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毕业论文 论 文 名 称 农业银行股份制改革的障碍及对策研究学 生 姓 名 指 导 教 师 专 业 金融学 学 院 金融学院 附录一Functions of Global Commercial BanksCredit ServiceThe primary function of a global commercial bank, of course, is to accept deposits and lend money. Indeed lending is the cornerstone of global banking activity. Banks is overseas markets may lend money in local currency to local clients out of branches or subsidiaries in foreign countries, funded by local currency deposits or by local money-market borrowings. For example, Deutsche Banks branch in Mexico City may lend pesos to a local car manufacturer, funded by peso deposits in its local branch. This is purely local business, in which the bank competes with domestic banks or with affiliates of other foreign financial institutions.Alternatively, the bank may also engage in cross-border lending, in which a loan is made to a borrower in a country other than the lenders residence, and is denominated in a currency other than that of the borrowers currency. According to Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan in 1998, cross-border lending doubled in previous decade. For example, Deutsche Banks branch in London may loan U.S dollars to the same car manufacture in Mexico City. This loan is funded by dollars generated worldwide.All lending activities, whether direct or syndicated, should generate revenue for the bank. The spread is akin to gross profit on the loan; it is the difference between the interest the bank earns on the loan and the interest it pays on its own borrowed funds. The spread should be sufficient to cover overhead, risk, and profits. Lending activities can also generate a variety of fees. One form of lending, for example, is the revolving credit facility. This permits the customer to borrow, or draw, up to a certain maximum amount over an agreed time period under an agreed interest formula. This formula is usually based on the London Interbank Offered Rate, or LIBOR(the interest rate paid between banks for dollars on deposit in London), plus a margin reflecting the borrowers creditworthiness. Thus General Motors, for example, might pay LIBOR plus 1/4 percentage point, while Bolivia might pay LIBOR plus 3percetage points. The bank, in turn, earns a commitment fee for standing ready to lend, whether or not the funds are actually disbursed. As we shall see, bans earn fees from a variety of lending-based services, such as syndicated loans and letters of credit. Syndicated Loan FacilitiesSyndicated Loan are central tool international banking, widely used by banks to meet customers need for large-scale and/or high-risk loans. A syndicated loan is a credit extended by a group of bank to a single customer, usually on common terms. This permits the risk, which might be too large for one bank to accept on its own, to be shared out among a large group of bank. It also facilitates the extension of credits that would otherwise be too big for one bank to handle. Moreover, the syndication technique enables large and medium-sized regional banks to participate in international lending activities. Syndicated Loans are accompanied by a weighty set of loan documentation and some standard legal agreement. For example, the agreement will usually specify the judgment currency and legal jurisdiction if the parties find it necessary to go to court; it will specify that all creditors are to be treated equally; and it will require the borrower, if a government, to waive its right to sovereign immunity(meaning that the bank can sue the government if necessary).Syndication can be a handsome source of fee revenue for the lead bank or banks. In general, the borrower pays a commitment fee on the funds that are not disbursed, plus interest on the funds that are drawn down (usually, LIBOR plus a margin), as well as agent fee. Typically, one or more large bank acts as lead or agent in the facility, gathering information