金融学外文翻译

中文 3660 字外文原文Is the 2007 U.S. Sub-Prime Financial Crisis So Different? AnInternational Historical ComparisonCarmen M. Reinhart University of Maryland and the NBER and Kenneth S.Rogoff Harvard University and the NBERThe first major financial crisis of the 21st century involves esoteric instruments, unaware regulators, and skittish investors. It also follows a well-trodden path laid down by centuries of financial folly. This time is a problem of sub-prime mortgages, but this time is not different. In fact, there are stunning quantitative parallels across a number of major crisis indicators from the standard literature on international financial crises. For example, the run-up in U.S. equity and housing prices, which Graciela L. Kaminsky and Carmen M. Reinhart (1999) find to the be best leading indicators of crisis in countries experiencing large capital inflows, closely tracks the average of the nineteen major post World War II banking crises in industrial countries. So, too, is the inverted v-shape of real growth in the years prior to the crisis. Despite widespread concern about the effects on national debt of the early 2000s tax cuts, the run-up in U.S. public debt is actually somewhat below the average of other crisis episodes. In contrast, the pattern of United States current account deficits is markedly worse.The book is still open on the how the current dislocations in the United States will play out, but some precedent can be found in the aftermath of other bank-centered financial crises in industrial economies. Depending on the degree of trauma to the banking system, they can be quite severe. A severe banking crisis typically has a far deeper and more protracted effect on growth than does a severe currency crisis, if the latter occurs in isolation. The average drop in (real per capita) output growth is over two percent, and it typically takes two years to return to trend. For the five most catastrophic cases (which include episodes in Finland, Japan, Norway, Spain and Sweden), the drop in annual output growth from peak to trough is over five percent, and growth remained well below pre-crisis trend even after three years. It is, of course, the more catastrophic casesthat policymakers particularly want to steer clear of.1. Post War Bank-Centered Financial Crises: The DataOur main purpose here is to make simple and straightforward comparisons of the United States 2007 crisis with other post-war crises, employing a small piece of a much larger and longer historical data set we have constructed (see Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff, 2008.) The extended data set catalogues banking and financial crises around the entire world dating back to 1800 (in some cases earlier). In order to focus here on datamost relevant to present U.S. situation, we do not consider the plethora of emerging market crises, nor industrialized country financial crises from the Great Depression or the 1800s. Nevertheless, it is striking how much the “this time is different” syndrome has already been repeated.First came the rationalizations. This time, many analysts argued, the huge run-upin U.S. housing prices was not at all a bubble, but rather justified by financial innovation (including to sub-prime mortgages, as well as by the steady inflow of capital from Asia and petroleum exporters. The huge run-up in equity prices was similarly argued to be sustainable thanks to a surge in U.S. productivity growth a fall in risk that