政府审计问题和改革外文翻译

中文4010字本科毕业论文（设计）外 文 翻 译题 目 政府审计公告制度的现状分析及其对策 专 业 会 计 学 外文题目 Government auditing in China: Problems and reform外文出处 Government auditing in China: Problems and reformN. incorporating Advances in InternationalAccounting 2008，(24)：119-127 外文作者 杨寿昌，贾森泽忠孝，莫里斯彭德尔伯里 原文：Government auditing in China: Problems and reform1. IntroductionFor 30 years after its foundation in 1949, the Peoples Republic of China went through a series of major mass political movements which left it extremely isolated from the rest of the world, especially capitalist countries. At the brink of a total economic collapse, China shifted its focus to economic development, began market-oriented economic reforms, and adopted an open-door policy in 1978.3 These changes revived both government auditing and independent auditing , which had been replaced by other monitoring mechanisms in the 1950s.As required by the 1982 Constitution of the Peoples Republic of China (PRC, 1982), the National Audit Office (NAO) was set up in 1983 as a department of the State Council. In addition, regional audit offices were also set up as departments of provincial, municipal and county governments. A regional government audit office is under the leadership of both the government audit office at a higher level and its supervising regional government. For example, the audit office of a provincial government is subject to the joint leadership of the NAO and the provincial government. Under the dual leadership system, for a provincial government audit office, the NAO provides auditing and regulatory guidance and monitoring while the provincial government provides resources and exercises personnel control. In addition, the NAO operates a network of branch offices in central government ministries and very large municipalities to audit various government departments, agencies, state owned enterprises under the control of the central government, and their associated institutions. These branch audit offices located in ministries and very large municipalities are under the direct leadership of the NAO.Although this government audit system has made significant contributions toward Chinas economic reform and opening up to the world in the past 20 years (Chinese Auditing System Research Group, 1999), it also suffers from the lack of audit independence. The existing problems of government auditing mainly stem from it being under the direct control of the executive body (the State Council). Under this system, various government departments and officials can, both theoretically and practically, interfere with government auditing, thus weakening the objectivity and fairness of the audit. However, the peoples congresses at various levels have begun to attach significant importance to, and make increasing use of, the audit report. At the same time, more and more taxpayers have begun to pay attention to how their money is used by the government. While the NAOs lack of independence has always been a problem ever since its establishment, this problem is creating increasing tensions in the current political setting because of the accountability needs of the legislature and taxpayers. The accountability relationship between the government and the legislature is compromised by the fact that the auditor is not independent of the government.Notwithstanding these problems, the NAO has stepped up the level of public disclosure of audit findings in recent years. In 2003, the NAO for the first time disclosed to the public that serious financial problems existed in four ministries of the central government. This disclosure and the problems exposed attracted much media attention and the phrase “Audit Storm” was used to refer to the disclosure and the issues raised. This “Audit Storm” continued in 2004 and 2005 when the NAO in its annual report disclosed the serious illegal acts in other ministries of the central government. However, although this storm has