代理问题与企业理论(中英)—by-laowen

Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm 代理问题与企业理论摘要：This paper attempts to explain how the separation of security ownership and control, typical of large corporations, can be an efficient form of economic organization. 本文试图说明证劵所有权和控制权的分离对于经济组织可能是有效形式的机理，尤其对于大型企业而言。We first set aside the presumption that acorporation has owners in any meaningful sense.我们首先抛开企业在任何意义下一定有所有者的假定 。The entrepreneur is also laid to rest, at least for the purposes of the large modern corporation.一定有企业家的假定也可以放在一边，至少对大型现代企业而言是的。 The two functions usually attributed to the entrepreneurmanagement and risk bearingare treated as naturally separate factors within the set of contracts called a firm. 通常认为认为企业家具有管理和风险承担这两种职能，而这两种职能通常被看做是企业的分离的要素。The firm is disciplined by competition from other firms, which forces the evolution of devices for efficiently monitoring the performance of the entire team and of its individual members. 企业总是有来自外部企业的竞争，这就不断促使对于整个团队和企业内部个人成员的表现监督机制不断进步。Individual participants in the firm, and in particular its managers, face both the discipline and opportunities provided by the markets for their services, both within and outside the firm. 企业的个人参与者，特别是对于管理者而言，在企业内部和外部都需要正视市场为他们的服务提供的准则和机会。Economists have long been concerned with the incentive problems that arise when decision making in a firm is the province of managers who are not the firms security holders.长期以来，经济学家就一直十分关注由一些不是企业证劵持有者的核心管理者进行企业决策所产生的激励问题。One outcome has been the development of behavioral and managerial theories of the firm which reject the classical model of an entrepreneur, or owner-manager, who single-mindedly operates the firm to maximize profits, in favor of theories that focus more on the motivations of a manager who controls but does not own and who has little resemblance to the classical economic man. 结果导致了企业行为理论和管理理论的发展，这些理论摒弃了古典模型中一个追求利润最大化的企业家或者企业所有者的假定，而赞同集中研究控制企业但不拥有企业的管理者（这和古典理性人假定有很大的不同）的激励问题。Examples of this approach are Baumol (1959), Simon (1959), Cyert and March (1963), and Williamson (1964).例如：鲍莫尔（1959）、西蒙（1959）、希尔特和马奇（1963）、威廉姆森（1964）。More recently the literature has moved toward theories that reject the classical model of the firm but assume classical forms of economic behavior on the part of agents within the firm.最近，关于企业代理者问题，经济文献倾向于摒弃古典企业模型而接受古典的经济行为的假定。 The firm is viewed as a set of contracts among factors of production, with each factor motivated by its self-interest.企业被看做是关于生产要素的一系列契约，这些要素都是受着自身利益最大化的激励。Because of its emphasis on the importance of rights in the organization established by contracts, this literature is characterized under the rubric property rights. 因为强调契约确定的组织内权利的重要性，因此这些文献都出现在“产权理论”的标题下。Alchian and Demsetz (1972) and Jensen and Meckling (1976) are the best examples. 最好的例子是阿尔奇安和德姆塞茨（1972）、杰森和梅克林（1976）。The antecedents of their work are in Coase (1937, 1960). 这些文献的先驱是科斯（1976）。The striking insight of Alchian and Demsetz (1972) and Jensen and Meckling (1976) is in viewing the firm as a set of contracts among factors of production. 阿尔奇安和德姆塞茨（1972）、杰森和梅克林（1976）将企业看作是在生产要素之间的一系列契约。In effect, the firm is viewed as a team whose members act from self-interest but realize that their destinies depend to some extent on the survival of the team in its competition with other teams.结果，企业被看做一个团队，在该团队内的成员都是追求自身利益最大化但是都意识到其自身的命运在某种程度上取决于企业与其他企业竞争的成功情况。 This insight, however, is not carried far enough. 然而，这种见解还不够。In the classical theory, the agent who personifies the firm is the entrepreneur who is taken to be both manager and residual risk bearer.在古典模型中，代理人是企业的化身，承担着管理者和剩余索取者的双重角色。 Although his title sometimes changes for example, Alchian and Demsetz call him the employerthe entrepreneur continues to play a central role in the firm of the property-rights literature. 尽管称呼经常变换例如阿尔奇安和德姆塞茨将其称呼为“雇主”，但是在产权文献中，企业家在企业中承担着核心的角色。As a consequence, this literature fails to explain the large modern corporation in which control of the firm is in the hands of managers who are more or less separate from the firms security holders.