionunderovercapacity.14大学课件3.Originandevolutionofthe3.2Harverdschool：S-C-Pparadigm;structureschoolMason,EdwardS.ThefirstresearchinstitutionforindustrialorganizationtheorywasestablishedinHarverduniversity,called“MasonicLodge”(梅森联谊会)in1938.Heextendedtheresearchfrommonopolyandantitrusttothestudytowardentiremarketandmanufacturers,putforwardthetheorysystemandresearchdirection,madestablebaseforindustrialorganizationtheorysystem.Bain,JoeS.(ThefirstIOtextbook)IndustrialOrganization,firstedition,JohnWiley&Sons,Inc1959ThesymbolofaccomplishmentofTIO(TraditionalIndustrialOrganization)system.Init,Heclearlypointedouttheindustrywetalkaboutiscorporationgroupwhichproducehighreplaceableproducts.15大学课件3.2Harverdschool：S-C-PparadBainsviewTheessentialofSCPframe,istoinsistmarketstructureisdeterminantofmarketconductions;andinacertainmarketstructure,enterpriserconductionsisdeterminantofmarketperformance.Baseanalyzingpoint:fullcompetition-monopolyWhilethemarketstructuremovesfromonepointtoanother,theresultismarketbehaviorattributesvaryaccordingly,andbringingthechangeofmarketperformanceintheend.Themostfamousassumptionofcentralization、entry condition and profit rate.16大学课件BainsviewTheessentialofSCSchererscontributiontoS-C-PparadigmIndustrialMarketStructureandEconomicPerformance,Chicago：Rand-McNally，1970Makeasystematicexplanationforbasicconditionsintwosidesofsupplyanddemandandemphasizeitseffecttomarketstructureandbehavior.Feedbackeffectofmarketbehaviortomarketstructureandbasicconditionsanditseffectofmarketstructuretobasicconditions.HighR&Dleveltotechnologyconditionsandsochangethecostmodeandlevelofproductheterogeneity.eg.Collusionmayenhanceentrybarrierandsoaffectthelong-termmarketstructure.eg.17大学课件SchererscontributiontoS-C-市场结构卖者和买者的数量产品差别化进入壁垒成本结构垂直一体化企业联合市场行为价格行为产品战略研究与开发广告法律策略市场绩效生产和分配效率经济进步充分就业经济公平基本条件供给 需求原材料 价格弹性技术 增长率产品的耐用性 替代价值/衡量 市场类型商业习惯 购买方式工会 周期性和季 节性特点Scherer,1970,p5performancestructureconductTheMostSimplifiedS-C-Pframe18大学课件市场结构市场行为市场绩效基本条件Scherer,1970,p市场结构卖者和买者的数量产品差别化进入壁垒成本结构垂直一体化企业联合市场行为价格行为产品战略研究与开发广告法律策略固定资产投资共谋市场绩效生产和分配效率经济进步充分就业质量和服务经济公平基本条件供给条件 需求条件原材料 价格弹性技术 替代品产品的耐用性 市场增长地点 市场类型商业习惯 购买方式工会 周期性和季节性特点政府政策反垄断政策规则税收和补助贸易规则价格控制工资规则投资激励就业激励宏观经济政策SCP范式：当前的观点19大学课件市场结构市场行为市场绩效基本条件政府政策SCP范式：当前的观LimitationofTIOWithoutstableacademicbase,themainviewpointisdescriptiveandnotlogicallyinevitable.Asamatteroffact,itpaymoreattentiontotheonesideaffect,andcannotmakeclearexplanationforlogicofstrategicbehaviors.Limitationindatacollectionandmodelestablishment.20大学课件LimitationofTIOWithoutstabl3.3CriticismandcommentsbyChicagoSchoolStigler,GeorgeJ.(1968)：TheOrganizationofIndustry.Homewood,IL：RichardD.IrwinEntrybarrierbedefinedasakindsofadditionalcostburdenedbyentrantandincumbentisneedless.SotheentrybarrieritconsidersislowerthanwhatSCPframeconsiders.(Stigler,1968)Efficiencybycorporationsthemselvesbasicallydeterminesmarketstructureandperformance.(Demsetz,1973)Criticismtoassumptionof“centralization、entryconditionandprofitrate”.