been useful in drawing attention to some of the problems that had occurred, the level of audit independence means that only a small percentage of the total were exposed. Also, even where problems are exposed, this does not ensure that the same problems will not recur. Thus, the “Audit Storm” has heightened the awareness of the need for government auditing reform.2. Perceived problems of the current government auditing systemMost interviewees believed that the current problems of government auditing have their origins in its relation to the government, i.e., the NAO is in effect an internal auditing department under the governments direct control. The following paragraphs elaborate the main problems identified in the interviews.2.1. Lack of audit independenceThe majority of our interviewees acknowledged some direct or indirect intervention by people or organisations from outside the NAO. These have a strong negative impact on audit planning, the training and appointment of auditing personnel, the determination of audit tasks, the dealing with problems identified in the audit, and the disclosure of audit results. As a result, theNAOcan hardly perform any independent auditing. A director-general of a provincial government audit office commented: The problems identified in the audit should be dealt with in accordance with law, but if the problems involve the government, the audit office will experience interference from the governmental official in charge or from other authorities.Some interviewees acknowledged the lack of independence of government auditing, but at the same time they did not want to exaggerate the problem. Being a department directed by the government, how can the audit officework independently free from the interference of the government or the chief government officers (CGO)? Is the result of interference inevitably detrimental? The interviewees found it hard to answer these questions. Besides, the audit office and the government are at different administrative levels and may not always have consistent perceptions on auditing. Under this circumstance, as was revealed in the interviews, the audit office, being at the lower level, would normally follow the governments will and this is understandable. We argue that if auditing is supposed to satisfy merely the needs of the government, or if government audit is supposed to play a supporting role to governmental work, then the problem of limited audit independence is relatively partial, because government auditing still achieves its main objective. But if the peoples congress and taxpayers outside the government are also audit clients, and entrust the government audit office to investigate how the government implemented fiscal budgets approved by the peoples congress, then the control relationship between the audit office and the government becomes a severe problem. An immediate consequence of the lack of audit independence is that the audit report may no longer possess objectivity and fairness and it is therefore less likely to gain the trust and acceptance by the peoples congress and the public.2.2. Restricted disclosure of audit resultsThe interviewees generally felt that the disclosure of audit results might be restricted. A deputy CGO (a deputy mayor) of a municipal government commented in the interview: The audit report follows governmental arrangements, but this does not necessarily indicate that the government will prevent the disclosure of audit issues. Whoever acts as the CGO faces external pressure and thus s/he will disclose something, explain it to the peoples congress, and also save the face of the audit office. But will the CGO disclose all the issues or important issues then? Will the issues concerning his/her annual report be disclosed as they really are? One can never tell. A director-general from the NAO admitted: In fact, some government officials interfere with the audit office in reporting audit