结果，这些文献并不能够解释现代大型企业的情况，现代大型企业的控制权在管理者手中，这些管理者基本和企业的证券持有者是独立的。The main thesis of this paper is that separation of security ownership and control can be explained as an efficient form of economic organization within the set of contracts perspective. 本文的主要观点是,证券的控制权和所有权的分离可解释为经济组织的一种有效形式。We first set aside the typical presumption that a corporation has owners in any meaningful sense. 我们首先抛开企业在任何意义下一定有所有者的假定 。The attractive concept of the entrepreneur is also laid to rest, at least for the purposes of the large modern corporation. 定有企业家的假定也可以放在一边，至少对大型现代企业而言是的。 Instead, the two functions usually attributed to the entrepreneur, management and risk bearing, are treated as naturally separate factors within the set of contracts called a firm.通常认为认为企业家具有管理和风险承担这两种职能，而这两种职能通常被看做是企业的分离的要素。The firm is disciplined by competition from other firms, which forces the evolution of devices for efficiently monitoring the performance of the entire team and of its individual members. 企业总是有来自外部企业的竞争，这就不断促使对于整个团队和企业内部个人成员的表现监督机制不断进步。Individual participants in the firm, and in particular its managers, face both the discipline and opportunities provided by the markets for their services, both within and outside the firm. 企业的个人参与者，特别是对于管理者而言，在企业内部和外部都需要正视市场为他们的服务提供的准则和机会。1. The Irrelevance of the Concept of Ownership of the Firm 企业所有权概念的不相关性（企业所有权和资产所有权的不相关性）To set a framework for the analysis, let us first describe roles for management and risk bearing in the set of contracts called a firm. 为了建立分析框架，我们首先描述被称为企业的一系列契约中的管理和承受风险的角色。Management is a type of labor but with a special role-coordinating the activities of inputs and carrying out the contracts agreed among inputs, all of which can be characterized as decision making.管理是一种特殊的劳动协调要素活动和要素间的契约执行，这些都具有“决策”的特征。 To explain the role of the risk bearers, assume for the moment that the firm rents all other factors of production and that rental contracts are negotiated at the beginning of each production period with payoffs at the end of the period. 为了解释风险承受者的角色，暂且假定企业租用所有的生产要素和签订租用协议都是在生产之前，而支付在生产之后。The risk bearers then contract to accept the uncertain and possibly negative difference between total revenues and costs at the end of each production period.风险承担者因此约定要接受不确定性和在每次生产后的负的收益和成本差额。When other factors of production are paid at the end of each period, it is not necessary for the risk bearers to invest anything in the firm at the beginning of the period. 当生产函数的所有要素在每一期结束时得到支付，风险承担者并不需要在初期给公司投入任何东西。Most commonly, however, the risk bearers guarantee performance of their contracts by putting up wealth ex ante, with this front money used to purchase capital and perhaps also the technology that the firm uses in its production activities. 然而，更为普通的是，风险承担者必须事先提供财富要保证契约业绩，如暂垫资金购买企业生产所需要的资产和技术。In this way the risk bearing function is combined with ownership of capital and technology. 这种情况下，风险承担的职能和资本和技术的所有权是紧密相连的。We also commonly observe that the joint functions of risk bearing and ownership of capital are repackaged and sold in different proportions to different groups of investors.通常我们还可以观察到，风险承担和资本所用的联合职能通常重新打包，并且按不同的比例出售给不同的投资团体。 For example, when front money is raised by issuing both bonds and common stock, the bonds involve a combination of risk bearing and ownership of capital with a low amount of risk bearing relative to the combination of risk bearing and ownership of capital inherent in the common stock.比如，当暂垫资金来源于债券和股票，债券包含的风险和资产所有权相对普通股票而言通常风险比例小一些。 Unless the bonds are risk free, the risk bearing function is in part borne by the bondholders, and ownership of capital is shared by bondholders and stockholders.除非债卷是无风险的，否则债券持有者只承担部分风险，资产的所有权则是债券持有者和股票持有者共同的。However, ownership of capital should not be confused with ownership of the firm. 然而，资产所有权和企业所有权不应该混为一谈。Each factor in a firm is owned by somebody. 企业的任何一种要素归属于某人。The firm is just the set of contracts covering the way inputs are joined to create outputs and the way receipts from outputs are shared among inputs. 