(Brozen,1971)21大学课件3.3Criticismandcommentsby3.4NewIndustrialOrganization(NIO)：ThesecondtrendsNIO,after70s,20th.Focusonstrategicbehavioranalysis.GametheoryastheuniformmeaninNIO.Andnon-cooperativegametheoryisdominativeinit.Cournot-Bertrand paradoxCournot,1838outputselectedasoptionalvariable.Inequilibriumpoint,priceishigherthanmarginalcost,butlowerthanmonopolyprice.Bertrand,1883priceselectedasoptionalvariable.Inequilibriumpoint,priceequalstomarginalcost.So,althoughCournotspremiselooksnotsorealistic,butitsconclusionsuitstorealitywhileBertrandspremiseseemsmorerealistic,butitgetsalittleextremeconclusion.ThesolutiontothisparadoxisthetopicoflargepapersofNIOsince70s,20th.22大学课件3.4NewIndustrialOrganizatioResearchoncontrarycausality,namelymarketbehaviorseffecttofuturemarketstructure.Manymarketphenomenasuchaspricewar,patentrace,merger,RPM(resale-pricemaintenance)andadvertisingwarcanbeexplainedbystrategicinteractionamongcorporations.ThatsanotheraspectoftopicsofNIO.IOhasbeenthethirdimportantaspectamongeconomicsresearchdomains,onlybehindmicroeconomicsandmacroeconomics.23大学课件ResearchoncontrarycausalityLimitationofNIOMainlyoriginsfromitsmeans.BoundedrationalityPremiseistoosubtleandsometimesquestionable.(especiallyaboutsharedbeliefs)Theresultishardtogetexperientialprove.(BresnahanandSchmalensee,1987)“类似某种由不规则的碎片所组成的几何体”（Fractalization），“目前已成为一个由高度精致和特定的模型构成的迷宫，每一模型得出的结论只能应用于满足模型假设的特定场合”。（马丁，2003，p10）24大学课件LimitationofNIOMainlyorigin老产业组织学（即SCP范式，也称哈佛学派，或结构学派等)也研究与垄断和反垄断相关的问题，但他早期的理论色彩远逊于主要以博弈论为研究方法的新产业组织学。老产业组织学SCP范式中的因果关系（Mason,1939；Bain,1951,1956），以及后来的双向和反馈关系（SchererandRoss,1990,p.5），开始主要是经验性的，只是在产业组织学引入博弈论后，才具有了坚实的微观基础和严密的逻辑体系(Jacquemin,1999)。这也是为什么早期老产业组织学及其反垄断政策受到芝加哥学派等不断攻击的缘故。在反垄断问题上的互补25大学课件老产业组织学（即SCP范式，也称哈佛学派，或结构学派等)也而博弈论的应用和发展则有力的回击了芝加哥学派的批评，验证和支持了早期老产业组织学的许多结论与政策建议（Munter,1999；马丁，2003，p.9）。博弈论的研究成果表明，在一定的市场环境中，厂商会选择一定的策略性行为以影响竞争对手的行为和市场环境，这些行为具有限制竞争，危害消费者和社会福利的后果，所以反垄断应积极对它们进行规制。这个观念与芝加哥学派不同，但与早期老产业组织学类似，都对主导厂商的市场行为持怀疑态度，只不过与早期老产业组织学不同的是，博弈论具有正统的经济学基础和逻辑，因而能够为反垄断提供更具说服力的论证。博弈论更提升了老产业组织学的观点，高集中度、高市场份额、高进入壁垒等与高利润率之间的关系不仅仅是简单的因果关系，而是在一定初始环境下多方互动的结果（NormanandLaManna,1992,p.3-5），带有“均衡”的色彩（Jacquemin,1999）。26大学课件而博弈论的应用和发展则有力的回击了芝加哥学派的批评，验证和支3.5NewtrendsofthetheoryMergerbetweenTIOandNIOExperientialresearchrevivesResearchonindustrydynamics27大学课件3.5NewtrendsofthetheoryMe4.Researchdomains1、Bain,1949:structure,organizationandcorporationownershipcompaniescompetingbehaviorandpricingstrategy-includingmotivation,strategyandtacticsprice,outputandthecorrespondingoutcomespublicpolicieselicitedbythesestructure,conductionandoutcomes28大学课件4.Researchdomains1、Bain,19492、AlmarinandRodney,1974:Industrialorganizationfocusonapplyingmicroeconomicsintosuchareasasmonopoly,traderestriction,publicregulationandcompaniesownership,etc.29大学课件2、AlmarinandRodney,1974:29大3、Schmalensee,1987:(1)whethermanufacturersproductformaxingprofitsassumedbymicroeconomicstheory?Or,moregenerally,productforownerswealth?(2)whatdeterminestheboundarybetweenmanufacturersandmarket?(3)whatdoesthetermmarketmean?(4)whtkindsofdeterminantsaboutmarketstructure?(5)andotherderivativefactors？(6)whatfactorsdetermineextentofcompetinginoligopoly?(7)canincumbentsbehaviorsdeterentrantsentry?30大学课件3、Schmalensee,1987:30大学课件(8)couldstatisticalanalysisonseveralindustriesdataproveaboveassumptions?(9)howwillmanufacturerssetpricewithmarketpower?whatsthewelfaremeaningofthepricediscrimination?