for use in judging the creditworthiness of the borrower organizing the loan, and selling it down to other participating banks. The lead institution must have the ability to market the credit to other financial institutions, and to perform the necessary tasks of structuring and pricing the credit. Chase Manhattan (now J. P. Morgan Chase) has long reigned as the top bank in syndicated lending worldwide, with around 25 percent market share.The notion that syndicated loans reduce risk by sharing it out received a rude awakening in the 1980s, however, Credits to shaky Latin American borrowers, for example, were syndicated widely, often unsophisticated regional institutions with little or no expertise in international lending. There is a tendency for participants in the syndication to replay heavily o the credit analysis of the large, more sophisticated bans, and it is unclear to what extent the lead bank is responsible for the accuracy of the information presented on the borrow.Thus it is not surprising that following a period of fast-paced growth in the 1970s, the syndicated loan market dried up after 1981 as a huge portion of bank resources were redirected into rescheduling problem loans to emerging market borrowers. Many bankers came to believe that the syndication process contributed to problems in unraveling the Third World debt crisis of the 1980s. Many small, regional banks were clearly in over their heads., and they became a weak link as the rescheduling process unfolded. (Why were local banks in Louisiana and Kentucky lending to Brazil in the first place?) By the mid-1980s, many banks had transferred or fired their syndication experts and the bank closed down their syndication departments.The process was accelerated by a tighter international ban regulatory regime, which emerged after the Basel agreement on capital adequacy was announced in1988. This agreement required bans to maintain a certain ratio capital to loans according to a complex and controversial formula, producing a era of retrenchment for money. For the next few years, international bans were forced to build up their capital bases and were drawn away from private sector lending toward sovereign (loans to governments and public sector entities), which require less allocations of risk capital. As a result, ”club” deals became more popular I the late 1980s. Rather than a syndication of 100 or more banks club deals were put together quietly by a handful of big banks. As the 1980s gave way to 1990s, however the syndicated loan market began to rise from its ashes. With Third World debt issues resolved and capital adequacy levels healthy once more, banks began looking to rebuild their loan portfolios, while borrowers were eager to take advantage of the bans willingness to lend once more. Syndicated loans can provide large amounts of funding very quickly and easily. They guarantee confidentiality to the borrower, which may be critical if the customer raising funds for a acquisition or merger. Accordingly, by the middle to late 1990s, the revival in international syndicated lending had turned into a boom.The number of new syndicated loans hit a new record I 199697, amid increasingly fierce competition among banks to win the coveted (and lucrative) position of lead manager or agent. Spreads on loans to emerging market banks and subinvestment-grade European companies declined to unheard-of lows. Loans to Czech and South African bans, which would have been doe at around 1.0 percentage point above LIBOR just 18 months earlier, were made at just 0.2 percentage points above LIBOR in 1997. Price differentiation between top-grade and second-tier borrowers, according to some observers, declined to dangerously low levels. During 1997 the gap between spreads paid by developed country borrowers ad developing country borrowers almost disappeared. Partly because banks were so keen to win mandates from emerging market