战略经济学(四)

,Click to edit Master title style,Click to edit Master text styles,Second level,Third level,Fourth level,Fifth level,*,Click to edit Master title style,Click to edit Master text styles,Second level,Third level,Fourth level,Fifth level,*,Economics of Strategy,Chapter 3,Vertical Boundaries of the Firm,Besanko, Dranove, Shanley and Schaefer,1,Vertical Chain,Begins with the acquisition of raw materials,Ends with the sale of finished goods/services,Includes support services such as finance and marketing,Organizing the vertical chain is an important part of business strategy,2,Vertical Boundaries of the Firm,Which steps of the vertical chain are to be performed inside the firm?,Which steps of the vertical chain to be out-sourced?,Choice between the “invisible hand” of the market and the “visible hand” of the organization (Make or Buy),3,Vertically Integrated Firms,In a vertically integrated firm, many of the steps in the vertical chain are performed in-house. Example: UIBE,Some firms choose to outsource many of the vertical chain tasks and become vertically disintegrated. Example: Nike,4,Make versus Buy,Decision depends on the costs and benefits of using the market as opposed to performing the task in-house,Outside specialists may perform a task better than the firm can,Intermediate solutions are possible (Examples: Strategic alliances with suppliers, Joint ventures),5,上游下游,6,Support Services,Accounting,Finance,Legal Support,Marketing,Planning,Human Resource Management,7,Support Services,Support services can be major sources of value creation,UPS Logistics,Toyota Human Resource Manager,Nike - Marketing,8,Defining Boundaries,Firms need to define their vertical boundaries,Considerations,Economies of scale achieved by market firms,Value of market discipline,Ease of coordination of production flows in-house,Transactions costs when dealing with market firms,9,Some Make-or-Buy Fallacies,Firm should make rather than buy assets that provide competitive advantages,Outsourcing an activity eliminates the cost of that activity,Backward integration captures the profit margin of the supplier,Backward integration insures against the risk of high input prices,It makes sense to tie up the distribution channel in order to deny access to the rivals,10,Reasons to Buy rather than Make,Market firms (outside specialists) may have patents/proprietary information that makes low cost production possible,Market firms can achieve economies of scale that in-house units cannot,Market firms are subject to market discipline, whereas in-house units may be able to hide their inefficiencies behind overall corporate success (Agency and influence costs),11,Economies of Scale,12,Make-or-Buy in Insurance,Buying insurance utilizes economies of scale available to insurers,Large firms with sufficient capital can “self-insure”,13,案例：,Self-Insurance by British Petroleum,BP self-insures large losses but buys insurance for small losses,Why,14,Agency and Influence Costs,The incentives to be inefficient and innovative are weaker when a task is performed in-house,Agency costs are particularly problematic if the task is performed by a “cost center” within an organization,忽视代理成本优于消除代理成本,It is difficult to internally replicate the incentives faced by market firms,15,Influence costs,In addition to agency costs, performing a task in-house will lead to “influence costs” as well,“Internal Capital Markets” allocates scarce capital,Allocations can be favorably affected by influence activities,Resources consumed by influence activities represent “influence costs”,为什么在过去几十年里，,GM,在拥有世界上最高生产量的同时，它的许多零部件供应部门的成本也是最高的,16,Reasons to Make,Costs imposed by poor coordination,Reluctance of partners to develop and share valuable private information,Transactions cost that can be avoided by performing the task in-house,Each problem can be traced to difficulties in contracting,17,Role of Contracts,Firms often use contracts when certain tasks are performed outside the firm,Contracts list,the set of tasks that need to be performed,the remedies if one party fails to fulfill its obligation,18,Contracts,Contracts protect each party to a transaction from opportunistic behavior of other(s),Contracts ability to provide this protection depends on,the “completeness” of contracts,the body of contract law,19,Complete Contract,A complete contract stipulates what each party should do for every possible contingency,No party can exploit others weaknesses,To create a compete contract one should be able to contemplate all possible contingencies,One should be able to “map” from each possible contingency to a set of actions,One should be able to define and measure performances,One should be able to enforce the contract,20,Complete Contract (Continued),To enforce a contract, an outside party (judge, arbitrator) should be able to,observe the contingency,observe the actions by the parties,impose the stated penalties for non-performance,Real life contracts are usually incomplete contracts,21,Incomplete Contracts,Incomplete contracts,Involve some ambiguities,Need not anticipate all possible contingencies,Do not spell out rights and responsibilities of parties completely,22,Factors that Prevent Complete Contracting,Bounded rationality,Difficulties in specifying/measuring performance,Asymmetric information,23,Bounded Rationality,Individuals have limited capacity to,Process information,Deal with complexity,Pursue rational aims,Individuals cannot foresee all possible contingencies,24,Specifying/Measuring Performance,Terms like “normal wear and tear” may have different interpretations,Performance cannot always be measured unambiguously,25,Asymmetric Information,Parties to the contract may not have equal access to contract-relevant information,One party can misrepresent information with impurity,26,Contract Law,Contract law facilitates transactions with incomplete contracts,Parties need not specify provisions that are common to a wide class of transactions,27,Limitations of Contract Law,Doctrines of contract law are in broad language that could be interpreted in different ways,Litigation can be a costly way to deal with breach of contract,Litigation can be time consuming,Litigation weakens the business relationship,28,Coordination of Production Flows,For successful coordination one party needs to make decisions that depend on the decision made by others,A good fit should be accomplished in several dimensions. Some examples are:,Timing,Size,Color,Sequence,29,Coordination Problems,Without good coordination, bottlenecks arise in the vertical chain,To ensure coordination, firms rely on contracts that specify delivery dates, design tolerances and other performance targets,30,Design Attributes,Design attributes are attributes that need to relate to each other precisely;,significant loss in economic value results,Some examples,Sequencing of courses in MBA curriculum,Fit of auto sunroof glass to aperture,Timely delivery of a critical component,31,Design Attributes,If coordination is critical, administration control may replace the market mechanism,Design attributes may be moved in-house,32,Leakage of Private Information and Outsourcing,Well- defined patents can help but may not provide full protection,Contracts with non compete clauses can be used to protect against leakage of information,In practice non-compete clauses can be hard to enforce,例如竞业禁止条款,33,Transactions Costs,If the market mechanism improves efficiency, why do so many of the activities take place outside the price system? (Coase),Costs of using the market that are saved by centralized direction transactions costs,34,Transactions Costs,Outsourcing entail costs of negotiating, writing and enforcing contracts,Costs are incurred due to opportunistic behavior of parties to the contract and efforts to prevent such behavior,Transactions costs explain why economic activities occur outside the price system,35,Transactions Costs,Sources of transactions costs,Investments that need to be made in relationship specific assets,Possible opportunistic behavior after the investment is made (hold up problem),Quasi-rents (magnitude of hold up problems),36,Forms of Asset Specificity,Relation-specific assets may exhibit different forms of specificity,Site specificity,（电厂、钢铁加工）,Physical asset specificity,（玻璃生产的模具）,Dedicated assets,（定制的培训项目）,Human asset specificity,37,Rent and Appropriable Quasi-rent,38,The Holdup Problem,39,Effect on Transactions Costs,The holdup problem raises the cost of transacting exchanges,Contract negotiations become more difficult,Investments may have to be made to improve the ex-post bargaining position,Potential holdup can cause distrust,There could be underinvestment in relation specific assets,40,Asset Specificity and Transactions Costs,Relation-specific assets support a particular transaction,Redeploying to other uses is costly,Quasi rents become available to one party and there is incentive for a holdup,Potential for holdups lead to,Underinvestment in these assets,Investment in safeguards,Reduced trust,41,