results to the Peoples Congress. They even directly demand the audit office to remove big issues that violate regulations from the audit report.An official from the NAO also admitted in the interview that some local governments and related authorities interfere with the disclosure of audit findings and the resolution of audit results in order to shirk responsibilities and avoid excessive disclosure that might overshadow their political career. The interview data thus suggests that the audit office is not only constrained by the government in terms of audit planning and the determination of audit tasks, but also the disclosure of audit results. That is, the audit office cannot make its own decisions on what to disclose, how to disclose, and when to disclose. Consequently, there is no assurance on the authority and transparency of audit reports. With the submission of audit reports to the peoples congress, this problem of a lack of independence and transparency has aroused increased concerns. Since the Constitution (PRC, 1982) and the Audit Law (PRC, 1994a) lack clear and rigid rules on the disclosure of audit results, the content and degree of disclosure in the current auditing system are determined and censored by the governments discretionary disclosure policies on government affairs and are also heavily affected by the attitudes of CGOs.2.3. Auditing gapsMost interviewees mentioned the same problem; the audit is only applied to government units at a lower level of the hierarchy. That is, the audit rarely examines the responsibility and performance of the government itself or its CGO, and hence the depth, level, and scope of auditing are rather restricted. The following comment made by an interviewee who is a director-general at the NAO is representative of the views. From a legal point of view, there will not be any constraint on the audit of decisions made by higher-level officials, but in practice you cannot really question them. If in the audit process we discover problems or mistaken decisions made by high-level officials, we would rather not disclose them. We would assume that the government always does the right thing. That is to say, if the problems arose from decisions made by the government, we will not bother about them any more. How can we supervise our superiors? We are only a department of the government.Some of our interviewees also mentioned that in budget auditing, since the audit does not actually involve the financial responsibility and performance of the government and its CGO, it is unavoidable that many big issues are overlooked or neglected, especially those related to the government or CGOs themselves. Given that many problems result from governmental activity, the audit office can do nothing and the problems can appear over and over again. This kind of auditing exhibits a serious problem of power centralisation.2.4. Budget audit as a mere formalitySome interviewees questioned whether audit results would be reported accurately to the peoples congress even if the audit office carried out budget auditing at the government level. If the government determines the content of the audit report, budget auditing is in effect the governments “self-inspection”. The Constitution (PRC, 1982) empowers the CGO with respect to both auditing and financial matters. However, in many local governments, the CGO holds the financial decision-making powers while the deputy CGO is delegated to take charge of auditing. This situation might make it more difficult for the audit office to monitor fiscal and financial activities of the government and its CGO simply because the deputys unwillingness to expose a CGO. This is reflected in the remarks made by one interviewee, a deputy director-general at a provincial government audit office: The difficulty that the audit office faces in performing budget auditing is truly enormous, because fiscal and financial powers rest in the hands of