资源描述
LecturesatFudanUniversityonTheEconomicsofBehavior,Institutions,andEvolutionSamuelBowles,http:/www.santafe.edu/bowlesUniversityofSiena/SantaFeInstitute,Lorenzetti,AspectsofGoodGovernment,14thcenturySiena,LecturesatFudanUniversityonTheEconomicsofBehavior,Institutions,andEvolution,ThedynamicsofcapitalismandtheemergenceofapostWalrasianparadigmineconomics(Prologue,1)Economicmanandsocialpreferences:experiments,newpreferencefunctions,andmechanismdesign(3,JPubE)nstitutionaldynamics:theemergenceofprivatepropety(within-andbetween-groupselectiondynamics)(2,11)Institutionalpersistenceandinnovation:stochasticevolutionarygametheory(applicationofYoung)(12)Theco-evolutionofpreferencesandinstitutions:agent-basedmodelingofgroupselection(13)Parochialaltruismandwar(andsummingup)(Science07)Iwouldbehappytoamendthisprogramme,Relatedpapersat:http:/www.santafe.edu/bowles,WalrasianEconomicsinRetrospect.QuarterlyJournalofEconomics,115:4,2000withH.Gintis“InSearchofHomoeconomicus:BehavioralExperimentsin15SimpleSocieties”AmericanEconomicReview.91,2(2001)(withR.Boyd,C.Camerer,E.Fehr,H.Gintis,etal.).“PersistentParochialism:theDynamicsofTrustandExclusioninNetworks,”JournalofEconomicBehaviorandOrganization55,2004,withGintis“Socialpreferencesandpubliceconomics:mechanismdesignwhenprefernecesdependonincentives,”JournalofPublicEconomics,2008,forthcoming(withS-HHwang)“Policiesdesignedforselfinterestedcitizensmayunderminethemoralsentiments”Science,2008forthcoming.Groupcompetition,reproductivelevelingandtheevolutionofhumanaltruism.Science,314,2006.“Theco-evolutionofparochialaltruismandwar,”Science,319(2007)withJung-KyooChoi.Myemail:samuel.bowles,Capitalismandeconomictheory,Whatshouldmicroeconomictheorybeatheoryof?Mostofthepeopleintheworldarepoor,soifweknewtheeconomicsofbeingpoorwewouldknowmuchoftheeconomicsthatreallymatters.Schultz,T.W.(1980),“NobelLecture:TheEconomicsofBeingPoor,”JournalofPoliticalEconomy88,4:639-651.Theprimarytasktoeconomictheory(inmyview)istounderstand(reallyexisting)capitalismanditsevolution(noteconomicsystemsgenerically,notabstractprinciplesofoptimaluseofresources)IstheWalrasian(neoclassical)paradigmadequatetothistask?,Walrasian(neoclassical)economics,Aparadigm(school)ischaracterizedbywhatitteachesitsstudentsandthassumptionsthatarenecessaryandsufficientforitsmainresults.TheWalrasianparadigmischaracterizedbyCompletecontracts:enforceableatlowcostbythirdpartiesAbsence(ornearlyso)ofeconomiesofscaleEconomicman:exogenous,selfregardingpreferencesWhatarethebigfactsaboutcapitalistdynamicsthatthistheoryshouldexplain?,LeonWalras,FromBowles,EdwardsandRoosevelt,UnderstandingCapitalism:Competition,Command,andChange,OxfordUPress,2004,FromBowles,EdwardsandRoosevelt,UnderstandingCapitalism:Competition,Command,andChange,OxfordUPress,2004,FromBowles,EdwardsandRoosevelt,UnderstandingCapitalism:Competition,Command,andChange,OxfordUPress,2004,FromBowles,EdwardsandRoosevelt,UnderstandingCapitalism:Competition,Command,andChange,OxfordUPress,2004,FromBowles,EdwardsandRoosevelt,UnderstandingCapitalism:Competition,Command,andChange,OxfordUPress,2004,Citieswithmorethanamillionpeople1850andpresent,LondonandParis,Beijing,FromBowles,EdwardsandRoosevelt,UnderstandingCapitalism:Competition,Command,andChange,OxfordUPress,2004,FromBowles,EdwardsandRoosevelt,UnderstandingCapitalism:Competition,Command,andChange,OxfordUPress,2004,FromBowles,EdwardsandRoosevelt,UnderstandingCapitalism:Competition,Command,andChange,OxfordUPress,2004,FromBowles,EdwardsandRoosevelt,UnderstandingCapitalism:Competition,Command,andChange,OxfordUPress,2004,FromBowles,EdwardsandRoosevelt,UnderstandingCapitalism:Competition,Command,andChange,OxfordUPress,2004,FromBowles,EdwardsandRoosevelt,UnderstandingCapitalism:Competition,Command,andChange,OxfordUPress,2004,FromBowles,EdwardsandRoosevelt,UnderstandingCapitalism:Competition,Command,andChange,OxfordUPress,2004,Topincomeshares:UK1908-1998,Toppercentileshare:France1900-98,Top0.01%share:India1922-8,Top0.1%UK,US,France,India,FromBowles,EdwardsandRoosevelt,UnderstandingCapitalism:Competition,Command,andChange,OxfordUPress,2004,FromBowles,EdwardsandRoosevelt,UnderstandingCapitalism:Competition,Command,andChange,OxfordUPress,2004,FromBowles,EdwardsandRoosevelt,UnderstandingCapitalism:Competition,Command,andChange,OxfordUPress,2004,GrowthinproductivityGrowthinwagesUnevendevelopmentamongnationsPopulationgrowthandurbanizationWithincountryequalizationanddis-equalizationInequality:class,ethnicgroup,race,sex,urban-rural,GrowthofthestateTheinformationrevolution(otheraspectsoftechnicalchange)PersistenceofglobalpovertyInstitutionaldivergenceandconvergence,DoestheWalrasianparadigmprovideanexplanationofthesebigfactsaboutCapitalism?,Economicsisthestudyofhumanbehaviorasarelationshipbetweengivenendsandscarcemeans.L.Robbins(1935):16Aneconomictransactionisasolvedpoliticalproblem.EconomicshasgainedthetitleQueenoftheSocialSciencesbychoosingsolvedpoliticalproblemsasitsdomain.AbbaLerner(1972):259Thefirststressesexogenouspreferences,thesecondstressestheexogenousenforcementofincompletecontracts,Familiardefinitionsof(neoclassical)economics,Othertaxonomieswouldbeilluminating,forexample,concerningthecontentofpreferences,e.g.selfregardingorotherregarding)andtheroleofpositivefeedbacks(generalizedincreasingreturns)etc,Oneroadmapofeconomics:WalrasianandpostWalrasian,Whatshouldeconomictheorybeabout?,Nowatlastwearesettingourselvesseriouslytoinquirewhetheritisnecessarythatthereshouldbeanysocalledlowerclassesatall:thatiswhetherthereneedbelargenumbersofpeopledoomedfromtheirbirthtohardworkinordertoprovideforotherstherequisitesofarefinedandculturedlife,whiletheythemselvesarepreventedbytheirpovertyandtoilfromhavinganyshareorpartinthatlife.Theanswerdependsinagreatmeasureuponfactsandinferences,whicharewithintheprovinceofeconomics;andthisisitwhichgivestoeconomicstudiestheirchiefandtheirhighestinterest.,AlfredMarshall,PrinciplesofEconomics,1890,HasneoclassicaleconomicsprovidedananswertoMarshall?,Post-WalrasianeconomicsdiffersfromWalrasian(neoclassical)economicsinitsrepresentationof,Socialinteractions(incompletecontracts)Preferences(endogenous,notentirelyselfregarding)Theimportanceofincreasingreturns(positivefeedbacks)andmore(forasummary,seefigure14.1),Walrasianandevolutionaryeconomics(Figure14.1),PrecursorsofPost-Walrasianeconomics,Noteverythinginthecontractiscontractual.EmileDurkheimDeladivisiondutravailsocial.1902Howselfishsoevermanmaybesupposed,thereareevidentlysomeprinciplesinhisnaturewhichinteresthiminthefortunesofothers,andrendertheirhappinessnecessarytohim,thoughhederivesnothingfromit,exceptthepleasureofseeingit.AdamSmith,Thetheoryofmoralsentiments,1759Onlybymisusecouldtheappropriationoflaborbycapitalbecalledanykindofexchangeatall.KarlMarx,TheGrundrissePost-Walrasianeconomicsaddressesthemesstressedpriortotheadventofneoclassicaleconomicsusingcontemporarymathematicaltools.,TheemergenceofpostWalrasianeconomics:HobbestoHayek,abriefhistory,Theclassicalconstitutionalconundrum,againHobbesMandevilleSmithPropertyandmarketsasaformofconstitutionMarketsvsplanning:thegreatdebateWhymarketswonandWalrasianeconomicslost,Whichofthesesystemscentralplanningorcompetitionislikelytobemoreefficientdependsonthequestionunderwhichofthemcanweexpectthatfullerusewillbemadeoftheexistingknowledge.Andthis,inturn,dependsonwhetherwearemorelikelytosucceedinputtingatthedisposalofasinglecentralauthorityalltheknowledgewhichoughttobeusedbutwhichisinitiallydispersedamongmanydifferentindividuals,orinconveyingtotheindividualssuchadditionalinformationastheyneedinordertoenablethemtofittheirplansinwiththoseofothers.F.A.Hayek,“TheUseofKnowledgeinSociety”1945,TheWalrasiandetour,VirtuallyallofthemainideasmakingupthepostWalrasianparadigmweredevelopedmorethan4decadesagobyhighlyrecognizedscholars.Nash,Zeuthen,VN-M(gametheory,includingevolutionary,bargaining)Simon,Schelling(nonmarketsocialinteractions)Coase(transactionscosts,authorityinthefirm)Alchian,Becker(evoutionarymodelingzerointelligenceage)Duesenbery,Leibenstein(endogenouspreferences,statedependentpreferences)Myrdal(multipleequilibria)Whydidtheseideasproliferateinthe1990sandnotthe1960s?Timeforabreak?,Lecture1,part2InstitutionsandGames,Courbet,EnterrementaOrnans,Coordinationfailuresandtheclassicalconstitutionalconundrum?,ThestudyofinstitutionsismotivatedbytheimportanceofcoordinationfailuresasacauseofhumansufferingCoordinationfailure:noncooperativeinteractionleadingtoaresultthatisnotP-efficient.Theconundrum:Howcansocialinteractionsbestructuredsothatpeoplearefreetochoosetheirownactionswhileavoidingoutcomesthatnonewouldhavechosen?Modernfieldsofeconaddressingthisquestion:welfareeconomics,implementationtheory,optimalcontracttheoryGametheoryisthefundamentalanalyticaltoolforthestudyofeconomicinstitutions.,Whydocoordinationfailuresoccur,generically?,Thereasonwhyuncoordinatedactivitiesofindividualspursuingtheirownendsoftenproduceoutcomesthatallwouldseektoavoidisthateachpersonsactionsaffectthewell-beingofothersandtheseeffectsareoftennotincludedinwhateveroptimizingprocessorruleofthumbwhichresultsintheactionstakenbytherelevantactors.Moresimply:actorstonottakeappropriateaccountoftheeffectsoftheiractionsonothers.IncompletecontractsareoneofthereasonswhythishapppensTheproblemthusconcernsbothpreferencesandconstraints(e.g.peopledonotcareaboutothers,andtheyarenotconstrainedtoactasiftheydidcare),Institutions,Institutions:thelaws,informalrules,andconventionswhichgiveadurablestructuretosocialinteractionsamongthemembersofapopulationbasedoncentrallydeployedcoercion(laws),socialsanction(informalrules)andmutualexpectations(conventions)whichmakeconformingtotheinstitutionabestresponseforvirtuallyallmembersoftherelevantgroup,givenindividualbeliefsandpreferences.,Preferences,beliefsandconstraints(definedinch3),NBinstitutionsaregrouplevelphenomena,whilepreferencesandbeliefsarefactsaboutindividuals:Beliefs:anindividualsunderstandingoftherelationshipbetweenheractionsandconsequentoutcomes.Preferences:anindividualsevaluationoftheoutcomes.Constraints:definethesetoffeasibleactionsInstitutionsconstitutepartoftheconstraints(youhavetopayforthegoodsyouacquire)and(aswewillsee)theyalsoinfluencetheevolutionofbeliefsandpreferences.,TragedyoftheFishers:APrisonersDilemmaEyeJay6hours8hoursFish6hours1,10,1+Fish8hours1+,0u,u,CoordinationtypicallyinvolvesproblemsofbothallocationanddistributionasinthePDgame.,Whatistheallocationproblemhere?Whatisthedistributionproblem?,Pureconflictandpurecommoninterestgames.Whatarethey?,TragedyoftheFishers:APrisonersDilemmaEyeJay6hours8hoursFish6hours1,10,1+Fish8hours1+,0u,u,Commonandconflictinginterest,Thedegreeofcommoninterest:/(1-u)/(1+).orinthiscasethegainfromcooperationbycontrasttomutualdefectionrelativetothegainfromdefectingonacooperatorOrmoregenerally,themaximumdifferencebetweenthepayoffspossiblewhenbothchoosethesameactiondividedbythemaximumdifferencewhentheychoosedifferentactions(SWtoNEdistancecomparedtoSEtoNWdifference).,Ataxonomyofcoordinationfailures(consideringonlypurestrategies),Themathematicalrepresentationofinstitutions,Asexogenouslygivengames(e.gprincipalagentmodelsofwagesetting)AsNashequilibriaofgames(drivingontherightasamutualbestresponse)AsNEthatareaccessibleandstable(hasalargebasinofattraction)inaplausibledynamic(cropsharesofonehalfasstochasticallystablestates)NBtheprimarytoolforthefirstisclassicalgametheory(institutionsbydesign)whileforthesecondandthirdoneusesevolutionarygametheory(spontaneousorder),Gametheoryandthetheoryofinstitutions:advantagesandshortcomings,Advantagesovernon-strategicapproaches:ExplicitrepresentationofinformationandactionsetsSubject-subject(strategic)vsSubjectobjectShortcomings(onwhich,morelater)LimitationsoftheNashequilibrium(evolutionarilyirrelevantequilibria)Cognitivelyimplausiblerefinements,Desiderataforgametheory:manyimportantgamesare,Overlapping:oneplaysinmanygamessimultaneouslyRecursive:thestructureofthegameinsubsequentperiodsisanoutcomeofpastplayConstitutive:pastplayofagameinfluencesthepreferencesandbeliefs(andthereforepayoffsandequilibriumstrategies)insubsequentplayAsymmetric:whenmembersofdifferentclasses,species,sexes,nations,races,agecohorts,etcinteract,strategysetstypicallydiffer(andpayoffs).Otherthanthelast,gametheoryhasnotyetadequatelymodeledtheotherdesiderata,Whyarecoordinationfailurescommon?WhyareP-improvementsnotimplemented?,NoNEisP-efficient(PD)ThereexistsaP-efficientNEthatisaP-improvementoverthestatusquobutitisinaccessible(AG)ItisnotriskdominantCoordinatingactionsisimpossible(ifweknewhowtodothat,wewouldnotbepoor.)ThetransformationofthegametosupportanaccessibleP-efficientNEmayrequireinstitutionalinnovationsthatsubjectoneormorepartiestotheriskofautilityloss.Theremaybenomutuallyacceptableprocesstodeterminethesharingofthegainstocooperation.(UG:process-basedutility),Provisionaloutline,Bowles,2004:Microeconomics:Behavior,Institutions,andEvolution.PrincetonUniversityPress,ortheChinesetranslation(RenminUniversityPress)Evolutionary,InstitutionalandWalrasianeconomicsBowles,andH.Gintis.2000.WalrasianEconomicsinRetrospect.QuarterlyJournalofEconomics,115:4,pp.1411-39.OrBowles,2004,Prologue2.EconomicMan,SocialPreferencesi,andPublicEconomicsBowles,2004,Chapter3andBowles,2008.Policiesdesignedforselfinterestedcitizensmayunderminethemoralsentiments:Experimentalevidence.Science,InpressorBowles,andS-HHwang.2008.Mechanismdesignwhenpreferencesdependonincentives.JournalofPublicEconomics,3ModelingInstitutionalDynamics:EvolutionofPrivatePropertyBowles,Samuel.2004.Chapter2,Chapter114InstitutionalInnovationandPersistence.Bowles,Samuel.2004,Chapter12orSamuelBowlesandSureshNaidu,“InstitutionalPersistence”SFIWorkingPaper5Co-evolutionofpreferencesandinstitutionsBowles,2004,Chapter13andBowles,.2006.Groupcompetition,reproductivelevelingandtheevolutionofhumanaltruism.Science,6ParochialAltruismandWarBowles,Samuel.2006.Groupcompetition,reproductivelevelingandtheevolutionofhumanaltruism.Science,314,pp.1569-72.,
展开阅读全文