accompanied the “Great Moderation” in macroeconomic volatility. As for the extraordinary string of outsized U.S. current account deficits, which now soak up roughly two-thirds of all the worlds current account surpluses, many analysts argued that these, too, could be justified by new elements of the global economy. Thanks to a combination of a flexible economy and the innovation of the tech boom, the United States could be expected to enjoy superior productivity growth for decades, while superior American know-how meant higher returns on physical and financial investment than foreigners could expect in the United States.Next came the reality. In the past few month, we have seen a striking contractionin wealth, increases in risk spreads, and deterioration in market functioning. The 2007 United States sub-prime crisis, of course, has it roots in falling U.S. housing prices, which have in turn led to higher default levels particularly among less credit worthy borrowers. The impact of these defaults on the financial sector has been greatly magnified due to complex bundling techniques that were thought to spread risk efficiently, but in fact have made the resulting instruments extremely nontransparent and illiquid in the face of falling house prices.As a benchmark for the 2007 U.S. sub-prime crisis, we draw on data from nineteen bank-centered financial crises from the post-War period. We have included postwar episodes in which an important financial institution or segment of financial sector collapsed in a manner similar to that described by Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999). For further discussion and documentation, see Reinhart and Rogoff (2008).These crisis episodes include:The Five Big Five Crises: Spain (1977), Norway (1987), Finland (1991), Sweden (1991) and Japan (1992), where the starting year is in parenthesis. Other Banking and Financial Crises: Australia (1989), Canada (1983), Denmark (1987), France (1994), Germany (1977), Greece (1991), Iceland (1985), and Italy (1990), and New Zealand (1987), United Kingdom (1974, 1991, 1995), and United States (1984, 2007).The “Big Five” crises are all protracted large scale financial crises that are associated with major declines in economic performance for a protracted period. Japan (1992), of course, is the start of the “lost decade,” although the Nordic Crises and the Spanish crisis of 1977 all left deep marks on their economies as well.The remaining rich country financial crises represent a broad range of lesser events. The 1984 U.S. crisis is the savings and loan crisis and, of course, the 2007 crisis is the sub-prime crisis, which we have represented as a U.S. crisis though of course it has had asevere impact on banks from Europe to Central Asia.While generally all the crises centrally involved the banking system, we have included the 1995 UK crisis that resulted from the bankruptcy of Barings, which was essentially an investment bank.We note that one crisis episode not encompassed by our selection criteria is the period of severe bank stress in the U.S. and Europe, especially, caused by the developing country debt crisis that began in 1982. We omit it because the bank crisis was not clearly at the epi-center of problem (which had it roots in U.S. disinflation and a drop in world commodity prices). Moreover, it overlaps somewhat with our dating of the thrift crisis. However, including it would not weaken our results.2. ComparisonsWe now proceed to a variety