the CGO. Important fiscal and financial issues and the annual fiscal and financial budget must be decided by the CGO. Once the budget is set, any budget adjustment must also be approved by the government and its CGO. Under such conditions, auditing fiscal and financial budgets would be equivalent to the audit of the government and its CGO. Thus, auditors face not only the finance department but also the CGO. In the auditing process, if the finance department tells the auditor that the CGO does not give permission for something to be audited, then the auditor will not have the necessary access.Moreover, as the relationship between the peoples congress and the government is that of supervisor and supervisee, it is difficult, if not impossible, for the government audit office to serve two “masters”. In such a conflicting situation, the government audit office can only put the governments interests and requirements first, since the government is its direct “boss”. To serve the government in essence and the peoples congress in appearance is an inevitable choice of the government audit office under the current system. The legislature therefore cannot directly exercise audit supervision and can only indirectly monitor the fiscal budget through auditing. The legislature also lacks other practical approaches and tools for monitoring the implementation of fiscal budgets and this limits its ability to obtain an insight into the workings of financial systems and budget implementation. The legislature can therefore play a very limited role in monitoring financial systems and fiscal budgets.3. Reforming and ConclusionWe carried out interviews in 2002 in order to comprehend and evaluate the current government auditing systemin China and identify a rational and feasible approach to reforming the system. We also examined the impact of the recent “Audit Storm” on the government auditing system. The results of our investigation show that the current government auditing system in China lacks independence and transparency. The lack of independence affects the objectivity and reliability of auditing which is particularly important when auditing the implementation, use and control of budgeted funds by central and regional governments. It is this aspect of government auditing that has the greatest need for audit independence.Our analysis of the “Audit Storm” shows that ithas increased auditing transparency and attracted much attention from the public, the NPC officials, academics, and government officials to the serious problems in managing public finance. It has also shown that government auditing has an important role to play in protecting public interests. However, merely drawing attention to the problems cannot prevent them from recurring. Also, government censorship means that many problems are not disclosed and it has proved difficult to extend the “Audit Storm” to local audit bureaus. All these weaknesses are rooted in the lack of independence in the current government auditing system.The “Legislature Approach” has been widely discussed among Chinese academics. Although it emphasises audit independence, it neglects the centralised nature of the government structure, the political tension between the government and the legislature, and the problems that the legislature itself faces. Therefore, implementing this approach in the current political climate may weaken the governments economic control and require a major restructuring of the government and the legislature, thus lacking practicality and feasibility.To smooth this proposed transition, we put forward a “Dual-Track System” as an interim step toward a fully-fledged legislature-led state audit system. Our proposal suggests that the legislature and the government should set up separate audit organisations to exercise different audit responsibilities. The “Dual-Track System” takes into account both the need to improve audit independence and the feasibility of reform. This approach satisfies the increasing will of the Chinese legislature to strengthen budget auditing while at the same time meeting the need of the government to maintain strong economic control.Source:Suchang Yang , Jason Zezhong Xiao , Maurice Pendlebury .Government auditing in China: Problems and reformN.Advances in Accounting, incorporating Advances in International Accounting，2008，(24)：119-127.