企业仅仅是一些列契约，这些契约包含了要素为了生产的投入方式和产出在要素之间的分配。In this nexus of contracts perspective, ownership of the firm is an irrelevant concept. 在这种契约缔结的视角，企业所有权和资产所有权的概念是不相关的。Dispelling the tenacious notion that a firm is owned by its security holders is important because it is a first step toward understanding that control over a firms decisions is not necessarily the province of security holders.消除企业是证券持有者拥有的这一根深蒂固的观念是重要的，因为这是理解企业决策的控制者不一定是主要的证券持有者的第一步。 The second step is setting aside the equally tenacious role in the firm usually attributed to the entrepreneur.第二部是消除企业主要归功于企业家的贡献这一同样根深蒂固的观念。2、 Management and Risk Bearing: A Closer Look 管理者与风险承担：更细致的观察The entrepreneur (manager-risk bearer) is central in both the Jensen-Meckling and Alchian-Demsetz analyses of the firm.阿尔奇安和德姆塞茨的企业分析中都认为企业家（风险承担者）是企业的核心. For example, Alchian-Demsetz state: The essence of the classical firm is identified here as a contractual structure with: 1) joint input production; 2) several input owners; 3) one party who is common to all the contracts of the joint inputs; 4) who has the right to renegotiate any inputs contract independently of contracts with other input owners; 5) who holds the residual claim; and 6) who has the right to sell his central contractual residual status.例如，阿尔奇安写到：“古典企业的本质被认为是一种结构契约，它包括：1）联合的要素生产函数，2）几个要素拥有者，3）与所有要素都有契约关系的某方当事人，4）该当事人可以就某一要素的契约进行独立的重新谈判，5）该当事人有剩余索取权，6）该当事人有权出售其中心的、契约性的、剩余权的地位。The central agent is called the firms owner and the employer (1972, p. 794).这个处于中心的代理人被称为企业的拥有者或者雇主（1972，p,794）.To understand the modern corporation, it is better to separate the manager, the agents of points 3 and 4 of the Alchian-Demsetz definition of the firm, from the risk bearer described in points 5 and 6. 为了更好地理解现代企业，最好分开管理者（阿尔奇安企业定义中的3、4点的代理者）和风险承担者（阿尔奇安企业定义中的5、6点的代理者）。The rationale for separating these functions is not just that the end result is more descriptive of the corporation, a point recognized in both the Alchian-Demsetz and Jensen-Meckling papers. 分离这两个职能的理由不仅仅是更好地描述了企业，正如阿尔奇安和德姆塞茨的文章中所承认的。The major loss in retaining the concept of the entrepreneur is that one is prevented from developing a perspective on management and risk bearing as separate factors of production, each faced with a market for its services that provides alternative opportunities and, in the case of management, motivation toward performance.保留企业家这一概念的主要缺陷在于，这阻碍了人们将管理和风险承担看做两个生产的独立要素的视角，这两者都有其服务的市场和可供选择的机会，就管理而言，表现的激励。Thus, any given set of contracts, a particular firm, is in competition with other firms, which are likewise teams of cooperating factors of production. 因此，任何给定的契约集（一个特殊的企业）将和其他企业竞争，他们类似于生产要素相互合作的团队。If there is a part of the team that has a special interest in its viability, it is not obviously the risk bearers.如果团队中的某部分对于企业生存至关重要，那么肯定不是风险承担者。 It is true that if the team does not prove viable factors like labor and management are protected by markets in which rights to their future services can be sold or rented to other teams.如果团队没有给予像劳动力和管理者这种至关重要的要素市场保护，即某要素的未来服务可以在市场上出售或者出租给其他团队， 那么这是风险承担者。The risk bearers, as residual claimants, also seem to suffer the most direct consequences from the failings of the team.风险承担者作为剩余索取者，在失败的团队中承担最为直接的后果。However, the risk bearers in the modern corporation also have markets for their services-capital markets-which allow them to shift among teams with relatively low transaction costs and to hedge against the failings of any given team by diversifying their holdings across teams.然而，现代企业的风险承担者有市场资本市场以较低的成本通过不同团队之间多元化持有以减低既定团队失败所带来的风险。Indeed, portfolio theory tells us that the optimal portfolio for any investor is likely to be diversified across the securities of many firms.事实上，资产组合理论告诉我们任何投资者最优的资产组合是对各公司的证券多元化投资。 Since he holds the securities of many firms precisely to avoid having his wealth depend too much on any one firm, an individual security holder generally has no special interest in personally overseeing the detailed activities of any firm.由于投资者持有多家公司的证券以避免其财富过多依赖某个公司，因此其通常很少有兴趣关心某一家公司的具体事务。 