(10)howdoesproductsqualityandquantitybedecidedonincompletemarket?Andwhetheritsoutcomeisoptimalinanysense?(11)whetherthemarket-determinedlevelofadvertisingistoohigh?Andwhethertheyenhanceentrybarrier?(12)whetherlargemanufacturersoncentralizedmarketismainsourceoftechnologyprogressasSchumpetersaid?(13)howimportantdoesitmeanthatdeviatingfromcompetition?31大学课件(8)couldstatisticalanalysisSchmalensee,1988Threesubjects:Howdoesofenterprisesdeterminetheirconduction,scale,scopeandorganization?Incompletecompetitionhowmarketbehaviorandperformancedeterminedbycomparativelysteadyobservablevariablesnamelymarketstructure,andhowtomeasuremarketstructureinextensivemeaning?Publicpoliciestowardenterprisers32大学课件Schmalensee,198832大学课件5.ParadigmandmeansS-C-PparadigmRegressionanalysis：Cross-partsstatisticalanalysisinindustrylevelOligopolymodels:GametheoryTheconclusionfromgametheoryissimilarwithwhatfromS-C-Pholders.Obviously,gametheoryismoreaccurateandalongwithmainstreameconomics.Buttheformerismorefitforpositivestudy,anditconstitutesthefoundationofmorevisualknowledgewhichgametheorymodelsrelyingon.Casestudy33大学课件5.ParadigmandmeansS-C-Ppara6.Outline1、Introduction2、Behaviorofmonopolisticmanufacturers3、Pricediscriminationandtwo-partpricing4、Verticalrestriction5、Baseofoligopolytheory6、Productdifferentiation(horizontalandvertical)7、Entrybarrierandentrydeterment8、Cartelandcollusion9、Advertising10、Research&development34大学课件6.Outline1、Introduction34大学课件Chapter 2 Market PowerECNUOrientalRealEstateCollege35大学课件Chapter2MarketPowerECNUO第一部分主要讨论垄断性行为单一产品和多产品定价、质量选择、价格歧视、纵向控制等。这些部分较一般的讨论垄断力量的运作，即只要企业拥有一定程度的市场力量下的行为，并不要求它拥有完全的垄断地位。这里考察的大部分情况即使在存在竞争者的情况下也会出现。36大学课件第一部分主要讨论垄断性行为单一产品和多产品定价、质量选择2.1MeasureofmarketpowerWhatismarketpower?Simply,marketpowermaybedefinedastheabilitytosetpricesabovecost,specificallyaboveincrementalcostormarginalcost,thatis,thecostofproducingoneextraunit.Insomemaening,centralquestionsofIOareIstheremarketpower?Howdofirmsacquireandmaintainmarketpower?Whataretheimplicationofmarketpower?Istherearoleforpublicpolicyregardingmarketpower?37大学课件2.1MeasureofmarketpowerWhammmmmMonopolypricingpmonopolypriceObjectivefunction：max=R-Cfirst-ordercondition：d/dp=0sop-C(D(p)=-D(p)/D(p)Commonexpression：MR=MC38大学课件mmmmmMonopolypricing38大学课件Lernerindex（AbbaLerner,1934）derivedfromfirst-ordercondition(elasticityrule)：L=(-MC)/=1/isdemandelasticitywhereinmonopolyprice(positivevalue)=(dD/dp)*(p/D)Lernerindexcanbeusedtomeasureallkindsoffirmsmarketpower.39大学课件Lernerindex（AbbaLerner,1934mLernerindexofmonopolyfirmpQLernerindexissimilarasrateofmarginalgrossprofit.Inmorecases,weusesimilarscoretomeasureLernerindex,namelyuseunitcostreplaceMCpMCMRDMarginalgrossprofit40大学课件mLernerindexofmonopolyfirmMonopolypricemustinareawherein1Why?41大学课件Monopolypricemustinareawhmpisininverseratiowithmonopolypower(垄断势力)pqqpmMCMCqmpqminleftchartislowerthaninrights42大学课件mpisininverseratiowithmMonopolyandmonopolyforceItseemsthatismorereasonablethanmarketshareusedtodefinemonopolyforce.Forexample,inthechart2.1,firminthelefthas90%marketsharewhiletherighthas100%,perfectmonopoly.So,accordingtomarketshareindex,therightfirmisclosertothepositionofmonopolyfirm,butinmonopolyforceangle,istheleft.Anddependsonmuchfactors,someisstaticandothersaredynamic.43大学课件MonopolyandmonopolyforceItTable2-1LernerindexofsomeindustriesinUSA行业谷类产品软饮料浓缩炼奶蒸馏水炒咖啡勒纳指数0.7170.5950.5930.5710.507行业奶油麦芽饮料香烟人造冰冰淇淋勒纳指数0.5000.4890.4260.3800.33244大学课件Table2-1Lernerindexofsome2.2SourceofmarketpowerControlscarceresourceSeeksupportsofstake-holders,suchasforbiddonofmarketentrySomeanti-entrystrategy(exampleofUSAairline)EconomyofscaleandscopeLearingeffectR&D45大学课件2.2SourceofmarketpowerCont2.3WelfareanalysisofmarketpowerGeneralwelfareorgeneralsurplusequalstoconsumersurplusplussupplierssurplus.WhenconsumerpriceequalstoMC,generalsurplusismaximal.Deadweightlossrepresentsonlywhatwecangetwhentransformedfrommonopolytoperfectsituation.Itsetstheupperlimitforefficiencythroughrectifyingmonopolypricing.46大学课件2.3WelfareanalysisofmarketConsumerSurplusDupit(1844)firstlyintroducedanothername：Marshallconsumersurplusrepresentschoke-offprice(阻断价格),namelyminimumpricewithnodemand.isnestconsumerssurplus.AndgeneralCSequalstopluspaymentD().47大学课件ConsumerSurplusDupit(1844)0Measureofconsumersurpluspq0q=D(p)Anothermaeningofdemandcurve：ReservationpriceCS：thepartthatconsumerswouldliketopayforthanactualpaymentIncontinuousfunctionassumption,CS=areaoftriangle48大学课件0MeasureofconsumersurpluspqSupplierssurplusSSisdefinedasmanufacturersprofitinthisindustry.Profitequalstosalesincomesubtractscost,andcostistheintegralofmarginalcost.Soindustryprofitequalstotheareabetweenmarginalcurveandhorizontalcurveof.49大学课件Supplierssurplus49大学课件CommentsonmarketpowerMRDMCNestCSdeadweightloss50大学课件CommentsonmarketpowerMRDMC度量标准的问题使用CS和SS的前提是需求和供给曲线不仅代表私人收益和成本，而且代表所有的社会收益和成本。如果存在外部性，情况就不同了。当使用总剩余变化的衡量标准时，意味着我们不在意收益在消费者和生产者之间的分配。但这个假设并不一定能被广泛接受，例如人们可能认为消费者剩余的增加比生产者剩余的增加更重要。51大学课件度量标准的问题51大学课件CommentsonmarketpowerLiebenstein,1966X-inefficiencyX-inefficiencyexistsinanyorganization,namelyproducingunderproductionpossibilitycurve.Monopolyfirmshavenoincentivetoreducecost,andX-inefficiencyinitismoreseriousthanincompetitivecase.Highcostcanbepartlyimputedtoconsumersthroughitsmonopolyforce.Exampleinourcountry：telecomindustry,electricpowerindustryetc.52大学课件CommentsonmarketpowerLiebeOnlyifpositivemonopolyprofitexists,firmshavetheincentivetograb,maintainandusemarketpowerspendingsomeoftheprofit.Thatsso-calledrent-seekingactivities.Posner,1957RentdissipationtheoryIfrentseekingactivitiesiscompetitive,inzero-profitequilibrium,TullockQuadrangleisdissipatedutterly.Baumol,1990Indifferentinstitutions,entrepreneurshipmaybeproductive,unproductiveevendestructive.Monopolyprofitisakindofrentessentially.Rentseekingactivitieswillreducegeneralsocialwelfare.Thelargestharmofmonopolyespeciallyinstitutionalmonopolymaybethatitdistortspeoplesbehaviorsandbringsonnonproductiveordestructiveactivities.Commentsonmarketpower53大学课件OnlyifpositivemonopolyprofOpDAEBConstantMC=0Deadweight=ABE(Harbergertriangle,1954)ExperientialstudyshowsDeadweightlossmeasuredbyHarbergertriangleislowerthan1%ofGNP.Rentseekingactivities：directnonproductiveactivitiestogetrentofTullockQuadrangle(OAEP)(Tullock,1967)54大学课件OpDAEBConstantMC=0DeadweigPayoutofrent-seekingStrategicpayoutManagingpayout55大学课件Payoutofrent-seekingStrategi表2-21995-1998/9年中国部分垄断行业的租金估算（过勇，胡鞍钢，2002）垄断行业租金额（亿人民币/年）占GDP比重（%）电力行业560-11200.751.50交通运输邮电业740-9001.01.2邮电通信业215-3250.290.43民航业75-1000.10.13医疗机构75-1000.10.13合计1300-20201.72.756大学课件表2-21995-1998/9年中国部分垄断行业的租金估算2.4PublicpolicyonmarketpowerMonopolypriceishigherthanmarginalcost.Inanothersaying,outputsetbymonopolyislowerthanoptimaloutput.Thatmeansincreaseofoutputwilladdwelfare,becausemarginalwilling-paymentishigherthanmarginalcost.Policies：Regulation、Antitrust、IndustrialPolicy（caseofantitrust，eg）Ifscaleeconomicsislarge,competitionmaybenotfeasiblechoice.Innaturalmonopolycase(onlyonemonopoly),directregulationtomonopolyisthebestchoice.57大学课件2.4PublicpolicyonmarketpoMarginalcostpricingDqNaturally,thefirstsolutionistomakepriceequalstoMC.C=+tso,t=C-0Profit=-FSubsidyF：newtaximpositionRegulatorycapture：peoplebeingregulatedinvesttoinfluenceregulatorsdecisionsothatitbepropitioustofirmsprofitmaximizationnotsocialwelfaremaximization.C=F+cqProfit=-F58大学课件MarginalcostpricingDqNaturalAveragecostpricingPrice=averagecostpDACqc=FEFirmisobligedtopriceminimuminconditionprofitbenonegative,namelypriceequalstoaveragecost.Onesolutionbetweenmarginalcostpricingandmonopolypricing.InUSA,rate-of-returnregulationisusedwildlyinpublicutilities.ThatisclosetoACP.Inthisregulation,firmshavenomotivationtoreducecost.Regulationgap(规制时滞).59大学课件AveragecostpricingPrice=averLow-powerincentivemechanismpricevarieswithcostinthesamerate,withthelowestincentivetoreducecost.High-powerincentivemechanismPricesetbeforehandandfixedregardlessofcostvarying.Reduceone-dollarcostmeansgainingone-dollarprofit.Governmentopportunismandfirmsrationalexpectation.Helplessinincentiveoffirmstoimproveproductorservicesquality.60大学课件Low-powerincentivemechanism6GainofmonopolyEconomyofscaleandscopeInnovation(Schumpeter)Innovationactivitiesiscost-largeandrisky,soislargemonopolywhohaspossibilitytoinvestininnovation.Tradeoff：Patentinstitutionandpatentterm.NegativeexternalityWhennegativeexternalityexists,competitiveoutputishigherthansocialoptimalvalue,whilemonopolyoutputisclosertoit.61大学课件GainofmonopolyEconomyofscaChapter 3 MonopolyECNUOrientalRealEstateCollege62大学课件Chapter3MonopolyECNUOrien3.1Marketstructure:classification,characteristicandmeasure3.1.1DeterminantsMarketconcentrationratioProductdifferentiationBarrierstoentryandexitPriceelasticityShort-termcoststructure63大学课件3.1Marketstructure:classifi1、Marketconcentrationratio：firmisoutput,sale,assetsamount,employeenumber，etc.Herfindahl-HirschmanindexXsizeoftheindustryXifirmissizeSimarketshareoffirminnumberoffirms64大学课件1、Marketconcentrationratio642、ProductdifferentiationCrosspriceelasticityAdvertisingdensity=AD/SLAD=sumofadvertisingSL=productsale植草益（1997，31industries）AD/SL3.5%orAD2billionyenveryhighproductdifferentiation1%AD/SL3.5%or1billionyenAD2billionyenhighproductdifferentiationAD/SL1%orAD1billionyenmediumproductdifferentiation65大学课件2、Productdifferentiation65大学3、BarrierstoentryandexitBarrierstoentryBarrierstoentryistheadvantagesharedbycurrentfirmsthatmeansincumbentscankeeppricehigherthancompetitive
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