borrowers I order to establish new relationships, major mispricing of credit risk undoubtedly occurred. Bankers insist, though, that they demanded more ancillary, fee-based business to accompany the low-cost loans.Following the Asian financial crisis in 1997, the market for syndicated lending tightened up once more, and some of this mispricing has been corrected. In fact the latest development is the use of “market-flex” clauses to protect bankers against some of the risk involved in syndicated lending. These clauses, which were pioneered by Chase in 1997 and became increasingly popular I the next two years, allow lenders to alter the pricing or structure of the la as market condition fluctuate. During 1998 and 1999 spreads also rose sharply, especially on syndicated loans to emerging market countries such as those in Latin America. The strongly rated Chilean electric company, for example was able to borrow at LIBOR plus 0.25 percentage points in early 1998; by year-end, the spread had widened to 2.25 percentage points.In the first half of 1999, volumes in the syndicated loan market soared once more, fueled by a boom in European mergers and acquisitions. Syndicated lending has reemerged as the primary source of finance for mergers and acquisitions, especially in the European market; nearly half of the new syndicated loans worldwide in the first half of 1999 were denominated in the euro European, the new European currency introduced on January 1, 1999. Analysts expect the European syndicated loan market to continue expanding strongly, as long as merger and acquisition activity continues to expand.Project Finance Project Finance is somewhat less susceptible to the boom-bust cyclicity of syndicated lending, but it too experienced a sharp resurgence in the early to middle 1990s, followed by a dramatic in 1997-98. Project finance refers to financing for large-scale capital projects, which are generally very large in scale, log in term and high in risk. “Pure” project financing occurs when the debt is to be serviced only by cash flows attributable to the project itself, without recourse to the projects “sponsors”. The borrower is the project itself,. Thus project financing dose not appear o the balance sheet of the sponsors, and it does not affect their financial structure or creditworthiness.From the lenders point of view, project finance can be a risky proposition indeed. Since the projects are usually long term in nature, the debt maturities can stretch out even over several decades increasing the riskiness of the credit. Moreover, infrastructure tend to generate cash in local currency, creating currency risk for banks that are lending in dollars. Even worse, revenue earned by local infrastructure companies, such as power companies, may be artificially manipulated by politicians. Thus a central task of bankers involved in project finance is to identify and quantify the risks, and then to allocate them acceptably among the various participants in the project.A list of the risk associated with project finance would include the following:l Resource risk: the possibility that the oil, gas, or minerals expected to be in the ground will not be present in sufficient quantities to service the debt.l Input risk: the chance that the basic viability of the project will be threatened by the unavailability or high prices of key inputs such as energy or raw materials.l Completion risk: the risk that the project will be delayed indefinitely, resulting in substantial cost overruns.l Market risk: the risk that future demand for the product will decline.l Operating risk: the risk that even after the project becomes operational, costs will change or critical elements such as labor or transportation will be disrupted.l Force majeure: the possibility that-so-called ”acts of God” will occur to disrupt the project, ranging from warfare to weather.l Political risk: the possibility that political