资源描述
LOAN GUARANTEES:COSTS OF DEFAULT AND BENEFITS TO SMALL FIRM作者：ALLAN L. RIDING& GEORGE HAINES JR. 国籍：Canada出处：Carleon University, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada原文正文：Governments of most countries seek to encourage Small and Medium Sized Enterprise (SME) growth and the job creation that many believe is fostered by such growth. Substantive growth usually requires expansion capital. It is often perceived that compared with larger firms, SMEs face disproportionately less access to the debt capital they need for start-up, growth, and survival.Consequently, governments and trade associations have often intervened in credit markets by taking on the role of guarantor of loans that financial institutions advance to SMEs. For example, the Small Business Administration in the United States provides guarantees of loans made by banks to qualifying small firms. Similar schemes are in effect in, among other countries,Canada, Japan, the U.K., Korea, and Germany. Trade associations take on such roles in France, Spain,and other nations.Loans that support the expansion of small enterprises may convey significant benefits to the borrowing firms and, through job creation and retention, to the rest of society. However, to the extent that some borrowers are unable to meet the repayment obligations of their debt, guarantors also face material real costs of honoring their guarantee to the lenders. Loan guarantee programs are designed in a variety of ways. Often these programs do not appear to reflect guidance from economic theory or experience.This paper draws on empirical evidence to compare costs with benefits. In addition, it uses the results and economic theory to provide some guidance for the design of loan guarantee programs. Finally, the study shows that loan guarantee programs can be an effective means of supporting start-up, growth, and survival of new and risky enterprises. The work finds that substantial total and incremental job creation may be attributed to the Canadian loan guarantee program.The paper reviews previous - -attempts to conduct cost-benefit analyses of loan guarantee programs.It finds wide variation, internationally, in default rates. Published data suggests default rates vary from less than 5% (Germany) to more than 40% (U.K.). The empirical analysis reported here focuses on the Canadian implementation of loan guarantees, the Small Business Loans Act (SBLA). Findings include (1) loan guarantees granted under the terms of the SBLA provide an extremely efficient means of job creation, with very low estimated costs per job; (2) default rates are higher for newer firms, increase with the amount of funds borrowed, and vary widely by sector (borrowers in the retail and accommodation, and food and beverage sectors were significantly more likely to default than borrowers in other sectors); and (3) the widening eligibility to larger firms and to larger loans may not be well advised and is inconsistent with the goals of the program. Moreover, reducing the loan ceiling would arguably discourage fraudulent applications while servicing those SMEs most in need of early-stage capital.In addition, analysis of the lenders motives suggests that default rates on the portfolio of guaranteed loans and, therefore, the costs of honoring guarantees, are particularly sensitive to the level of the guarantee. Small reductions in the level of the guarantee (for example, guaranteeing80%of principal and accrued interest instead of 85%) could lead to substantial reductions in default rates. Debate persists in economic theory about whether or not government intervention in the credit market is warranted, in spite of the findings that loan guarantees seem to make positive contributions. Further analysis of these issues is advised. 2001 Elsevier Science Inc.- -贷款担保的违约成本和对小企业的利处作者： 亚伦.瑞德 乔治.海恩斯国籍：加拿大出处：加拿大.安大略省.渥太华市.carleon 大学中文译文：大多数国家的政府鼓励中小企业的成长，并认为中小企业的成长能促进就业机会的增长。中小企业实质性的成长需要资本扩张。通常认为，相对于大企业而言，中小企业面临着不成比例或者说很少能筹集到其发起、成长和生存所需要的债务资本。政府和行业协会常常扮演者信贷担保人的角色以使贷款机构向中小企业发放贷款。例如，在美国，小企业管理局向符合条件的小企业发放银行贷款担保。类似的计划，实际上，在其他国家例如加拿大，日本，英国，韩国和德国都存在。法国、西班牙和其他国家的行业协会也常常扮演着这种角色。支持扩大小企业的贷款，可能会给借款单位带来显著效益；并且能够通过创造新的就业岗位和保留原来的岗位，也会给整个社会带来显著效益。然而，从某种程度上，一些借款人无法履行期借款偿还义务，担保者也面临着向放款者履行地担保义务的物质上的实际成本。贷款担保计划书有各种各样的设计样式。通常，这些计划书的出现并不直接反映经济理论或经验方面的指南。这篇论文是基于实证研究以对比贷款担保的成本和收益。此外，本篇论文使用研究结果和经济理论向贷款计划的设计给以指导。最后，研究表明，贷款担保计划是支持本身具有风险的新型企业发起、存在和生存的有效方式。研究发现，大量的总量和增量的就业岗位的创造可以归因于加拿大的贷款担保计划。这篇论文回顾了以前试图进行的贷款担保计划的陈本收益分析。研究发现，国际范围内，违约率存在着很大差异。公布的数据表明，违约率从不到 5%（德国）到超过40%（英国）。据此期间，对重点向加拿大实施的贷款担保和中小企业贷款法的实证分析的结果表明：（1）根据中小企业贷款法，贷款担保提供了一种非常有效的创造就业岗位的方式，并给与创造的每个岗位的成本非常低的估计；（2）- -新企业的违约可能性更大，并且这种可能性随着借款金额的增加而提高；不同行业的违约率有着显著不同（零售、住宿、食品和饮料行业的借款者的违约率比其他行业借款者的违约率更高。）；（3）扩大交大的企业和交大贷款资格可能并不是合适的建议，并且这也与贷款担保计划的目标不想符合。此外，降低贷款上限无疑将阻止欺诈应用从而向中小企业提供其早期最需要的资本金。此外，对贷款人的动机分析表明担保贷款组合的违约率和履行担保的成本对保证水平特别敏感。保证水平的小幅度减小（例如，保证 80%的本金和利息而不是 85%的本金和利息）可能导致违约水平的大幅度减小。尽管有发现说明担保贷款似乎做出了积极的贡献，但关于政府干预信贷市场是否是必须的经济理论一直被争论着。进一步分析这些问题变得很有必要。
展开阅读全文