of simple comparisons between the 2007 U.S. crisis and previous episodes. Drawing on the standard literature on financial crises, we look at asset prices, growth and public debt. We begin in Figure 1 by comparing the run-up in housing prices. Period T represents the year of the onset of the financial crisis. So period T-4 is four years prior to the crisis, and the graph in each case continues to T+3, except of course in the case of the U.S. 2007 crisis.1The chart confirms the case study literature, showing the significant run-up in housing prices prior to a financial crisis, with the affect being particularly pronounced for the “Big five” severe cases. Housing prices in th United States, however, have risen even further.the big five crisis countries tended to experience equity price falls earlier on. Of course, each of thesel crises occurred at different points i in the global productivity cycle, which may explain some of the difference. Then, too, the monetary -responses differed across these episodes, with the Federal Reserve pumping in an extraordinary amount of stimulus in the early part of the most recent episode.owever,115105100PQFigure 2: Reni Eqoiti Piicz and BanJziii CrisU5: 2001=100Jaw.孚 ft: bauin?匚口书 in為 oc 丈 eCOEOlTEIadiT-4=lM挖1eragE Sjf the Bis. Crises! JIIIIIIIIt-4占t-1Tt+1K2H-3Figure 3 looks at the current account as a share of GDP, again starting four years before the crisis. Again, the United States looks like the typical pre-crisis country, in the capital inflows accelerate going into the crisis. However, the U.S. deficits are more severe, reaching over six percent of GDP. As already mentioned, there is a large and growing literature that attempts to rationalize why it might be beneficial for the United States to a sustained current deficit. The simplest argument is that increasing global trade and financial globalization supports larger current account imbalances (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2001). The various rationales for the massive U.S. current account deficit would be more reassuring if the U.S. deficit were not almost twice the average of the earlier precrisis episodes.Real per capita GDP growth in the run-up to debt crises is illustrated in Figure 4. The United States 2007 crisis follows the same inverted V shape that characterizes the earlier episodes. Growth momentum falls going into the typical crisis, and remains low for two years after. In the more severe “Big Five” cases, however,ktish evgerrolawrtghershoc and more prolonged. Not encouraging for the U.S. economic outlook, the aftermath of a banking crisis tends to have a protracted effect on real growth.public debt is rising prior to the 2007 U.S. crisis, it is rising notably more slowly than in the average of the other 18 episodes, and much more slowly than the Big Five. This shallow path of U.S. public debt also makes it clear that the large current account deficits shown earlier owe to factors other than just government excess.The correlations in these graphs are not necessarily causal, but in combination nevertheless suggest that if the United States does not experience a significant and protracted growth slowdown, it should either be considered very lucky or even more “special” that most optimistic theories suggest. Indeed, given the severity of most crisis indicators in the run-up to its 2007 financial crisis, the United States should consider itself fortunate if it can have post-crisis trajectory parallel to