conditions surrounding the project will become adverse.l Regulatory risk: the risk that is represented to the projects completion by change in a governments rules and regulations pertaining to a certain industry. Such actions as tax hikes prohibition of certain activities, and opening a market up to additional competition may negatively affect the outcome of the project as well as jeopardize its ability to repay the loan.International project finance activity boomed the first half of the 1990s, reflecting deregulation, privatization, and rapid economic growth in emerging market countries. The value of loans and bonds raised without official guarantees soared by 53 percent in 1995 alone, driven largely by activity in Asia, where rapid growth was putting severe pressure on the power and transportation infrastructure. As in the syndicated loan market, margins on bank lending in this sector narrowed sharply as competition intensified, and bankers showed more willingness to assume some of the aforementioned risks. Also, as in the syndicated loan market, project finance activity slowed markedly following the financial crisis of 1997-98, especially in Asian and Latin American market.Trade FinanceMuch less “sexy”and much less riskythan syndications and project finance, trade finance is the breadand butter operation of international lending. Indeed, trade finance is the great-granddaddy of international banking. Prior to the 1960s, the international operations of U.S. banks were mostly limited to financing international trade. Even today, trade financing is an important revenue source for many international banks. The primary instrument of trade finance is the letter of credit(LC) which allows the credit of the bank to be substituted for that of the customer. An LC is a draft drawn by a company or individual on a bank, ordering it to pay a specified amount at a specified time accepted by the bank to a named individual (or the bearer). In effect, the bank promises that payment will be made on the specified date. This facilitates international trade between a buyer and seller who otherwise would not be willing to ship goods without some guarantee that payment will be made. Banks change a fee for LCs contingent liabilities most will never require the ban t make a payment.There are other types of LC as well. A standby letter of credit may be issued to reassure creditors that the bank will stand ready to make payment if the original borrower is unable. Companies routinely obtain standby LCs to back up their commercial paper offerings for instance. A performance letter of credit obliges the bank to guarantee that its customer will perform some service as required; if the customer fails to provide the service, the bank will be forced to make restitution. All letter of credit provide fee income for the bank.Commercial Paper Commercial paper, or CP, is a standard financing technique for U.S. corporations. It refers to short-term promissory notes issued by strong corporate borrowers to sophisticated investors, usually other corporations, pension funds, mutual funds, and banks . Most commercial paper is issued for very short maturities, typically 90 days, and is rolled over at maturity. The issuing corporations is expected to provide a commercial bank loan backup facility to support its paper in the (unlikely) event of a market disturbance that might disrupt rollovers. While the commercial paper market has its origins in the United States, a lively Euro commercial paper market has sprung up as well, primarily focused in London. Commercial paper is essentially a substitute for ban loans, although bankers do participate in the CP market both as underwriters and guarantors.附录二全球商业银行的功能信贷服务全球商业银行的最主要职能是接受存款并发放贷款。事实上，贷款是全球银行业务的基石。在海外市场上，银行可以通过自己的海外分行或附属行向当地顾客提供当地货币的贷款，资金主要来源于当地货币的存款和在当地货币市场上的借款。例如,德意志银行在墨西哥城的分行利用在当地吸纳的比索存款，向当地一家汽车制造厂商提供比索贷款。这是完全意义上的当地业务，在这一过程中德意志银行的竞争对手来自于本土银行或其他外资银行在当地的分行。