In short, efficient allocation of risk bearing seems to imply a large degree of separation of security ownership from control of a firm. 简而言之，对风险承担的有效分配似乎意味着证券所有权和企业控制权的大程度的隔离。On the other hand, the managers of a firm rent a substantial lump of wealththeir human capitalto the firm, and the rental rates for their human capital signaled by the managerial labor market are likely to depend on the success or failure of the firm. 另一方面，企业的管理者出租自己的大量财富他们的人力资本给企业，其由管理者劳动力市场标记的人力资本的租金价格很大方面取决于其管理的企业的成败。The function of management is to oversee the contracts among factors and to ensure the viability of the firm. 管理者的职能是监督要素的契约的执行以及确保企业的生命力。For the purposes of the managerial labor market, the previous associations of a manager with success and failure are information about his talents. 对于管理者市场而言，管理者之前的成败代表着管理者的才能。The manager of a firm, like the coach of any team, may not suffer any immediate gain or loss in current wages from the current performance of his team, but the success or failure of the team impacts his future wages, and this gives the manager a stake in the success of the team.企业管理者，就像团队里的教练，其现在的工资并不受他的团队现在的表现影响，但是他的团队的成败将影响他的未来工资，这就给予了管理者关心团队成功的激励。The firms security holders provide important but indirect assistance to the managerial labor market in its task of valuing the firms management. 企业证券的持有者提供了一个重要但是非直接的帮助在劳动力市场评价企业的管理者。A security holder wants to purchase securities with confidence that the prices paid reflect the risks he is taking and that the securities will be priced in the future to allow him to reap the rewards (or punishments) of his risk bearing.证券持有者购买证券是相信其支付的价格反应了他所承担的风险以及该证券在未来可以收获风险所对应的报酬（或者惩罚）。Thus, although an individual security holder may not have a strong interest in directly overseeing the management of a particular firm, he has a strong interest in the existence of a capital market which efficiently prices the firms securities. 因此，尽管一个证券的持有者并没有兴趣直接关心某一特定企业的管理者，但是他对能够反应企业价值的资本市场十分感兴趣。The signals provided by an efficient capital market about the values of a firms securities are likely to be important for the managerial labor markets revaluations of the firms management. 有效市场关于企业证劵价值的信号对于管理者市场关于企业管理者的评价十分重要。We come now to the central question. 我们现在碰到了核心问题。To what extent can the signals provided by the managerial labor market and the capital market, perhaps along with other market-induced mechanisms, discipline managers?管理者劳动市场和资本市场提供的信号，也许伴随其他价格机制，多大程度上约束管理者。 We first discuss, still in general terms, the types of discipline imposed by managerial labor markets, both within and outside of the firm. 我们首先在一般意义上讨论，管理者劳动市场对企业内和企业外施加的约束的类型。We then analyze specific conditions under which this discipline is sufficient to resolve potential incentive problems that might be associated with the separation of security ownership and control.接下来分析特定条件下，上述约束对解决企业证券所有权和控制权分离带来的激励问题十分有作用。3、The Viability of Separation of Security Ownership and Control of the Firm: General Comments 企业证券所有权和控制权分离的生命力;一般评论The outside managerial labor market exerts many direct pressures on the firm to sort and compensate managers according to performance. 外部的管理者劳动力市场对企业施加了许多压力以促使企业根据管理者的表现给予选择和补偿。One form of pressure comes from the fact that an ongoing firm is always in the market for new managers.一种压力来自于发展中的企业总是在寻找市场的新管理者这一事实。 Potential new managers are concerned with the mechanics by which their performance will be judged, and they seek information about the responsiveness of the system in rewarding performance.潜在的新的管理者会考虑其表现的评价机制，以及搜寻其表现的报酬的系统反应的信息。Moreover, given a competitive managerial labor market, when the firms reward system is not responsive to performance the firm loses managers, and the best are the first to leave.更重要的是，给定一个竞争的管理者劳动力市场，当企业的报酬并不是管理者表现的反应，企业将会失去管理者，最好的管理者会首先离去。 There is also much internal monitoring of managers by managers themselves.管理者之间也有许多关于管理者的内部监督。 Part of the talent of a manager is his ability to elicit and measure the productivity of lower managers, so there is a natural process of monitoring from higher to lower levels of management.