the milder banking crises in the comparison set, as opposed to the much larger growth pauses experiences by Spain, Japan, Sweden, Norway and Finland during their severe financial crises.3. ConclusionsTolstoy famously begins his classic novel Anna Kareninawith the line “Every happy family is alike, but every unhappy family is unhappy in their own way.” While each financial crisis no doubt has its own distinctions, there are also striking similarities, in the run-up of asset prices, in debt accumulation, in growth patterns, and in current account deficits. The majority of historical crises are preceded by financial liberalization, as documented in Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999). While in the case of the United States, there has been no striking de jure liberalization, there certainly has been a de facto liberalization. New unregulated, or lightly regulated, financial entities have come to play a much larger role in the financial system, undoubtedly enhancing stability against some kinds of shocks, but possibly increasing vulnerabilities against others.Perhaps the United States will prove a different kind of happy family. Despite many superficial similarities to a typical crisis country, it may yet suffer a growth lapse comparable only to the mildest cases. Perhaps this time will be different as so many argue.Whatever the long-term outcome, the quantitative parallels to earlier post-war industrialized-country financial crises, at least in the pre-crisis period, is worthy of note. Of course, inflation is lower and better anchored today worldwide, and this may prove an important mitigating factor.ownOne last parallel deserves mention. During the 1970s, the U.S. banking system stood as an intermediary between oil-exporter surpluses and emerging market borrowers in Latin America and elsewhere. While much praised at the time, 1970s petro-dollar recycling ultimately led to the 1980s debt crisis, which in turn placed enormous strain on money center banks.3 It is true that this time, a great deal of petro-dollars are again flowing into the United States, but many emerging markets have been running current account surpluses, lending rather than borrowing. Instead, a large chunk of money has effectively been recycled to a developing economy that exists within the UnitebdordSetrast. es Over a trillion dollars was channeled into the sub-prime mortgage market, which is comprised of the poorest and least credit worth borrowers within the United States. The final claimant is different, but in many ways, the mechanism is the same.翻译文章一个国际历史性的比较：2007美国次贷金融危机是否不同卡门莱因哈特米马里兰大学和国家经济研究局和哈佛大学肯尼斯罗格夫学和国家经济研究局21 世纪的第一次重大金融危机涉及深奥的手段，不易察觉的调整机构和活跃的投资者。它 也良好地遵循了百年来金融危机的闹剧规律。这一次我们将面临抵押贷款的问题,但与之前相 比，也并无什么差异。事实上，在定量指标上，很大一批危机指标都和国际金融危机的标准文 献相吻合。例如，卡明斯基和卡门莱因哈特米（1999 年）通过密切跟踪二战后十九次主要工业 国家的银行危机研究，发现美国股票上涨和住房价格,是引起经济危机中国家大量资本流入的最 好指标。因此，也就是倒V形实际增长在未来数年之前的危机。尽管2000年代初期，人们广泛 关注减税国家的债务情况，但美国的公共债务却低于其他经济危机波及的国家。与此相反，美 国的赤字格局是明显恶化。该书还对如何改变美国目前混乱的情况做深入的研究，但一些先例可在其他银行的善后事 宜中找到。根据银行系统不同程度的损伤，工业经济体的金融危机的相当严重。较之发生在隔 离状态下的货币危机，一次严重的银行危机通常具有更深远，更持久影响。平均降低产出的增 长（人均）超过百分之二时通常需要2年时间才能恢复到原有趋势。五个最灾难性的案例（其 中包括发作在瑞典，芬兰，日本，挪威，西班牙）， 年产量从高峰下降到低谷，但三年后，其 增长率超过百分之五，并保持良好的势头。1.战后银行经济危机数据：我们的主要目的是将美国2007 年危机与其他战后危机做简单的比较，使用一小块更大和 较长远的历史数据集延长数据，我们已经构建（见莱因哈特和肯尼斯学 罗格夫， 2008。）危 机围绕设定的目录银行和金融扩展数据，整个世界可以追溯到1800年（在某些情况下更早）。 为了集中这些数据，目前在美国的相关情况下，我们不过多地考虑新兴市场危机，也不涉及 十九世纪的工业化国家或金融危机大萧条。 不过，惊人的是“这一次是不同的”综合症已经 被重复。首先是合理化。这一次，许多分析师认为，不是所有的美国房价的庞大升值都是泡沫经 济，而是金融创新的理由（包括次级抵押贷款，以及来自亚洲的稳定资金流入 和石油出口国。 