与此相对，银行可以进行跨国界借款，即贷款人向所在国以外的借款人发放贷款，而且所贷货币是所在国本币之外的外币。根据美联储主席Alan Greenspan1998年的讲话，跨国界借款在此前的10年翻了一番。例如，德意志银行的伦敦分行可以向墨西哥城的同一家汽车制造厂商提供美元贷款。这一贷款的资金来源于德意志银行在全球范围的美元业务。所有的借款活动，无论是直接贷款还是辛迪加贷款，应该为银行产生收益。利息之间的差额就相当于贷款的毛利：它等于银行对贷款受到的利息减去它借款所付的利息利差收益应包括一般管理费用，风险管理费用和利润。借贷活动同时可以产生各种手续费。例如，有一种形式的贷款，称为循环贷款安排。此类贷款可以允许客户在商定的时期内在商定的利率安排之下，借贷或累积借贷某笔资金，借款总额到某一最高金额上限为止。这一利率安排通常以伦敦同业银行拆放利率，或称LIBOR(银行之间使用的在伦敦的美元存款的利率)为基础，再加上一个由借款者的信用级别决定的差额。比如，通用汽车公司的借款利率是LIBOR再加上0.25个百分点；而玻利维亚政府的借款利率可能高达LIBOR再加上3个百分点。因此，在循环信贷安排中，不管最终是否发放贷款，银行将为时刻准备贷款而收取承诺费。所以我们可以看到，银行可以从各种各样的贷款服务中收取费用，比如辛迪加贷款和信用证服务。辛迪加贷款安排辛迪加贷款是国际银行业的核心工具之一，银行广泛应用这种方式来满足顾客的大额或高风险的贷款要求。一项辛迪加贷款通常指一组银行同时向同一顾客发放的贷款，贷款期限相同。这样，原本对一家银行来讲过高的信贷风险就由数家银行一同来提供资金。此外辛迪加贷款安排可以使大中型的地方银行也参与到国际银行业务中来。辛迪加贷款一般需要签订一整套的合同文本和法律协议。例如，协议中要规定结算货币和所适用的法律，这样双方即使对簿公堂也有律可依；协议还要规定对所有的贷款人要一视同仁；此外，它还要规定，在政府作为借款人的情况下，要放弃其主权豁免（这意味着，如果需要的话，银行可以向政府提起诉讼）.辛迪加贷款(或银团贷款)可以为牵头银行或全体银行提供丰厚的手续费收入。总之，借款人将为未使用的信用额度支付承诺费，加上为使用的贷款支付的利息（通常是LIBOR加上一个利息差额），以及一笔代理费用。典型的做法是，一家或几家大银行作为牵头银行或代理银行，搜集有用的信息来判断借款者的信用级别，组织贷款，并把贷款份额再出售给其他参与的银行。牵头银行必须要有能力将贷款销售给其他金融机构，完成必要的组织工作并为之定价。大通曼哈顿（现在的J.P.摩根大通）在全球范围内的辛迪加贷款中一直占据主导地位，占有大约25%的市场份额。然而，辛迪加贷款分散风险的提法在20世纪80年代受到了严重的警告。例如，在局势动荡的拉美国家，国际银行贷款绝大部分都是辛迪加性质的，而且借款人大多是不成熟的区域性机构，对国际借款的必要技术所知寥寥，或干脆一无所知。参加辛迪加的银行大多严重依赖大银行所提供的信用分析，大银行固然技术上更加精熟，但谁也不知道他们掌握的借款人信息究竟有多大的准确度。因而，经历20世纪70年代的快速增长期之后，辛迪加贷款到1981年后逐渐近于枯竭也是意料之中的事情，这种贷款安排导致国际银行业花费很大一部分资源对新兴市场借款人进行债务重组。很多银行家在解读20世纪80年代发生在第三世界的债务危机时，都相信辛迪加贷款起到了推波助澜的作用。很多的小型，地区性银行都不堪重负，它们已经成为了国际债务重组过程中一个脆弱的链条。（当时路易斯安那或肯塔基的银行为什么要向巴西贷款呢？）到80年代中期，很多银行里的辛迪加贷款专家要么转行要么被解雇，而银行中的辛迪加贷款部门纷纷关门。在1988年巴塞尔协议对银行资本充足率作出规定后，国际银行监管规则趋于严格，使辛迪加贷款萎缩的过程加快。巴塞尔协议要求银行依据一套而且有争议的公式，对所放贷款保持一定的资本比率，这使国际银行业过了一段紧日子。在随后数年内，国际银行必须建立其资本基础，而且从向私人部门贷款变为主权贷款（向政府和公共部门贷款），后者所需的风险资本较少。因此，“俱乐部协议”在20世纪80年代末非常流行。与辛迪加贷款动辄涉及上百家甚至更多数目的银行相比，俱乐部协议只是由几家大银行协商实施。但是，当80年代过去，90年代来临时，辛迪加贷款犹如凤凰涅磐重新兴起。随着第三世界债务问题的解决，银行资本充足率水平又恢复正常，银行开始重新审视自己的贷款组合，同时借款人也想再次利用银行的贷款意愿而得到资金。辛迪加贷款能够快速简便地提供大量的资金；贷款银行为借款方保守秘密，如果借款的目的在于收购和兼并，保密的承诺就显得格外的重要。因此，到90年代中期，国际辛迪加贷款从复兴走向繁荣。银行之间为争夺令人艳羡而且利润丰厚的牵头或代理银行地位展开了激烈的竞争，因此新兴的辛迪加贷款总额到1996至1997年创造了纪录。同时对新兴市场银行和欧洲的次可投资级公司利差贷款低到了前所未闻的地步。以捷克和南非银行的贷款为例，18个月前的利率还是LIBOR加上1.0个百分点，到1997年已经低到了HIBOR加0.2个百分点。有观察家认为，当时最高信用级别和次一级别的借款者之间，贷款的价差已经低到了相当危险的地步。在1997年的亚洲金融危机后，辛迪加贷款市场再度趋于紧张。某种程度上这种定价差得到了纠正。实际上，市场上最近的发展是运用“市场调控”的法则来保护银行家们免受辛迪加贷款的风险。1997年该法则由大通曼哈顿银行首次提出，其后越发流行。其内容是允许贷款人按照市场条件的变化改变价格或贷款结构。在1998年到1999年贷款利差也急剧加大，在对拉美等新兴市场国家的辛迪加贷款之中这一点特别明显。以信用级别很高的智利电力公司为例，该公司在1998年初还可以按LIBOR加0.25个百分点来借款，到年底，利差竟达到了2.25个百分点。在1999年的下半年，受到欧洲兼并和收购活动的推动，辛迪加贷款的数量再次高涨。在全球，特别是欧洲市场，辛迪加贷款再次成为购并活动的主要融资资源；1999年1月1日，欧洲统一货币欧元诞生以后，该年度世界上几乎一半的辛迪加贷款是用欧元来完成的。分析家们认为：只要兼并收购活动继续，欧洲辛迪加贷款还将会强劲增长。项目融资相对于辛迪加贷款的膨胀收缩的周期效应，项目融资不太呈现大起大落的波动。但是从20世纪90年代初到90年代中期，项目融资也经历了一个迅速恢复，紧接着到19971998年又急剧收缩的过程。项目融资是指大型资本项目的融资，其通常特点是规模大，期限长而且风险高。“纯项目融资”是指只用项目本身产生的现金流来支付本息，而不需要向赞助商求助。此时的借款人是项目本身，所以项目融资不出现在赞助商的资产负债表上，也不影响赞助商的财务结构和信用级别。事实上，从贷款人的观点来看，可能认为项目融资的风险是相当大的。因为这些项目一般都具有长期性，债务期限可能长达几十年，必然会增加信用风险。此外，基础建设融资产生的现及流一般都是当地货币，这就给用美元借贷的银行增加了外汇风险。更有甚者，从当地基础建设比如电力公司中产生的利润收入，可能会受政客们操纵。因此参与项目融资的银行家必须以辨别和控制风险为中心任务，然后再把风险在项目的参与者之间进行合理的分配。和项目融资有关的风险包括以下种类：l 资源风险：指在资源开发项目中，底下蕴藏的石油，天然气或其他矿物没有达到偿还债务所需的储量。l 投入风险：指在开发项目中，由于主要投入的物资比如动力或原材料的价格过高或可使用的数量有限，导致项目的基本可行性受到影响。l 完成风险：指项目无限期拖延，导致成本大大超标。l 市场风险：未来产品的需求可能会下降。l 经营风险：此风险是指在项目投入运行后，项目成本可能发生变化，或像劳动力或运输等关键因素受到破坏。l 不可抗力：发生所谓“上帝的行为”（指从战争到天气等各种不可抗拒的因素），而导致项目运营被迫中断的可能。l 政治风险：指项目所处环境的政治条件发生不利变化的可能性。l 监管风险：由于与某一行业有关的政府法规和规定变化对项目的完成所构成的风险。例如税收的增加对某种活动的禁止以及对更多的竞争者开放市场等行动，都可能对项目的收益带来消极的影响或是危及项目的还贷能力。 20世纪90年代的上半叶，国际项目融资取得了很大的发展，这也反映了新兴市场国家的放松监管和私有化进程以及经济的快速发展。仅1995年一年间，非官方担保的贷款和债券的总价值增加了53%之多。其中亚洲的发展起了主要的促进作用，由于该地区的经济快速增长，也就给动力和运输基础设施的发展施加了巨大的压力。如同辛迪加贷款市场，银行借贷的利差随着竞争日趋激烈而急剧缩小，银行家对承担上述的某些风险也表现了更过的愿望。与辛迪加贷款市场的另一相同点是，在1997到1998的金融危机之后，项目融资的发展也明显减缓，在亚洲和拉美市场更是如此。贸易融资贸易金融远不如辛迪加贷款和项目融资那么迷人，当然风险也要小的多。贸易金融是国际金融领域的日常业务，实际上也是国际银行业的“祖师爷”。20世纪60年代以前，美国银行的国际业务大部分都局限于为国际贸易融资。直到今天对很多的国际银行来说，贸易金融仍是一个重要的利润来源。贸易金融的首要工具就是信用证（LC），它允许银行本身的信用被某位顾客的信用所替代。信用证是某个企业或个人向银行开具的书面文件，要求银行在银行接受的前提下，在某一特定时间向某
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