译文：中国政府审计：问题和改革1、简介1949年后的30年，中华人民共和国经历了一系列重要大众政治运动,使它在世界各地极其孤立，特别是资本主义国家。在一个经济全面崩溃的边缘，中国将重点转移到经济发展，开始了以市场为导向的经济改革，并通过了1978年3月的门户开放政策，同时恢复政府审计与独立审计并取代了20世纪50年代所实行的监测机制。按照中华人民共和国1982年宪法规定，国家审计署（NAO）作为国务院的部门成立于1983年。此外，区域审计办公室还成立了省，市，县政府部门。一个地区的政府审计办公室是根据双方的政府审计办公室在更高水平上监督区政府的领导。例如，一个省级政府审计办公室是受审计署和省级政府共同领导。在双重领导体制下，为省政府审计署，审计署的审计和监管提供指导和监督，而省政府提供资源和演习人员控制。此外，审计署经营在中央部委和分支机构网络非常大的直辖市审计根据中央的政府来管制各政府部门，机构，国有企业，其他关联机构。这些分支审计机关各部委由超大型城市设下的国家审计署直接领导。虽然在过去的20年，这个政府审计制度已给中国的经济改革开放做出了重大贡献（中国审计制度的研究小组，1999年），但是在面向世界时也遭受了缺乏审计独立性的质疑。政府审计中存在的问题主要源于其下的行政机构（国务院）的直接控制之下。在这个制度下，各政府部门和官员可以在理论和实践中干扰政府审计，从而削弱了审计的客观性和公正性。然而，随着审计报告越来越多的使用，各级人民代表大会也开始重视其重要意义。与此同时，越来越多的纳税人开始注意他们的钱是如何由政府使用。虽然审计署的缺乏独立性一直是公司成立以来的问题，这个问题正在创造出越来越多的创造了电流，因为问责的政治环境日益引起了立法机关和纳税人的关注。政府与立法机关之间的关系受到损害责任的事实是审计人员不独立于政府的重大原因。由于存在这些问题，审计署已加紧在近几年的审计结果公开披露的水平。 2003年，审计署首次向公众披露了四个中央部委存在的严重财政问题。此披露和曝光的问题备受媒体的关注，“审计风暴”一次也由此而来。在2004年和2005年，在其年度报告中披露了审计署对中央其他部委的严重违法行为。然而，尽管这场风暴已在提请人们注意所发生的问题，但是审计独立性的一些有用的手段，只有一小部分的总暴露。此外，即使问题暴露出来，这并不能确保不会再发生同样的问题。因此，“审计风暴”已加深了对政府审计改革必要性的认识。2、当前政府审计制度审计改革已知的问题大部分受访者认为当前的政府审计的问题是与政府密切相关的，这实际上是一种行为的内部审计部门在政府的直接控制。以下各段阐述的访谈中发现的主要问题。（1）缺乏审计独立性我们的大多数受访者承认，审计署的一些人或组织从外面直接或间接干预。在审计发现的问题时，与审计结果公开，这些审计规划，培训和审计人员的任命，对审计任务的决心具有强大消极影响。因此，审计署也很难执行任何独立审计。一个审计局局长说道：在审计中发现问题应依法处理，但如果问题涉及到政府，审计机关将将会干扰负责的政府官员或其他机关。一些受访者承认政府审计缺乏独立性，但同时他们也不想夸大这个问题。由政府指导的一个部门，审计机关如何能从政府或行政政府官员的干预中独立工作？这是不可避免的结果。受访者觉得难以回答这些问题。此外，审计署和政府是在不同的行政级别，对审计可能并不总有一致的看法。在这种情况下，如在访谈中透露，审计署处在较低水平者，通常会按照政府的意志来执行这是可以理解的。我们认为，如果审计仅仅满足政府的需要，或者如果政府审计发挥作用，支持政府工作为政府审计实现其主要目标，那么，有限的审计独立性问题是比较片面的。但如果人民代表大会代表和政府以外的纳税人也是审计客户，并委托政府审计办公室，由人民代表大会通过研究如何将政府推行财政预算，那么审计办公室和政府控制之间的关系将成为一个严重问题。一个审计缺乏独立性的直接后果是，审计报告可能不再具备客观性和公正性，因此，不太可能获得人民代表大会代表和公众的信任和接受。（2）限制披露审计结果受访者普遍认为，审计结果的披露可能会受到限制。CGO政府的副市长在接受采访时评论说：审计报告按照政府的安排，但这并不一定表示政府将防止审计问题披露。无论谁担任，政府总部面临的外部压力使得她/他会透露一些东西，解释给人民代表大会，同时也节省了审计署的时间。但是，政府总部将怎样披露所有的问题或重要的问题呢？有关的问题将会在他的年度报告中予以披露？这是一个永远无法知道的问题。审计署的一位官员指出：事实上，一些政府官员干涉审计署审计结果报告给人大。他们甚至要求审计机关直接删除违反规定的审计报告大问题。在对审计署的官方采访中也了解到，一些地方政府和相关部门的审计结果披露和审计结果决议，以推卸责任，避免过多的披露，可能掩盖其政治生涯的干涉。这样的访谈资料显示，审计局是不仅在规划方面，还在政府审计和审计任务的决心对审计结果披露进行限制。也就是说，对审计机关透露什么，如何披露，以及何时公开自己的决定进行限制。因此，没有对审计报告的权威性和透明度的保证。随着审计报告提交给人大，这就说明缺乏独立性和透明度的问题已引起日益关注。因为宪法（中华人民共和国，1982年）和审计法（中华人民共和国，1994年）缺乏明确和严格的审计结果，内容和当前审计系统信息披露程度的披露有分歧，以及政府的自由裁量对政府事务进行披露政策截尾规则，也严重影响了CGOs的态度。（3）审计差距多数受访者提到了同一问题;审计是只适用于在一个较低的水平层次的政府单位。也就是说，审计能检查的责任和政府本身或政府总部的性能很少，因此深度，水平和审计范围是相当有限。以下是由审计署总干事提出的代表性意见。从法律的角度来看，不会有任何更高级别的官员作出审计决定的约束，但实际上，你不能真正问他们。如果我们在审计过程中发现的问题或由高级别官员作出错误的决定，我们宁愿不予以披露。我们假设政府总是不正确的事情。这就是说，如果问题是由政府作出的决定产生的，我们不会理会他们。这样我们如何能监督我们的上司？我们只是一个政府部门。我们的受访者有些人还提到，在预算审查，因为实际上并没有涉及审计的财务责任和政府及其政府总部的性能，这是不可避免的，许多大问题被忽略或忽视，特别是有关政府或CGOs自己。考虑到许多问题，从政府活动的结果上看，审计署可以什么也不做，可能会出现的问题一遍又一遍。这种审计展览中的一个严重问题是中央集权力量。（4）预算审计作为一种走过场一些受访者质疑，审计结果将准确地向人民代表大会报告即使审计局开展了政府一级预算审计。如果政府决定了审计报告的内容，预算审计是政府的“自我检查”之功效。宪法（中华人民共和国，1982年）两方面授权审计和财务事项的政府总部。然而，在许多地方政府，政府总部举行的财务决策而下一级采取委托负责审计的权力。这种情况审计机关在监察财政和政府及其政府总部的金融活动时可能会变得更加困难了，只是因为不愿意暴露政府中部的弊端。这是由一个受访者，一名副主任，省级政府审计办公室干事的发言反映：困难在于审计机关在执行财政预算审计面临的真正的巨大的压力，因为财政和金融权力安息在中区政府合署手中。重要的财政和金融问题和年度财政财务预算必须由政府总部决定。一旦预算设置，任何预算的调整也必须经政府批准和中区政府合署。在这种情况下，审计财政财务预算将等同于政府的审计，它的中区政府合署。因此，审计人员面临的不仅是财政部门，而是政府总部。在审计过程中，如果财政部门告诉审计人员说，中区政府合署不准许被审计的东西，那么，审计人员将没有访问的必要。此外，由于人大和政府之间的关系是监督和监管，这是困难的，因为政府审计办公室为两个“主人”。在这种冲突的情况下，政府审计机关只能把政府的利益和要求放在第一，因为政府的直接“老板”是他。为人民服务在本质上和人民代表大会的政府在外观上是一种政府审计办公室在现行制度下的必然选择。因此，立法机关不能直接行使审计监督和监测只能间接地通过审计财政预算。立法机关也缺乏监督财政预算执行情况其他的实用方法和工具，这限制了它的能力，以获得对财务制度和预算执行的运作的了解。因此，立法机关能够在监测金融体系和财政预算时起到十分有限的作用。3、改革和总结我们进行了面谈，以便在2002年理解和评估目前中国政府审计系统，并确定一个合理的，可行的改革制度。我们还研究了近期的“审计风暴”的政府审计制度的影响。我们的调查结果显示，目前中国政府审计制度缺乏独立性和透明度。缺乏