股票价格的巨大运行也同样被认为伴随持续激增得益于美国生产率增长下降的风险 下“大 稳定”的宏观经济波动。至于非凡串联的美国项目赤字过于庞大，目前大约吸收世界上所有 账户盈余的三分之二。受到全球经济的新元素的影响，许多分析家认为，这些也可能是合理 的。由于经济与科技创新热潮的灵活结合，美国可望在未来的几十年里享受卓越生产力的不 断增长，而与外国人相比，优越的美国人更能发现物理和经济投资所能带来的高回报。接下来是现实。在过去数月，我们已经看到了显著的财富收缩和增加的传播风险还有市场 运作的恶化。 2007 年，美国次贷危机，当然受美国房价下跌的影响， 这反过来又导致较高水 平信贷违约，特别是信誉不高的借款人。这些机构的影响金融领域的拖欠率已经大大放大捆绑 技术，被认为分散风险有效投资,但实际上其取得的结果非常不透明，技术流动性不足，且不易 面对下跌的房产价格。作为 2007年美国次贷危机的基准，我们绘制了一战后十九家银行危机的数据图。我们已经 涉及战后波及点，其中一些重要的金融机构或金融部门的倒塌类似于卡明斯基和莱因哈特在 1999 年进一步讨论的文件（见 Reinhart 和 Rogoff，2008）。这些危机事件包括：“五大”的危机：西班牙（1977），挪威（1987 年），芬兰（1991），瑞典（1991年）和日 本（1992 年），其中今年开始在括号。其他银行和金融危机：澳大利亚（1989 年），加拿大（1983 年），丹麦（1987 年），法国（1994年），德国（1977年），希腊（1991年），冰岛（1985年）， 意大利（1990年）和新西兰（1987年），英国（1974年，1991 年，1995 年），美国（1984年， 2007 年）。“五大”的危机，都是大规模的旷日持久的金融危机，表现在在较长的一段时间内经济大 幅下降。虽然北欧和西班牙1977年的经济危机也留下了深刻的印记，但日本1992 年的经济危 机才是“失去的十年”的开始。 其余的富裕国家的金融危机代表了广泛范围内的小事件。1984年美国的危机是储蓄和贷款危机， 当然，2007 年危机是次贷危机，一开始我们错误地只把它当成美国的危机，但它却波及了整个 欧洲还有中亚。虽然一般危机都集中在银行系统，1995 年英国的危机是导致巴林银行（本质上是一个投资银行） 的破产的主要原因。我们注意到，危机事件的选择标准不涵盖美国和欧洲的银行压力，特别是1982 年发展中国 家造成的国家的债务危机年。我们忽略它，因为银行危机并不是问题的中心，它植根于通货紧 缩和世界商品价格下降。此外,它有点重叠于我们所说的节俭危机。2.比较我们现在进行的2007 年美国的金融危机和以往的各种事件的简单比较。在金融危机的标准 文献绘图中，我们来看看资产和公共债务的价格增长。我们开始通过比较图1 进行房屋价格上 涨的比较。T期间代表了金融危机爆发的一年。所以周期T-4是前四年的危机，并在每一种 情况下继续为T+3期间，在美国2007年crisis.l图表案件个案研究文献证实，显示了金融危 机时期的房价，特别是在“五大”危机的严重影响的情况下极为明显。在美国住房价格中甚至 有进一步上升的情形。图2着眼于市场的股票价格指数增长的实际利率。 (对于美国来说，该指数是标准普尔 500;莱因哈特和Reinhart, 2008年国外帀场提供完整的清单。美国又看起来更加像如此原型危机的国家。在这里，从五个发生危机的国家的经验来看， 跟之前相比股票价格趋于下跌。当然,这些危机发生在每一个全球生产力的周期,这也许可以 解释一些共同点。然后,这也是有差异的,在这些事件与美联储在最近的事件的初期,货币的 反应就说明了这一切。135 -B0 -125 -120 -1)5 -110 -105 -P5 -M -Figirre 3: Cune-nt AccountGDP on the Ev of Banking Cri:esS5 -从图3中看出，作为一个经常账户占GDP的份额，在危机开始的四年之前。美国看起来像典型的危机前的国家,其资本流入加速了没过进入危机时代。然而,美国的赤字是 如此的严重，甚至超过国内生产总值的百分之六之远。如前所述，有一个庞大而越来越多的文献资料库，试图找出各种理由，将美国当前的持续赤字进行合理化。最简单的说法是， 随着全球贸易和金融的全球化支持较大的经常账户失衡(Obstfeld和Rogoff, 2001 )。 对于美国经常的巨额赤字的各种理由会更放心，如果没有美国的赤字几乎两倍于危机前的 早期发作的平均水平,金融危机也不会那么快发生。人均国内生产总值增长实际运行中的后续债务危机,如图4 所示。美国2007 年危机 遵循相同的倒 V 形为特征的早期事件。增长势头将持续下降的典型危机,两年后仍然偏 低。在较严重的“五大”的情况中,增长冲击是越来越大,并且时间在不断的延长。不为 美国经济前景令人鼓舞,但银行危机之后往往有一个长期的影响实际增长的过程。t-iFigure 4:GDP GrofftL per Capita Biinkiag Crites(PPP bifar die SiE 5 Crist:A =rai9 far tanLmg crEES zDiDixaLe; 齐Hgune ?: Public Debt nod Bfinking Crie?E90Avaraze for hrki:啓 cns* l.k Areiage for the Big 5 ClisesE3DUS：10IIIIIIIIMf-3(-2t-1Tt-1t-2t-J图5看起来占GDP的比例在公共债务上比较大。公共债务增加是一个几乎普遍的情 况,它预示着金融危机的开始,是危机的前兆,尤其是1984年美国的危机。然而,尽管 公共债务上升到 2007年之前,美国的危机,它正在崛起,但是比所有危机的平均水满,甚至远远慢于所有的五大危机。这个现象在美国的公共债务浅路径也有清楚地表明，庞大 的经常帐赤字前面显示负的因素不仅仅是政府的责任，其他的因素也不可忽视。而这些图的相关性并不一定是因果关系，但在组合起来可以看出它给我们的建议，如 果美国不发生重大和长期的增长放缓，它要么被认为是非常幸运的，甚至更多的“特殊” 是最乐观的理论认为。事实上，在金融危机的最严重的程度指标，在运行到2007 年的金 融危机，美国应该考虑它本身的好日子，如果能有危机后的轨迹平行设置在比较温和的银 行危机，相对于更大的增长停顿的严重财政危机期间，要参考西班牙，日本，瑞典，挪威 和芬兰的经验，来作出最合理的决策。3.结论托尔斯泰在他的经典小说安娜卡列尼娜中说到“每一个幸福的家庭是一样的，但每个 不幸的家庭都有他们自己的不幸。”虽然毫无疑问，每一个金融危机有其自身的区别，也 有惊人的相似之处，在运行的资产价格上涨，债务积累，以及增长模式，并有经常帐赤字 历史的危机大多是在金融自由化之前，如卡明斯基和Reinhart (1999)记载。而在美国的 情况下，一直没有显示出的法律上的自由化，但确实事实上是自由化的。新的管制，或宽 松的监管，金融实体来发挥在金融体系中的作用越来越大，无疑对提高某些类型的稳定性 冲击，但可能增加对他人的安全漏洞。也许美国会成为一个不同的幸福家庭。尽管一个典型的危机，国内许多表面上否相似 它可能还受失误相比只增长了最温和的案件。也许这次会是不一样的，因为这么多的争论 都强调了。无论长期结果，提供了量化的相似之处早期战后工业国的金融危机，至少在危 机前的时期，是值得注意的。当然，通货膨胀较低，当今世界上更好地锚，就是能证明这 是一个重要的缓和因素。值得一提的最后一点。 在20世纪70年代，美国的银行体系作为一站之间的石油出口 国的盈余，是拉丁美洲和其他地区的新兴市场借款人的中介。虽然当时很多好评，但是20 世纪70年代石油美元循环，最终还是导致了1980年代的债务危机，而这又放在货币中心 银行，造成巨大负担，这是事实，这一次的石油美元再次大量流入美国，但许多新兴市场 已经运行的经常帐盈余，而不是非借贷的贷款。相反，一大块的资金，有效地被回收到一 个发展的经济中，但是美国自己也有其边界的存在。超过一万亿美元被输送到次级抵押贷 款市场，这是最贫穷和最不发达的国家在美国的信用值得借款人赞成的。最后的索赔是不 同的，但在许多方面，该机制是相同的。