管理者的能力之一是激励和度量下级管理者的生产率，因此这里有一个自上而下的管理者监督机制。 Less well appreciated, however, is the monitoring that takes place from bottom to top. 然而，这一自上而下的监督机制并没有受到好评。Lower managers perceive that they can gain by stepping over shirking or less competent managers above them. 下级的管理者意识到紧跟着弱懦和没有能力的管理者会受到更好的收益。Moreover, in the team or nexus of contracts view of the firm, each manager is concerned with the performance of managers above and below him since his marginal product is likely to be a positive function of theirs. 进一步，在一个组织或者企业中，每个管理者都关注他的上级和下级管理者的表现，因为他的边际生产率与这些管理者的表现是正相关的。Finally, although higher managers are affected more than lower managers, all managers realize that the managerial labor market uses the performance of the firm to determine each managers outside opportunity wage. 最后，尽管顶层的管理者相对下面的管理者更受企业表现的影响，但是所有管理者都意识到管理者劳动市场是根据企业的表现来决定每一个管理者外部可选择机会的工资。In short, each manager has a stake in the performance of the managers above and below him and, as a consequence, undertakes some amount of monitoring in both directions.简而言之，每一个管理者都与上下级管理者有着利益关系，结果，都会有一些对上下级管理者的监督。All managers below the very top level have an interest in seeing that the top managers choose policies for the firm which provide the most positive signals to the managerial labor market.所有低于最高层的管理者都有兴趣了解最高层管理者选择的企业政策，这种政策向管理劳动力市场提供最为确切的信号。But by what mechanism can top management be disciplined?但是最高层管理者如何受到约束呢？ Since the body designated for this function is the board of directors, we can ask how it might be constructed to do its job. 因为董事会的建立正是为了实现这个功能，我们会问董事会如何构建以实现这个职能。A board dominated by security holders does not seem optimal or endowed with good survival properties. 证券持有人支配的董事会并不是最优的或者具有强生命力的性质。Diffuse ownership of securities is beneficial in terms of an optimal allocation of risk bearing, but its consequence is that the firms security holders are generally too diversified across the securities of many firms to take much direct interest in a particular firm.证券所有权的分散对风险承受的最优配置是有益的，但是结果导致证券持有者过于分散持有企业的证券以至于并不关心特定企业。 If there is competition among the top managers themselves (all want to be the boss of bosses), then perhaps they are the best ones to control the board of directors. 如果企业高层管理者之间存在竞争（都想成为老板们的老板），他们也许是最好的控制董事会的人选。They are most directly in the line of fire from lower managers when the markets for securities and managerial labor give poor signals about the performance of the firm. 当证券市场和管理劳动力市场发出企业表现不好时，高层管理者最容易受到下面管理者的批评。Because of their power over the firms decisions, their market determined opportunity wages are also likely to be most affected by market signals about the performance of the firm.因为他们拥有企业的决策权，他们的市场决定的机会工资最受企业表现的市场信号的影响。 If they are also in competition for the top places in the firm, they may be the most informed and responsive critics of the firms performance. 如果他们都竞争企业的最高位置，他们应该是最为熟悉企业业绩的人，也是企业业绩最好的评价者。Having gained control of the board, top management may decide that collusion and expropriation of security holder wealth are better than competition among themselves.如果高层管理者获得了董事会的控制权，他们可能会合谋欺骗和剥夺证券持有者的财富而不是相互竞争。 The probability of such collusive arrangements might be lowered, and the viability of the board as a market-induced mechanism for low-cost internal transfer of control might be enhanced, by the inclusion of outside directors.通过外部董事的介入，这种合谋安排的概率会降低，同时董事会作为进行低成本的内部控制权转移的市场引致机制的作用也会提高。 The latter might best be regarded as professional referees whose task is to stimulate and oversee the competition among the firms top managers.外部董事最好被看做是专业调停者，其任务是激励和监督企业高层管理者之间的竞争。 In a state of advanced evolution of the external markets that buttress the corporate firm, the outside directors are in their turn disciplined by the market for their services which prices them according to their performance as referees. 在存在着高度发育的支撑着现代股份企业的外部市场条件下外部董事受着他们的劳务市场的约束，在这个市场上，他们的价格依照作为调停者的绩效而确定。Since such a system of separation of security ownership from control is consistent with the pressures applied by the managerial labor