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Bargainingcosts,influencecosts,andtheorganizationofeconomicactivity1990CambridgeUniversityPressPerspectiveonPoliticalEconomyJ.AltandK.shepse(eds.),TransactionCostEconomy,Coase(1937,1960)Williamson(1975,1985)CostofOrganizingtheeconomicactivities1.PhysicalProductionanddistribution2.Costofcarryingoutnecessaryexchange（Vague）,TwoElementstoAdd,Shot-termbargainingcost(强调)(Williamson:assetspecificity,frequency,uncertaintyInfluencecost：Identifycostsattachedtocentralized,discretionarydecisionmaking,CritiqueandExtensionofthereceivedtheory,1.UncertainfutureVsshort-termcontractsExplainSTC:Periodshortenough,AllinformationavailableBC:Wagepaid;Monitoring;EnforcingProblem:STCcannotrestrictlong-termbehaviorsTwo-partiesrelationanalysishypothesis:1.Riskneutral,FinanciallyUnconstrained,Expected-wealth-MaximizingBargainer.2.farsighted3.Opportunistic4.Distantcontractsgoverningprohibitivelycostlytowrite.,Proposition,Ifthecostsofbargainingovershort-termarrangementswereZERO-thenthemarketoutcomewouldbeefficient.TwoemphasisbeforeProvement：1.Theactionsdonotdependonbargainingpowerbutthedistributionofthefruits2.Inabilitytowritecompletecontractshaseffectonthewaythepartiessharerisks.(Limitedintertemporalorcontingenttransfer),Example：,FisherBodyandGeneralMotors（Klein，Crawford，Alchian）Twoperiod：1.Agreementaboutplantsiteanddesign,shareofcost2.Negotiateprice,fixedtransferpayment,qualitystandards,deliveryschedule.(Fullknowledge)Problems:GeneralMotorsfearFisherBodyOpportunism(Quasirents)resoluton:havingGeneralMotorsbearpartoftheplantscostEssence:DistributionalriskandbecompensatedbyintitialcashpaymentCondultion:Bargainingcostsisinthedeterminingtheefficiencyofmarkettransaction.,Addment：,Aboutassumption：Riskneutral:failinindividualContractwithoutrestriction:cantnotbepreciselymonitoredFudenberg,holmstrom,milgrom(1990),Nonmarkettransactions:,1WhyPreferMarket?2.Incentive(Williamson,Grossman,Hart)3.Miss:Thecostthatdonotdependspecificallyoncontrolofassets.（Centralizedauthority）,Costsofcentralizedauthority,Whyunplanned,decentralizedsystemalwaysdobetterthancentrallyplanned,consciouslycoordinatedsystem.(Noanswer)View:mostdistinguishesanycentralizedorganizationistheauthorityautonomyofitstopdecisionmakersormanagement(Intervene)Inappropriateuse.1.Fortheirowninitiative.2.Bepersuadeormanipulatebyothersforexcessiveorinappropriateuse.,Influencecosts,ThecostWhenthecentralauthorityisbothincorruptibleandintelligentenoughResource：1.Affectothersdecisionstotheirbenefit2.Ineffcientdecisionsresultfrominfluenceactivityortheattemptstopreventorcontrolthem.,Whyitisdifficulttoignoretheattemptatinfluence?OnereasoninfluenceisinevitableisthatdecisionmakersmustrelyonothersforinformationthatisnoteasilyavailabletothemdirectlyTheincentivestoattempttoinfluenceanorganizationsdecisionsare,tosomeextent,endogenous,Thus,carefulorganizationaldesigncanatleastpartiallycontrolthedirectcostsofinfluenceactivities.Expression1.boundariesofthefirm:Thewidespreadpracticeofspinningofforisolatingunprof-itablesubsidiaries2.Auniversityspolicyofrequiringitsschoolstobetubsontheirownbottoms,eachindividuallyresponsibleforitsrevenuesandexpenditures,costsoftheirown,Worthwhileinvestmentswillbeforegonelessqualifiedpeoplewillbeassignedtokeypositionslessqualifiedpeoplewillbeassignedtokeypositionsbaddecisionswillbemadebecausecommunicationhasbeenrestrictedandavailableinformationisnotuseddesirableresourcetransfersbetweendivisionswillnotbeeffec-ted.,Tradingoffthecosts,Japanesefirmsmakeusebothofwagepoliciesandoforganizationalrulestofacilitateextensiveinvolvementoftheiremployeesindecisionmakingwithoutencouragingexcessiveattemptsatinfluence,Thevalidityoftheseargumentsdependson,Centrallycontrolledorganizationconsiderablyfreefromoutsideintervention.1.propertyrightsoverthefirmgenerallyresideattheexecutivelevelorhigher2.executivesgenerallyhavebetterandmorefluidinformationsystemsthancourtsorgovernmentagenciesdo,Summaryandconclusions,Governmentalunitoranexecutiveinafirmhasintervenecertainidentifiablecostsareincurred.1.atendencyfortheauthoritytointerveneexcessively2.Increasedtimedevotedtoinfluenceactivitiesandacorrespondingreductioninorganizationalproductivity3.poorerdecisionmaking4.alossofefficiencyastheorganizationadaptsitsstructureandpoliciestocontrolinflu-enceactivitiesandtheircosts.,Influenceactivitiesareessentiallypoliticalandbecausethetheoryappliesequallytopublicandprivateorganizations.,中国的国企的治理影响成本是否过高？影响成本更为抽象化。如何定位，政治活动。,
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